Jibowu v. Target Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2020
• Docket Number: 17-CV-3875 (PKC) (CLP)
• Citation: 492 F.Supp.3d 87
• Parties: Priscilla JIBOWU, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. TARGET CORPORATION and Target Corporation of Minnesota, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

492 F.Supp.3d 87

Priscilla JIBOWU, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.TARGET CORPORATION and Target Corporation of Minnesota, Defendants.

17-CV-3875 (PKC) (CLP)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed September 30, 2020

David A. Roth, Marc Scott Hepworth, Rebecca Solomon Predovan, Charles Gershbaum, Hepworth, Gershbaum & Roth, PLLC, Janine Kapp, New York City Law Department, Jessica S. Massimi, Jessica Massimi, Esq., New York, NY, Fran L. Rudich, Christopher MIchael Timmel, Seth R. Lesser, Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP, Rye Brook, NY, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey D. Wohl, Pro Hac Vice, Paul Hastings LLP, San Francisco, CA, Sara B. Tomezsko, Paul Hastings LLP, Caitlin Dorothy Brown, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, New York, NY, David James, Pro Hac Vice, Joel O'Malley, Pro Hac Vice, Joseph G. Schmitt, Pro Hac Vice, Nilan Johnson Lewis PA, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Priscilla Jibowu ("Plaintiff"), individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, brings this putative collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") against Defendants Target Corporation and Target Corporation of Minnesota, alleging overtime violations pursuant to the FLSA, New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), Illinois Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL"), and Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act ("IWPCA"). Before the Court are Defendant Target Corporation's motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification of a FLSA collective action.¹ For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification is granted subject to the limitations set forth in this Memorandum and Order.

BACKGROUND²

I. Target's Executive Team Leaders

Defendant Target Corporation ("Defendant" or "Target") is a national retailer with approximately 1,800 stores total and with stores in each of the 50 states. (Defendant's Rule 56.1 Statement ("Def.’s 56.1"),³ Dkt. 86-2, ¶ 1.) Some of these stores have annual sales volumes exceeding $100 million and workforces as large as several hundred employees. (Id. ¶ 2.) Each Target store has two salaried managerial positions: the senior-most Store Team Leader ("STL"), and some number of Executive Team Leaders ("ETLs"). (Id. ¶¶ 3–4.) At the time Plaintiff worked for Target, ETLs were staffed in departments such as Sales Floor—divided into Softlines and Hardlines in large-volume stores—Guest Services, Food Services, Logistics, and Replenishment. (Id. ¶ 5.) Target stores also employ "team leaders" and "team members," positions that are classified as non-exempt and paid on an hourly basis. (Id. ¶ 10.) Target classifies ETLs as exempt executives/administrators for purposes of the FLSA and state labor laws. (See id. ¶ 11.)

Upon hire or promotion to the ETL role, ETLs undergo six weeks of "Business College," which includes classroom and in-store training in leadership and management. (Id. ¶¶ 20–23.) As part of Business College, ETLs take wage-and-hour compliance training to reinforce the expectation that they do not spend more than half of their time on nonexempt, hourly tasks. (Id. ¶ 24.) After Business College, ETLs undergo twelve weeks of in-store training specific to their positions. (Id. ¶ 25.)

Target's job descriptions for the various ETL roles convey the expectation that ETLs spend the majority of their time on managerial duties. (Id. ¶ 26.) ETL duties are also generally summarized in Target's Exempt Team Member Handbook (the "Handbook"), which states that exempt employees are required to spend more than half of their time on managerial duties. (Id. ¶¶ 14–15; see also Handbook, Dkts. 86-12, 86-13, 86-14.) The Handbook also notes that exempt employees may "assist with hourly tasks on occasion," including "Zoning; Stocking; Cashiering; Unloading trailers, [and] moving boxes." (Def.’s 56.1, Dkt. 86-2, ¶¶ 16, 19.) In additional to their regular responsibilities, ETLs also work several shifts each week as their store's Leader on Duty ("LOD"), in which capacity they have additional oversight and managerial responsibilities over the entire store. (See id. ¶¶ 34–46.)

