Jiles v. Archer

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: RUTH C. BALKIN
• Citation: Jiles v. Archer, 2014 NY Slip Op 2262, 116 A.D.3d 664, 983 N.Y.S.2d 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)
• Decision Date: 02 April 2014
• Parties: Tawanna N. JILES, appellant, v. Alana ARCHER, et al., respondents.

116 A.D.3d 664

983 N.Y.S.2d 283

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 02262

Tawanna N. JILES, appellant,

v.Alana ARCHER, et al., respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

April 2, 2014.

Silberzweig & Sznitken, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Neil Sznitken of counsel), for appellant.

Fidelity National Law Group, New York, N.Y. (Don Davis of counsel and Anthony Prisco, former of counsel, on the brief), for respondent U.S. Bank National Association.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., SANDRA L. SGROI, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.

In an action pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to compel the determination of claims to real property, and for a judgment declaring that the plaintiff is the owner of the subject property and that the defendant U.S. Bank National Association has no interest in the subject property, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (McDonald, J.), entered January 2, 2013, which, upon a decision of the same court dated February 14, 2012, made after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.

ORDERED that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal from the decision is deemed to be a premature notice of appeal from the judgment ( seeCPLR 5520[c] ); and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the facts, with costs, the complaint is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for the entry of an appropriate amended judgment, inter alia, declaring that the plaintiff is the owner of the subject property and the defendant U.S. Bank National Association has no interest in the subject property.

The plaintiff entered into an arrangement with her cousin, Gregory Wynn, to purchase certain residential property in Queens County. In July 2002, the property was purchased in the plaintiff's name. To finance the purchase, the plaintiff obtained a $180,000 loan from a mortgage lender. She did not contribute any money to the purchase, did not intend to reside there, had never visited the property, and did not speak to the tenants who occupied the property. She authorized Wynn to manage the property and pay the mortgage and other property costs with rental income, and Wynn retained any remaining rental income as a commission. The mortgage was satisfied in February 2004, without any contribution from the plaintiff.

In April 2006, a deed purportedly was executed by the plaintiff conveying her interest in the property to the defendant Alana Archer. To finance the purchase, Archer obtained a $500,000 mortgage loan from First Franklin. In November 2006, the mortgage was assigned to the defendant U.S. Bank National Association (hereinafter U.S. Bank). Archer subsequently defaulted in paying the mortgage, and U.S. Bank commenced a mortgage foreclosure action against her.

The plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to compel the determination of claims to the property and for a judgment declaring that she is the lawful owner of the property. She alleged that the 2006 deed was a forgery and was, therefore, void, and the mortgage held by U.S. Bank was invalid. After this action was commenced, pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure in the action by U.S. Bank against Archer, U.S. Bank purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and obtained a referee's deed purporting to convey the property to it.

Following a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court found that the 2006 deed was a forgery, but the plaintiff was barred from seeking equitable relief because she had unclean hands in the purchase and sale of the property. The court dismissed the complaint, and the plaintiff appeals.

In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this Court is as broad as that of the trial court, and it may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses ( see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v. Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492, 499, 470 N.Y.S.2d 350, 458 N.E.2d 809;Parr v. Ronkonkoma Realty Venture I, LLC, 65 A.D.3d 1199, 1201, 885 N.Y.S.2d 522).

“A deed based on forgery or obtained by false pretenses is void ab initio, and a mortgage based on such a deed is likewise invalid” ( Cruz v. Cruz, 37 A.D.3d 754, 754, 832 N.Y.S.2d 217;see ABN AMRO Mtge. Group, Inc. v. Stephens, 91 A.D.3d 801, 803, 939 N.Y.S.2d 70;First Natl. Bank of Nev. v. Williams, 74 A.D.3d 740, 742, 904 N.Y.S.2d 707;GMAC Mtge. Corp. v. Chan, 56 A.D.3d 521, 522, 867 N.Y.S.2d 204). “If a document purportedly conveying a property interest is void, it conveys nothing, and a subsequent bona fide purchaser or bona fide encumbrancer for value receives nothing” ( ABN AMRO Mtge. Group, Inc. v. Stephens, 91 A.D.3d at 803, 939 N.Y.S.2d 70;see Marden v. Dorthy, 160 N.Y. 39, 48, 54 N.E. 726;Solar Line, Universal Great Bhd., Inc. v. Prado, 100 A.D.3d 862, 863–864, 955 N.Y.S.2d 96;First Natl. Bank of Nev. v. Williams, 74 A.D.3d at 741,...