Jideofor v. City of Minneapolis Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 07 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-cv-1686 (KMM/TNL) |
| Parties | Okwuchukwu E. Jidoefor, Plaintiff, v. City of Minneapolis Police Department; The 3rd Precinct, and its Officers; Kehung Anderson; John Does Officers #1-10; and Freedom Specialty Insurance Company; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Plaintiff Okwuchukwu E. Jidoefor commenced this action on June 29, 2022 by filing a complaint and an application to proceed without paying fees or costs, also known as an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”). On October 11, 2022, United States Magistrate Judge Tony N Leung recommended dismissing the Complaint's federal claims for failure to state a claim, dismissing the state claims for lack of jurisdiction, and denying the IFP application as moot. Mr. Jidoefor timely objected to that report and recommendation (“R&R”). [ECF No 14.] Having reviewed the R&R, the objections, and the entire case file, the Court overrules Mr. Jidoefor's objections, accepts the R&R, denies the IFP application and dismisses the action.
The R&R thoroughly and accurately discusses the factual history of this proceeding and its predecessor. The Court adopts the R&R's proposed findings and summarizes them here to provide relevant context for the discussion of Mr. Jidoefor's objections.
This case is the sequel to an earlier lawsuit between Mr. Jidoefor and Defendant Freedom Specialty Insurance Company (“FSIC”). Jidoefor sued FSIC in 2016 for allegedly breaching an insurance policy that Jidoefor claimed applied to the theft of 39 vehicles from his business. Jidoefor v. Freedom Specialty Insurance Co., No. 16-CV-1109 (PAM/FLN) (D. Minn. Apr. 27, 2016). FSIC counterclaimed that Jidoefor had, in fact, allegedly sold the vehicles but never transferred the titles and was thus directing an insurance fraud scheme. [R&R at 2.] During the pretrial phase of that lawsuit, FSIC sought Jidoefor's jail calls to prove its counterclaim. [Id. at 2-3.]
Before the motion seeking the jail calls could be fully litigated, both parties agreed to a stipulated dismissal. The stipulation dismissed the case on the merits and specified that there was no admission of guilt or liability. [Id. at 4.] Judge Paul Magnuson dismissed the case with prejudice as stipulated. [Id.]
However, four years after that first case was dismissed, Mr. Jidoefor appealed to the Eighth Circuit. [Id.] That appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Jidoefor v. Freedom Specialty Ins. Co., No. 21-2331 (8th Cir. filed June 16, 2021). After the appeal was dismissed, Mr. Jidoefor attempted to relitigate the insurance dispute with FSIC in state court, but those cases were removed to federal court and dismissed based on res judicata. See Jidoefor v. Freedom Specialty Ins. Co., No. 21-CV-01609 (ECT/ECW), 2021 WL 6052517 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 2021).
This litigation is another offshoot of the previous FSIC litigation. In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Jidoefor brings his claims against the City of Minneapolis Police Department, the Minneapolis Police Department's Third Precinct and the officers stationed there, Kehung Anderson, a group of unnamed “John Doe” police officers, and FSIC. [Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 8.] Mr. Jidoefor asserts that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because the dispute involves a federal question.[1] [Id. at 2.] Jidoefor alleges principally that FSIC knowingly filed false information in support of its motion seeking his jail calls, then lied to him and his attorneys about the information in FSIC's possession to pressure Jidoefor to agree to the stipulated dismissal in the 2016-17 case. [Id.] Mr. Jidoefor also makes several ancillary claims supporting this main claim, including violations of federal laws, constitutional provisions, and state-law claims. [Id.]
Reviewing the pleadings pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the R&R concluded that none of Mr. Jidoefor's federal claims plausibly stated a claim for relief and should be dismissed. As a result, the R&R further recommended that the Court should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the IFP application should be denied as moot.
The R&R first construed Mr. Jidoefor's reference to “Federal Liability Tort Claim” as having asserted claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80. The R&R found none of the defendants are federal employees, and therefore, the FTCA does not apply. See Christpherson v. Bushner, 33 F.4th 495, 499 (8th Cir. 2022) ().
The R&R next turned to Jidoefor's invocation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and observed that § 1983 does not provide a substantive cause of action on its own but provides a vehicle to bring claims under distinct federal constitutional provisions. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002). With respect to Mr. Jidoefor's equal-protection claim, the R&R noted that a plaintiff must allege that they have been arbitrarily classified into members of an identifiable group, and then been treated unequally on the basis of that classification. See Engquist v. Ore. Dep't of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008). Alternatively, plaintiffs may allege they were classified into “class of one” where they were irrationally singled out individually, even from those who are similarly situated. See Higgins Elec., Inc. v. O'Fallon Fire Prot. Dist., 813 F.3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 2016). The R&R concluded that Mr. Jidoefor failed to raise either type of equal-protection argument since he does not allege that anyone classified him into a group, nor that he was singled out from similarly situated individuals. And last, the R&R recommended dismissal of Mr. Jidoefor's Eighth Amendment claim because its provisions do not apply to this case.
Having concluded that the Amended Complaint asserts no plausible claims arising under federal law, the R&R observed that the pleading contains references to quintessential state-law claims such as fraud, tortious interference, and breach of contract. Because the federal claims were found deficient, and there was no independent basis for jurisdiction over those state claims, the R&R recommends declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Consequently, the R&R recommended dismissal of these state claims without prejudice.
Much of the substance in Mr. Jidoefor's objections to the R&R appears to restate allegations from the Amended Complaint. Other statements reference the Federal Rules of Evidence (mostly the rules concerning hearsay) and purport to “put Defendant to proof.” For reasons discussed below, these are not proper bases for objections to the R&R.
The Court construes the remainder of Mr. Jidoefor's objections as raising three challenges to Magistrate Judge Leung's analysis in the R&R. First, he argues that the R&R mishandled the Equal Protection claim and asserts that he was discriminated against on the basis of his alienage. Second, he raises an argument that his § 1983 claim is adequately pled because officer Anderson and other police officers acted under color of law to deprive Jidoefor of his rights. And third, he contends that the state-law claims would be supported by diversity jurisdiction even in the absence of any federal question.[2]
The Court reviews de novo any portion of the R&R to which specific objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b). In the absence of objections, the Court reviews the R&R for clear error. Nur v. Olmsted County, 563 F.Supp.3d 946, 949 (D. Minn. 2021) (). District court judges “may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). Additionally, a “party cannot, in his objections to an R & R, raise arguments that were not clearly presented to the magistrate judge.” Hammann v. 1-800 Ideas.com, Inc., 455 F.Supp.2d 942, 947-48 (D. Minn. 2006) (citing Roberts v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 466, 470 (8th Cir. 2000)). Because Mr. Jidoefor is self-represented, his objections are entitled to a liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Applying these standards, the Court finds no error with the R&R's findings and conclusions.
Mr. Jidoefor's objections invoking the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply here because pleadings requirements are more favorable to plaintiffs than evidentiary standards. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (). Both the Magistrate Judge and this Court have read all Mr. Jidoefor's allegations as true and taken reasonable inferences in his favor. Gorog v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 760 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2014). (discussing dismissal standard).
Objections even when liberally construed for pro se litigants, must direct the district court to alleged errors. The Eighth Circuit has identified (1) reciting portions of the R&R to which the objection is made, and (2) setting out correct facts and rulings by referencing appropriate transcripts as a sufficient basis for pro se objections. Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995). The portions of Mr. Jidoefor's objections that restate allegations from the Amended Complaint do not meet this liberal standard and do...
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