Jill G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 17 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-CV-766 (JLS) |
| Parties | JILL G.[1], Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Matthew G. brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (“Act”), seeking review of the decision made by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) finding that he was not disabled. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 10. The Commissioner responded and cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings, to which Plaintiff replied. Dkts. 12, 13. Plaintiff Matthew G. passed away, and on June 24, 2022, his mother, Jill G., was substituted as Plaintiff under Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. 15. For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiffs motion and grants the Commissioner's crossmotion.
This action originates from Matthew's application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and his application for Title XIV Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), both filed on March 22 2017.[2] Tr. 177-80.[3] Matthew alleged that he had been disabled since October 31, 2016 due to the following condition: type 1 diabetes, depression, panic disorder post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) substance abuse disorder, traumatic brain injury (“TBI”), and a peptic ulcer. Tr. 6869. Matthew's application was initially denied, and he requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Tr. 90-99, 100-08.
Following the hearing, in which Matthew was represented by counsel, ALJ V. Paul McGinn issued a decision finding that Matthew was not disabled. Tr. 15-32. Matthew's request for Appeals Council review was denied, after which he commenced this action. Tr. 1-6; Dkt. 1.
I. District Court Review
Judicial review of disability claims under the Act is limited to whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013). The Commissioner's factual findings are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. See Estrella v Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2019). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
While the Court does not determine de novo whether the claimant is disabled, the Commissioner's conclusions of law are not given the same deferential standard of review. See Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003). If there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, then upholding the determination “creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have his disability determination made according to correct legal principles.” Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987); see Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)) ( that the Court's review for legal error ensures “that the claimant has had a full hearing under the . . . regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the . . . Act.”).
Disability under the Act is determined under a five-step test. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1986); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). “Substantial work activity” is work activity that involves significant physical or mental activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a). If the ALJ finds that the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claimant cannot claim disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).
Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Absent such impairment, the claimant may not claim disability. Id.
Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant meets or medically equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(c); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525, 404.1526. If such criteria are met, then the claimant is declared disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.920(d).
Even if the claimant is not declared disabled under the third step, the ALJ may still find disability under the next two steps of the analysis. The ALJ must determine the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The RFC is a holistic assessment of the claimant's medical impairments, both severe and non-severe, that evaluates the claimant's ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for collective impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
In the fourth step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the RFC to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b)(3), 416.960(b)(3). If the ALJ finds that the claimant is unable to perform past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1).
In this final analytical step, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant is able to perform any other relevant work corresponding with his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c), 416.960(c). Here, the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the ALJ to prove that a significant number of jobs in the national economy exist that the claimant can perform given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c), 416.920(g), 416.960(c); see Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).
The ALJ determined that Matthew had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of October 31, 2016. Tr. 18. He also found that Matthew suffered from the following severe impairments: substance use disorder, diabetes mellitus type I, depression, and anxiety. Tr. 18. The ALJ further found that Matthew's impairments, including his substance use disorder, met Listing 12.04 for Depressive, Bipolar, and Related Disorders and Listing 12.06 for Anxiety and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders under 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 24.
The ALJ, however, concluded that Matthew's substance use was a contributing factor material to the disability determination and that his remaining limitations would not cause more than a minimal impact on his ability to perform basic work activities if his substance use ended. Tr. 26-31. Therefore, according to the ALJ, Matthew was not entitled to DIB or SSI at any time following the alleged onset date of October 31, 2016. Tr. 31.
Plaintiff makes three arguments for judgment in her favor. See Dkt. 10-1 at 1. First, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's finding that Matthew had no severe physical impairments was unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. at 15. Second, she claims that the ALJ improperly evaluated the relationship between Matthew and Licensed Clinical Social Worker (“LCSW”) Daniel V. Norton. Id. at 18. Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly concluded that Matthew's substance use disorder was a contributing factor material to the disability determination. Id. at 22. As set forth below, Plaintiffs arguments are without merit.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred at step two in finding Matthew's TBI and carpal tunnel and cubital tunnel syndrome to be non-severe impairments. Dkt. 10-1 at 15.
The claimant bears the burden of establishing severity at step two. Felix S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., F.Supp.3d No. 20-CV-06703, 2022 WL 4486319, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2022) (quoting Taylor v. Astrue, 32 F.Supp.3d 253, 265 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)). This requirement is de minimis and is intended only to screen out the weakest of claims. McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 151 (2d Cir. 2014). The “mere presence of a disease or impairment, or establishing that person has been diagnosed or treated for a disease or impairment” is insufficient to establish severity. Felix S., 2022 WL 4486319, at *3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To be severe, an impairment “must cause more than minimal limitations in [a claimant's] ability to perform work-related functions.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Matthew sustained a TBI on March 20, 2017 from an “intoxicated fall from standing.” Tr. 694. The ALJ found Matthew's TBI to be non-severe because it resulted in a hospitalization lasting less than thirty days and because Matthew was cleared to work and drive by January 4, 2018. Tr 24, 694, 795. The ALJ did note, however, that Matthew experienced a “brief exacerbation of symptoms following his TBI” while seeing Christopher D. Radziwon, Ph.D., between June and August 2017. Tr. 22 (citing Tr. 666-67, 774-80). The ALJ pointed to a lack of evidence relating to Matthew's carpal tunnel and cubital tunnel syndrome prior to March 5, 2019, and he found that the impairment did not meet ...
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