Jiggetts v. Maryland

• Decision Date: 11 January 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action SAG-23-63
• Parties: ALEXANDER JIGGETTS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF MARYLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL ANTHONY BROWN, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

ALEXANDER JIGGETTS, Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL ANTHONY BROWN, Defendants.

Civil Action No. SAG-23-63

United States District Court, D. Maryland

January 11, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On January 9, 2023, this court received the above-entitled complaint filed by self-represented plaintiff Alexander Jiggetts. Mr. Jiggetts did not pay the filing fee, nor has he included a motion to proceed in forma pauperis with his filing but includes a request for appointment of counsel^[1] and for recusal of the undersigned judge. Because the complaint is frivolous, it must be dismissed.

Mr. Jiggetts is suing Maryland's Attorney General for the right to practice law without a license. He explains that he intends to open a non-profit organization for the purpose of providing free legal advice to prisoners and people who cannot afford an attorney. Additionally, he states that this organization would assist people who have been released from prison by providing them with cash, housing, and other resources so they will not succumb to the “harsh street life.” ECF 1 at 1. Mr. Jiggetts asserts that he is qualified to run such an organization by virtue of his “experiences in the streets,” his diploma, and his “knowledge of how the state and Federal courts work.” Id. In Mr. Jiggetts' view, he has a First Amendment right to give legal advice without being licensed to practice law. Id. at 2.

1

Mr. Jiggetts includes a letter addressed to Chief Judge Bredar asking that both Judge Rubin and the undersigned judge be excluded from assignment to this case. ECF 1-1. The basis for his request for recusal is his belief that female judges cannot be impartial when reviewing his claims because of “allegiance to women's rights” and past decisions dismissing his complaints. Id. Recusal can be considered whenever a party to any proceeding files a sufficient affidavit stating that the judge before whom a case is assigned has a personal bias or prejudice either against that party or in favor of another party. 28 U.S.C. § 144. A motion for recusal must also be accompanied by a certificate stating that the motion is made in good faith. Another section of the code, 28 U.S.C. § 455, requires a federal judge to recuse herself “in any proceeding in which h[er] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Any alleged bias “must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from h[er] participation in the case.” Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)). Due process may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge has no actual bias if, for instance, “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” See Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 285, 137 S.Ct. 905, 907 (2017) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). Mr. Jiggetts' request for recusal does not include any cognizable basis; his own personal bias against female jurists, while unfortunate, will not be accommodated by this court. His request is denied.

This court recognizes its obligation to liberally construe pleadings filed by self-represented parties. See Ericson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Liberal...