Target conducts annual performance reviews of its employees in its regular course of business. (Id. ¶ 48.) An ETL's annual review is conducted by their direct supervisor, who meets with the ETL to discuss the assessment. (Id. ¶ 50.) Since the mid-2000s, Target separately has conducted semi-annual or annual self-audits in order to determine whether ETLs spend more than half of their time on managerial duties. (Id. ¶ 53.)

II. Plaintiff Jibowu's Employment at Target

Plaintiff Jibowu began her employment at Target in July 2010 at a store in Wilson Yard, Chicago, where she worked as a guest services team member and then a human resources team leader. (Deposition of Priscilla Jibowu ("Jibowu Dep."), Dkt. 100-1, at 28:9–19.) Plaintiff worked at the Wilson Yard store for almost two years (id. at 27:22–28:1), after which she worked at another Target store in Chicago, located on State Street, from 2012 to the end of 2013 (id. at 29:25–30:9). On or around January 2014, Plaintiff was promoted to the position of ETL Replenishment when she transferred from the State Street store to a store in the West Loop neighborhood of Chicago. (Def.’s 56.1, Dkt. 86-2, ¶ 65; Jibowu Dep., Dkt. 100-1 at 30:15–31:1.) When she was promoted, Plaintiff underwent six weeks of training during which she shadowed another ETL. (Def.’s 56.1, Dkt. 86-2, ¶ 66; Jibowu Dep., Dkt. 100-1, at 149:11–25.) Plaintiff next worked as an ETL Replenishment in a Target store in South Loop, Chicago, for approximately two years. (Jibowu Dep., Dkt. 100-1, at 31:5–13.) Plaintiff also had temporary assignments at Chicago-area Target stores in Evanston and Near North. (Id. at 31:14–25.) In August 2016, Plaintiff moved to Brooklyn, New York, where she worked as an ETL Sales Floor at Target's Brooklyn locations in Flatbush, Atlantic Terminal, and Gateway. (Id. at 35:22–37:14.) Plaintiff quit her employment at Target on or around October 20, 2017 in order to develop her career elsewhere. (Id. at 196:15–20, 200:20–24.)

III. Relevant Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced the instant action on June 28, 2017 (see Complaint ("Compl."), Dkt. 1), and Defendants answered on August 7, 2017 (Dkt. 13). On April 19, 2019, Defendant Target requested a pre-motion conference on its anticipated motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 67.) On May 22, 2019, the Court held a pre-motion conference and set a briefing schedule⁴ both for Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification of a FLSA collective action and Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (May 22, 2019 Minute Entry.) Defendant's motion for summary judgment was fully briefed on September 6, 2019 (Dkts. 86, 88, 89), and Plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification was fully briefed on September 10, 2019 (Dkts. 79, 91, 92).

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where the submissions of the parties, taken together, "show[ ] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (noting that summary judgment inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"). A dispute of a material fact is "genuine" if "the [record] evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The initial "burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact" rests with the moving party. Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep't , 613 F.3d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). Once this burden is met, however, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to put forward some evidence establishing the existence of a question of fact that must be resolved at trial. Spinelli v. City of New York , 579 F.3d 160, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A mere "scintilla of evidence" in support of the non-moving party is insufficient; rather, "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y. , 352 F.3d 733, 743 (2d Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). In other words, "[t]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Caldarola v. Calabrese , 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and emphasis omitted).

When assessing whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc. , 542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). The Court also construes any disputed facts "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ). However, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis omitted).

II. Executive Exemption to Overtime Pay

Defendant Target moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff Jibowu's FLSA, NYLL, and IMWL overtime claims, arguing that there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff's ETL roles fell within the bona fide executive exemption to...