Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Holman

• Citation: 373 So.2d 869
• Parties: JIM WALTER HOMES, INC. and Lewis J. Hill and Judy Hill, v. James I. HOLMAN, Cape Coral Bank as Administrator of the Estate of James I. Holman, Deceased. Civ. 1959.
• Decision Date: 08 August 1979
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 869

373 So.2d 869

JIM WALTER HOMES, INC. and Lewis J. Hill and Judy Hill, v. James I. HOLMAN, Cape Coral Bank as Administrator of the Estate of James I. Holman, Deceased.

Civ. 1959.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Aug. 8, 1979.

R. A. Norred, Birmingham, for appellant Jim Walter Homes, Inc.

Van Gamble, Birmingham, for appellants Lewis J. Hill and Judy Hill.

John S. Casey, Heflin, for appellees.

BRADLEY, Judge.

James I. Holman filed an ejectment action against Lewis J. Hill and wife, Judy Hill (hereinafter the Hills) and Jim Walter Homes, Inc., seeking possession of property described in the complaint and for damages for its possession. The Hills and Jim Walter Homes, Inc. denied Holman's right to possession and title in the property and suggested adverse possession for a period of three years prior to the filing of the action under Code of Alabama 1975, § 6-6-286.

Plaintiff died while the action was pending and, upon motion, the Cape Coral Bank, as administrator of the estate of James I. Holman, deceased, was substituted as the party plaintiff.

The case was tried before a jury which returned the following verdict:

We, the jury, assess the value of the use and occupation of the land in question at $660.00 for the period it has been possessed by the defendant; and further assess the value of the land as of this date at $850.00. And, we further find and assess the value of the improvements made by the defendants on said land at $4,712.50.

The trial court entered judgment according to the jury verdict on August 28, 1978. Defendants then filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. Defendants appeal from the judgment.

Appellants' first issue relates to the verdict and judgment rendered in the trial court. The contention is made that the judgment is not final as it does not purport to find for either the plaintiff or defendants. It is to be noted that appellants did not object to the forms of the verdict proposed by the trial court to be given to the jury; nor did appellants object to the verdict returned by the jury; nor did the appellants move the trial court to set aside the judgment. The appellants did not raise this issue in their motion for new trial, and the appellants have not moved this court to dismiss the appeal. The issue of whether the judgment is such a final one as to support an appeal is raised for the first time in this court. The question of whether a decree is final, so as to support an appeal therefrom, is a jurisdictional one and it is the duty of the reviewing court, where it is determined that a decree is not final, to dismiss the appeal on its own motion. Taylor v. Major Finance Co., 289 Ala. 458, 268 So.2d 738, 77 A.L.R.3d 1072 (1972).

The law in Alabama is well settled that where the language of judgments or verdicts can be reasonably interpreted by reference to the pleadings and papers in the case and the instructions of the court, then on such basis, intendments are indulged in favor of judgments. The real question is whether the verdict was hopelessly defective, thereby affording no proper basis for a judgment. Reynolds Bros. Lumber Co. v. W. S. Newell Construction Co., 284 Ala. 352, 224 So.2d 899 (1969). See Rule 58(b), ARCP.

We are convinced that the verdict is not so hopelessly defective as to provide no reasonable basis for the judgment.

The trial court read the statute in question, I. e. § 6-6-286, to the jury and explained several times the forms of verdict that the jury could return to the court.

One of the verdict forms explained by the court was that if the jury found that the defendants had been in possession of the property for more than three years, the jury must then assess the value, at the time of trial, of the permanent improvements made by the defendants, and the value of the land and the value of the use and occupation of said land.

The jury found the value of the improvements to be $4,712.50, the value of the use and occupation of the land at $660, and the value of the land to be $850. Although the jury did not specifically find that defendants had been in adverse possession of the land for more than three years, the clear import of their verdict, in view of the pleadings, evidence, and oral instructions to them by the court, was to find defendants in adverse possession.

Accordingly, the verdict is not so defective as to make the judgment void.

Appellants' next contention is that the heirs of James I. Holman were necessary party plaintiffs in the ejectment action. We refer to the case of Wilson v. Kirkland, 172 Ala. 72, 55 So....