Jiles v. Schuster Co.

• Decision Date: 14 November 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:17-CV-0894-SRB
• Citation: 357 F.Supp.3d 908
• Parties: Jesse JILES, Plaintiff, v. SCHUSTER CO., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

357 F.Supp.3d 908

Jesse JILES, Plaintiff,

v.SCHUSTER CO., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:17-CV-0894-SRB

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division.

Signed November 14, 2018

Ronald L. Edelman, Chad Stewart, Edelman & Thompson, L.L.C., Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff.

Michael C. Kirkham, Matthew D. Quandt, Sanders, Warren, Russell & Scheer LLP-OPKS, Overland Park, KS, for Defendants.

ORDER

STEPHEN R. BOUGH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before this Court is Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 25). For reasons explained below, the motion is denied.

I. Background

On November 1, 2016, Plaintiff Jesse Jiles was involved in an automobile accident with Defendant Scott Stafford, who at the time was driving a truck owned by Defendant Schuster Co. Plaintiff originally brought this action in Missouri state court, asserting claims of negligence, negligent entrustment, and negligent hiring and supervision. (Doc. # 1-1, pp. 2–7). The case was then removed to this Court on the basis of diversity. (Doc. # 1, p. 1). In their Amended Joint and Separate Answer, Defendants assert as an affirmative defense that "[p]ursuant to [Mo. Rev. Stat.] § 303.390, Plaintiff was an uninsured motorist at the time of the accident and is therefore barred from collecting non-economic damages from the insured." (Doc. # 22, ¶ 49).

Defendants now move for partial summary judgment, invoking Mo. Rev. Stat. § 303.390 to bar Plaintiff from claiming and recovering noneconomic damages. (Doc. # 26, p. 3). It is undisputed that Plaintiff was an uninsured driver at the time of the accident, that Plaintiff's prior automobile insurance policy had lapsed over nine months before the time of the accident, and that Defendants were insured at the time of the accident. (Doc. # 25, pp. 1–2; Doc. # 27, pp. 2–3). Plaintiff's main argument against partial summary judgment is purely legal: Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of noneconomic damages because the express language of § 303.390 would prohibit Plaintiff from recovering noneconomic damages and thus would violate his right to a jury trial under the Missouri Constitution.

II. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires a court to grant summary judgment on a claim or defense—or any part of a claim or defense—if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the district court the basis for its motion and pointing to portions of the record which the moving party "believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Moore v. Martin , 854 F.3d 1021, 1025 (8th Cir. 2017). "In both Rule 56 motions for summary judgment and Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of law, the inquiry is the same: Whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Linden v. CNH Am., LLC , 673 F.3d 829, 834 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Kinserlow v. CMI Corp. , 217 F.3d 1021, 1025 (8th Cir. 2000) ).

B. State Law in Federal Courts

A federal court interpreting a given state's law is "bound by decisions" of that state's highest court. Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. McDonough , 608 F.3d 388, 390 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Minn. Supply Co. v. Raymond Corp. , 472 F.3d 524, 534 (8th Cir. 2006) ). If a state's highest court has not decided the state-law issue, the federal court "must attempt to predict how the highest court would resolve the issue ...." Id. When determining this prediction, a federal court is "not bound to follow the decisions of intermediate state courts ...." First Tenn. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Pathfinder Expl. LLC , 754 F.3d 489, 490–91 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Morris , 976 F.2d 1189, 1196 (8th Cir. 1992) ). A federal court may, however, look to a given state's intermediate courts for persuasive authority, and "state appellate court decisions are highly persuasive." Id. District courts in the Eighth Circuit follow intermediate state court decisions "when they are best evidence of [state] law," disregarding such decisions only when "convinced by other persuasive data that the highest state court would decide ... otherwise." Id. at 491 (quoting United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Garvey , 328 F.3d 411, 413 (8th Cir. 2003) ). Similarly, state trial court decisions are "persuasive, particularly when" such decisions "deal with subjects peculiarly within the knowledge and experience of state courts." Pro Edge, L.P. v. Gue , 374 F.Supp.2d 711, 731 n.8 (N.D. Ia. 2005) (quoting Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. Russell , 167 F.Supp. 304, 310 (D. Ark. 1958) ).

