Jim Halsey Co., Inc. v. Bonar

• Decision Date: 04 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-180,84-180
• Citation: 683 S.W.2d 898,284 Ark. 461
• Parties: JIM HALSEY CO., INC., Appellant, v. Chet BONAR, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 898

683 S.W.2d 898

284 Ark. 461

JIM HALSEY CO., INC., Appellant, v. Chet BONAR, Appellee.

No. 84-180.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Feb. 4, 1985.

Martin, Vater & Karr by Charles Karr, Fort Smith, for appellant.

Jack Skinner, Greenwood, for appellee.

HOLT, Chief Justice.

This case arose when Rick Nelson did not appear for a muscular dystrophy benefit concert in Fort Smith. The concert promoter, Chet Bonar, filed suit against Nelson's booking agent, Jim Halsey Co., Inc., for breach of contract, fraud, and negligence. This appeal from the jury's verdict in favor of the promoter is before us under Sup.Ct.R. 29(1)(c) and (o) as it presents questions about an act of the general assembly and in the law of torts. We affirm.

The facts are summarized as follows: A muscular dystrophy association festival was planned in Fort Smith by the appellee, Bonar, and others, which was to include an arts and crafts fair, other activities at Kay Rodgers Park, and a concert by a named performer. Bonar was to receive 25% of the gross from ticket sales, gate fees, and arts and crafts table rentals. Bonar contacted the appellant, Halsey Inc., to hire a performer for the concert. Rick Nelson was selected for a $6,500.00 fee. The fee was increased twice with Bonar's approval until it was set at $8,500.00. In each instance a contract was prepared by Halsey Inc., and sent to Bonar for his signature. Bonar returned the signed contract to Halsey Inc., and it was forwarded to Nelson for his signature. It was never signed by Nelson or by his personal manager, Greg McDonald.

Bonar made a $3,750.00 deposit to Halsey Inc. on July 27, 1979, and began promoting the concert based on the appellant's assurances that Nelson would appear. The concert was scheduled for August 18, 1979. The final contract was sent to Bonar for his signature on August 2, which Bonar again signed and returned to Halsey Inc., who again forwarded it to Nelson. He still did not sign the contract. Two days before the concert, McDonald notified Halsey Inc. who in turn notified Bonar that Nelson would not perform at the concert. Halsey Inc. offered Hank Williams, Jr., in his place, and Williams played the concert for a fee of $6,500.00.

Bonar filed suit for breach of contract, fraud, and negligence. The jury returned a verdict for Bonar for $100,000.00.

The appellant raises numerous points on this appeal. We will address them in the order in which they were discussed in the parties' briefs.

The first allegation is that the trial court erred when it submitted the case to the jury on any theory other than breach of contract. The appellee also alleged fraud and negligence in his complaint. The jury was instructed as to these two theories in addition to breach of contract.

The appellant is apparently arguing that the appellee cannot pursue his case under two theories--contract and tort. Halsey Inc. maintains therefore that breach of contract is the appropriate theory, since the facts do not support the allegations of fraud and negligence. This argument is without merit.

This court has held that when a defendant denies liability, a plaintiff may proceed under two consistent theories of recovery. Elrod v. G. & R. Const. Co., 275 Ark. 151, 628 S.W.2d 17 (1982); Brown v. Aquilino, 271 Ark. 273, 608 S.W.2d 35 (1980); Ark.R.Civ.P. 18(a); Brill, The Election of Remedies Doctrine in Arkansas, 37 Ark.L.Rev. 385, 408 (1983). Contract and tort theories have been determined to be consistent when both seek the same relief and the evidence to support recovery on one theory partially supports it on another. Brill, supra.

Here, the remedies are concurrent and consistent in that they arise out of the same transaction, the same facts prove at least parts of the theories, and no inconsistent positions are taken.

The appellee's allegations of fraud and negligence are based on factual representations by the appellant that they would provide Nelson for the concert. The appellee states that Halsey Inc., knew these representations were untrue and that he, as a promoter, relied on the representations and was damaged as a result. He further maintains that Halsey Inc., had a duty to warn him of the likelihood that Nelson would not appear in sufficient time for him to seek a substitute performer and fully promote that performer. The appellee offered evidence in support of these allegations sufficient to instruct the jury on theories of fraud and negligence. There was no error.

