Jill v. Placer County

• Decision Date: 31 July 2003
• Docket Number: C041514.
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: JILL N., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PLACER COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents.

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JILL N., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PLACER COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents.

C041514.

Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District.

Filed July 31, 2003.

Placer. Super. Ct. No. SCV11814.

SCOTLAND, P. J.

Plaintiff Jill N. appeals from judgments of dismissal entered in favor of defendants Placer County (the County), Edward Bonner, and Randy Hall, in plaintiff's action for damages. At all relevant times, defendant Bonner was the Sheriff of Placer County.¹ When the incident that gave rise to this litigation occurred, defendant Hall was a deputy sheriff assigned as a detective.

The judgments of dismissal followed orders sustaining demurrers based upon plaintiff's failure to file a timely claim as required by the California Tort Claims Act. (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) Plaintiff contends her claim was timely and that, in any event, application of the claim presentation requirement violates principles of equal protection. Defendants argue we should dismiss the appeal because plaintiff's contentions are barred by principles of res judicata.

For reasons that follow, we shall (1) reject defendants' claim that the appeal should be dismissed, (2) affirm the judgments of dismissal with respect to the County and Bonner, and (3) reverse the judgment with respect to Hall.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's complaint alleges the following facts, which we accept as true for the purpose of reviewing the trial court's orders sustaining defendants' demurrers. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal. Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58.)

During 1997, plaintiff had been experiencing harassment by a former spouse. She complained to the sheriff's department, and defendant Hall arranged to interview plaintiff in her home. The interview occurred on November 18 or November 19, 1997. During the interview, Hall asked whether she was dating. Plaintiff stated she did not understand what that had to do with the investigation, and added she was not interested in dating.

At that point, Hall grabbed plaintiff's wrists, put them behind her back, and placed handcuffs on her. "He then rubbed the front of his body against [her] body, breathed into her ear and asked for a date. Hall rubbed his body, while his penis was erect, against plaintiff's buttocks [and] said [she] had a nice 'butt.'" When he pushed her onto the bed, plaintiff kept him away by raising her knees. Hall repeatedly asked for a date and asked whether plaintiff could get out of the handcuffs. The incident ended when plaintiff said she would yell for a retired law enforcement officer who lived with her. At that point, Hall removed the handcuffs, told plaintiff to call him in a few days, and left. Plaintiff did not report the attack until she read a newspaper article about a similar incident involving Hall.

A criminal complaint was filed against Hall, accusing him of sexual battery (Pen. Code, § 243.4) based on his misconduct against plaintiff and other victims. On August 7, 2000, Hall was sentenced to state prison for eight years as the result of a negotiated plea.

Plaintiff filed a governmental tort claim with the County on February 2, 2001. After the County sent her a notice that her claim was untimely, plaintiff filed an application with the County on March 13, 2001, seeking "permission to present [a] claim alleged by [the County] to have been filed late." The County denied the application by letter of April 20, 2001.

Plaintiff commenced this litigation by filing in the trial court a complaint for damages and a petition for an "order holding that [her governmental tort claim] was timely filed." Finding that the claim was untimely, the court denied the petition. Defendants then demurred to the complaint. The court sustained demurrers of the County and Bonner without leave to amend, and later sustained Hall's demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend. Judgments of dismissal were entered, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I

Initially, we consider and reject defendants' contention that the appeal should be dismissed on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Government Code section 905 requires a person who seeks tort damages against a local public entity to submit a claim to the local public entity. The public entity must act upon the claim within 45 days. (Gov. Code, § 912.4, subd. (a).) If the claim is not acted upon in such time, it is deemed to have been rejected. (Gov. Code, § 912.4, subd. (c).) A civil suit for tort damages cannot be maintained until such a claim has been presented and acted upon by the public entity, or it is deemed to have been rejected. (Gov. Code, § 945.4.)

A claim for damages for injuries to the person, such as plaintiff's claim, must be presented to the local government entity not later than six months after accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) If the claim is not timely presented, the claimant may make a written application to present a late claim. (Gov. Code, § 911.4, subd. (a).) The application must be made within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code, § 911.4, subd. (b).) A timely application must be granted if one or more of certain enumerated statutory factors are applicable. (Gov. Code, § 911.6, subd. (b).) If such an application is not granted or denied within 45 days, it will be deemed to be denied. (Gov. Code, § 911.6, subd. (c).)