C. Missouri Constitutional Right to Jury Trial and Mo. Rev. Stat. § 303.390

Missouri courts presume that a Missouri statute is constitutional and will not hold it unconstitutional "unless it clearly contravenes" a provision of the Missouri Constitution. Id. at 636 (quoting Rentschler v. Nixon , 311 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Mo. banc 2010) ). The challenging party has the burden of proving that the statute at issue "clearly and undoubtedly" violates the Missouri Constitution. Id. Missouri courts adhere to the principle that "if one interpretation of a statute results in the statute being constitutional while another interpretation would cause it to be unconstitutional, the constitutional interpretation is presumed to have been intended." Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc. , 821 S.W.2d 822, 838–39 (Mo. banc 1991) (citing Rust v. Sullivan , 500 U.S. 173, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ).

Missouri's constitution provides that "the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate ...." MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a). "The right to a civil jury trial is a personal right and, therefore, it may be waived." Badahman v. Catering St. Louis , 395 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Mo. banc 2013) (quoting Malan Realty Investors, Inc. v. Harris , 953 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Mo. banc 1997) ). Missouri courts have established a two-prong analysis for deciding whether a statute violates this right. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs. , 376 S.W.3d 633, 642 (Mo. banc 2012). First, the language "heretofore enjoyed" requires a court to determine whether a plaintiff's cause of action is of a type that would have entitled the plaintiff to a jury trial when Missouri's constitution was originally adopted in 1820. Id. at 637–38. If so, the court must determine whether that right "remain[s] inviolate" when the challenged statutory limit "requires courts to reduce the jury's verdict." Id. at 638. "Inviolate" for purposes of Missouri's constitutional right to jury trial "means ‘free from change or blemish, pure or unbroken.’ " Id. (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1190 (1993) ). Therefore, prong two of Watts requires courts to determine whether the challenged statute "changes the common law right to a jury determination of damages." Id. If so, "the right to trial by jury does not ‘remain inviolate’ and the cap is unconstitutional." Id.

Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 303.390.1, an uninsured driver "shall waive the ability to have a cause of action or otherwise collect for noneconomic loss against a person who is in compliance with the financial responsibility laws of this chapter due to a motor vehicle accident in which the insured driver is alleged to be at fault." The statute further provides that, "[i]n an action against a person who is in compliance with the financial responsibility laws prescribed by this chapter by a person deemed to have waived recovery" of noneconomic damages, "[a]ny award in favor of such person shall be reduced by an amount equal to the portion of the award representing compensation for noneconomic losses" and "[t]he trier of fact shall not be informed, directly or indirectly, of such waiver or of its effect on the total amount of such person's recovery." § 303.390.3(1)–(2). Neither the Supreme Court of Missouri nor Missouri's intermediate appellate courts have addressed whether § 303.390 violates Missouri's constitutional right to jury trial. Several Missouri circuit courts, however, have addressed this issue.

III. Discussion

A. No Narrower Grounds for Decision

The parties raise two arguments that, if applicable in this case, would allow this Court to decide the present motion without ruling on whether the challenged state statute violates that state's constitution. Neither argument provides the Court a pathway to decision. This Court cannot decline to decide the state-law issue raised in this motion on abstention grounds, as Defendants suggests in their reply brief,¹ nor can this Court base its decision on the narrower statutory ground that Plaintiff suggests in his opposition brief.² Because this Court lacks a basis to apply the abstention doctrines or to decide the motion on narrower statutory grounds, this Court must predict whether the Supreme Court of Missouri would hold that § 303.390 violates the Missouri Constitution.

B. Section 303.390 Violates Missouri's Constitutional Right to Jury Trial

Defendants argue that this statute bars Plaintiff from recovering noneconomic damages against them. Anticipating that "Plaintiff's only argument will be that he did not need to comply with the statute" because it violates his rights under the Missouri Constitution, Defendants argue that § 303.390 is consistent with the Missouri Constitution. (Doc. # 26, p. 6). In particular, Defendants anticipate Plaintiff's reliance on Watts and distinguish it from the present case. (Doc. # 26, pp. 8–9). Plaintiff argues that § 303.390 violates Missouri's constitutional right to jury trial because it is analogous to the statute that the Supreme Court of Missouri struck down in Watts for violation...