The next issue raised is that the trial court erred in admitting testimony and exhibits of potential lost profits, past and future, and submitting them as damages to the jury because such lost profits were speculative and conjectural.

The jury was instructed that, if they ruled in favor of the appellee, they were to award him an amount of money to fairly compensate him for the following elements of damage:

First: The value of any profits lost and the present value of any profits reasonably certain to be lost in the future.

Second: The present value of any loss of ability to earn in the future.

Third: The value of any expenses lost.

The appellant objected to this instruction on the basis that there was no substantial evidence making it reasonably certain that appellee would have made, or will make a profit. Halsey Inc., maintains the evidence was insufficient to remove the question of profits from the realm of speculation and conjecture. We disagree.

On appeal this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and affirms if there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Kennedy Bros. Const., 282 Ark. 545, 670 S.W.2d 798 (1984).

The appellee offered the following evidence as to lost profits. He maintained that he would have received a profit of $15,193.75 if Rick Nelson had appeared. The $15,193.75 figure was based on 85% capacity at the stadium, with half of the tickets sold to adults for $7.00 and half to children for $4.00. Half of the partial capacity seating was then multiplied by $4.00 and the other half by $7.00. These two gross revenues were then added. That total was multiplied by 25%, Bonar's contractual share of the ticket sale. The total equalled $15,193.75.

Bonar's evidence of loss of reputation was supported by his own testimony about the good reputation he previously enjoyed and the testimony of Fred Baker, Jr., another local promoter. Baker and other concert sponsors also testified that they would not hire Bonar again because of what happened with the Nelson concert.

Baker testified as to the amount of income the appellee will lose as a result of the damage to his reputation. The witness stated that a promoter can expect to put on at least one concert a year. He then figured a reasonable income from that concert based on a formula which included the number of seats at the local stadium, a typical ticket price, and reasonable ticket sales based on an average vacancy rate. He subtracted concert expenses and arrived at a net yearly income for the promoter of $31,880.00.

A second witness testified as to the present value calculation of that annual income over periods of three, five, and ten years.

This court has held that:

The rule that damages which are uncertain or contingent can not be recovered, does not apply to uncertainty as to the value of the benefits to be derived from performance, but to uncertainty as to whether any benefit would be derived at all. If it is reasonably certain that profits would have resulted had the contract been carried out, then the complaining party is entitled to recover.

Crow v. Russell, 226 Ark. 121, 289 S.W.2d 195 (1956), (quoting Black v. Hogsett, 145 Ark. 178, 224 S.W. 439 (1920)).

The fact that a party can state the amount of damages he suffered only approximately is not a sufficient reason for disallowing damages if from the approximate estimates a satisfactory conclusion can be reached. Williams v. Black Lumber Co., 275 Ark. 144, 628 S.W.2d 13 (1982). Here, the appellee offered sufficient proof that he would have realized a profit and an approximate estimate of what that profit would have been.

In proving anticipated profits, a party "must present a reasonably complete set of figures, and not leave the jury to speculate as to whether there could have been any profits." American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Kennedy Bros. Const., supra (quoting Sumlin v. Woodson, 211 Ark. 214, 199 S.W.2d 936 (1947)). Here again, the appellee offered proof of the amount of lost future profits, along with the formula used to compute the amount. It was therefore not error to submit lost profits to the jury as damages.

The appellant's third argument is that the trial court erred in not dismissing the appellee's negligence and fraud causes of action because they were barred by the statute of limitations.

The allegations of fraud and negligence were raised by the appellee in amendments to his original complaint. The trial court has broad discretion to permit amendments to pleadings and we sustain the exercise of that discretion unless it is manifestly abused. Wingfield v. Page, 278 Ark. 276, 644 S.W.2d 940 (1983); Ark.R.Civ.P. 15.

Rule 15 not only makes liberal provision for amendments to pleadings, it also states that any claim asserted in the amended pleading, which arises "out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading, ... relates back to the date of the original pleading." Rule 15(c).

Since the amendment relates back, there can be no statute of limitations objection to the amendment without proof of undue delay or prejudice. See, Brill, supra; Ozark Kenworth, Inc. v. Neidecker, 283 Ark. 196, 672 S.W.2d 899 (1984). No such proof was offered here.

The appellant next contends that the trial court erred in not dismissing appellee's cause of action based upon fraud because the complaint and amendments failed to state with particularity the circumstances of fraud.

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