When an application to file a late claim is denied or deemed denied, a petition may be made to the superior court for an order relieving petitioner from the requirement that a claim be filed. (Gov. Code, § 946.6.) To be entitled to relief, the petitioner must demonstrate that an application was made to the public entity and was denied or deemed denied, and must establish one or more of the statutory bases for relief. (Gov Code, § 946.6, subd. (b).) An order denying a petition for relief from the claim presentation requirements is a final appealable order (County of Alameda v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal. App. 3d 619, 622, 242 Cal. Rptr. 215) that will be given collateral estoppel effect in subsequent litigation (Gurrola v. County of Los Angeles (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 145, 150, 200 Cal. Rptr. 157).

Defendants assert that plaintiff sought and was denied relief from the requirement of presenting a timely claim, that she failed to appeal the order and that, by virtue of collateral estoppel, the order precludes the prosecution of her appeal from the ensuing judgments of dismissal. We disagree.

Plaintiff has continuously maintained that her tort claim was presented in a timely manner. When the County rejected her claim as untimely, she filed an application for leave to present a late claim, but made clear her position that the claim was timely. When the County denied the application, plaintiff did not petition for relief from the claim filing requirement. Instead, she filed her complaint together with a petition for an order declaring that her claim was presented in a timely manner.

There is no statutory procedure for a tort claimant to petition the trial court for an order declaring that a governmental tort claim was timely filed. If, as plaintiff asserts, her tort claim was timely filed, then the County's refusal to act on it, for whatever reason, constitutes a denial of the claim which would entitle plaintiff to proceed with her civil litigation. (Gov. Code, §§ 912.4 subd. (c); 945.4.) In such a circumstance, the appropriate procedure would be to file a complaint that includes an allegation of compliance with the claim presentation requirement. (Bohrer v. County of San Diego (1980) 104 Cal. App. 3d 155, 160, 163 Cal. Rptr. 419.)

The procedure employed by plaintiff was a creature of her own creation. It was in effect an attempt to obtain bifurcation of the issue of her compliance with the claim presentation requirement from the merits of the complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 597.) Defendants did not object. Instead, they participated in the procedure and obtained a favorable result. As it turned out, the bifurcation of issues provided defendants with an efficacious means of resolving the preliminary issue at an early stage of the proceedings. Obviously, defendants cannot demonstrate prejudice from the procedure. (Cf. Meyer Koulish Co. v. Cannon (1963) 213 Cal. App. 2d 419, 430, 28 Cal. Rptr. 757.)

When, in the first stage of a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court makes a determination that disposes of the action, it should enter a final judgment of dismissal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 597 .) Until such a judgment is entered, any appeal would be premature. (Sproul v. Cuddy (1953) 121 Cal. App. 2d 197, 201, 263 P.2d 92.) If the court's determination disposes of portions of the complaint, but not its entirety, the court may not enter a final, appealable judgment. (Crofoot v. Crofoot (1955) 132 Cal. App. 2d 794, 798-799, 283 P.2d 283.) Entry of judgment and appeal of the court's determination must await disposition of the entirety of the action. (Ibid.)

Here, the trial court entered a ruling on the timeliness of plaintiff's governmental tort claim but did not purport to enter a judgment dismissing all or any portion of the action. Plaintiff could not have appealed from the ruling. (Sproul v. Cuddy, supra, 121 Cal. App. 2d at p. 201.) Moreover, the trial court could not have entered an appealable judgment following its ruling because it did not dispose of the action in its entirety. (Crofoot v. Crofoot, supra, 132 Cal. App. 2d at pp. 798-799.)² Consequently, plaintiff followed an appropriate procedure by appealing from the judgments of dismissal ultimately entered, and she is entitled in this appeal to review of the trial court's ruling on the claim presentation issue.

II

We turn now to plaintiff's contention that her governmental tort claim was timely filed with the County.

As we have noted, plaintiff was required to present a claim to the County "not later than six months...