Jicha v. Karns

• Decision Date: 28 June 1968
• Citation: 39 Wis.2d 676,159 N.W.2d 691
• Parties: George J. JICHA, Appellant, v. James L. KARNS, Admr. Division of Motor Vehicles, Wis. Dept. of Transportation, Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 691

159 N.W.2d 691

39 Wis.2d 676

George J. JICHA, Appellant, v. James L. KARNS, Admr. Division of Motor Vehicles, Wis. Dept.

of Transportation, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 28, 1968.

From this judgment the appellant, George J. Jicha, appeals.

John W. Flood, Wausaukee, for appellant.

Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., Richard E. Barrett and E. Gordon Young, Asst. Attys. Gen., Madison, for respondent.

BEILFUSS, Justice.

The question presented in this appeal is whether the administrator's revocation of a chauffeur's license upon a conviction for operating a motor vehicle after revocation of regular driving privileges is a ministerial act and not subject to review.

The following statutory provisions are the subject of the controversy:

'343.31 Mandatory revocation of licenses after certain convictions. (1) The commissioner shall forthwith revoke a person's operating privilege upon receiving a record of conviction showing that such person has been convicted of any of the following offenses under a state law or under a local ordinance which is in conformity therewith, except that if a person licensed as a chauffeur was convicted for operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and such person was not operating a vehicle as a chauffeur at the time of such offense, only his regular license shall be revoked as provided in this section but his chauffeur's license shall be suspended for 15 days:

'* * *

'(f) Operating a motor vehicle while operating privileges are suspended or revoked.

'* * *

'(3) All revocations under this section shall be for a period of one year.'

'340.01(40) 'Operating privilege' means, in the case of a person who is licensed under ch. 343, every license so granted to such person; in the case of a resident of this state who is not so licensed, it means the privilege to secure a license under ch. 343; in the case of a nonresident, it means the operating privilege granted by s. 343.05(2)(c).'

'343.32 Other grounds for revocation of licenses. (1) * * *

'(2) The commissioner may suspend or revoke a person's operating privilege if such person appears by the record of the department to be an habitually reckless or negligent operator * * *. In regard to convictions which are not by themselves grounds for mandatory revocation of a license, such rule shall provide that demerit points accumulated when a person is not operating a vehicle as a chauffeur shall not be counted against his chauffeur's license but such rule may provide that demerit points accumulated by a person when operating a vehicle as a chauffeur shall be counted against his regular license. When a person who has had his regular license revoked continues to operate as a private operator and who also a chauffeur's license and is convicted of any traffic violation, 12 demerit points shall be assigned against his chauffeur's license.'

The appellant's argument in substance is that the last sentence of sec. 343.32(2), Stats., is the governing statute and that it requires not only the operator be apprehended driving as a private operator after revocation of his regular license, but also that he be convicted of a traffic violation. Appellant contends this statutory provision and sec. 343.31 are in direct conflict. The last sentence of sec. 343.32(2) was enacted in 1959, several years after the enactment of sec. 343.31, and appellant submits the later enacted statute must supersede the earlier enacted provisions.

This argument would prevail if the two statutes were in conflict and could not be reconciled. However, repeal or amendment by implication is not favored if they can be reconciled.

'The law does not favor a repeal of an older statute by a later one by mere implication. As said in Winslow v. Morton, 118 N.C. 486, 491, 24 S.E. 417: 'The implication, in order to be operative must be necessary, and if it arises out of repugnancy between the two acts, the later abrogates the older only to the extent that it is inconsistent and irreconcilable with it. (Citing cases.) A later and an older statute will, if it is possible and reasonable to do so, be always construed together, so as to give effect not only to the distinct parts or provisions of the latter, not inconsistent with the new law, but to give effect to the older law as a whole, subject only to restrictions or modifications of its meaning, where...