Jimenez-Cruz v. Astrue
| Decision Date | 11 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO.: 09-1812 (MEL) |
| Parties | EDWIN A. JIMENEZ-CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Plaintiff Edwin A. Jiménez-Cruz ("plaintiff" or "claimant") was born in May of 1959. (Tr. 80.) He attended school through the ninth grade, and worked as a carpenter's assistant, a janitor, and finally as a plant employee at a dairy company. (Tr. 100, 124, 131.) He left his most recent position as a plant employee on June 19, 2002, claiming he could not return to work due to discogenic disease, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, lumbar strain with radiculopathy, and depression. (Tr. 123.)
On August 27, 2003, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and insurance benefits pursuant to Title II and Part A of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(I), 423 (2012). (Tr. 80-85.) Plaintiff alleged disability beginning on June 18, 2002. (Tr. 123.) His application for Social Security benefits was denied initially on May 6, 2004 and upon reconsideration on December 20, 2004. (Tr. 48-56, 58-65.) On February 8, 2005, claimant filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which was scheduled to take place on May 15, 2007. (Tr. 42-45, 66.)
Plaintiff received a Notice of Hearing dated April 9, 2007, and on that same day, plaintiff's counsel prepared a motion to waive his appearance at the hearing. (Tr. 16.) Plaintiff signed a sworn statement in support of the motion, stating that he was waiving his right to be present and be heard at the hearing, but he was not renouncing his right "to an impartial and complete hearing where [he] will appear through [his] attorney." (Tr. 17.) On May 15, 2007, when plaintiff's counsel appeared at the hearing alone, the ALJ cancelled the hearing due to plaintiff's failure to appear. (Tr. 27-29.)1 The ALJ gave plaintiff's counsel seven days to submit written arguments and evidence in support of plaintiff's case. (Tr. 27.) He also notified counsel that he would decide the case based on the medical evidence in the record and any written arguments and additional evidence that counsel wished to submit for the record. (Tr. 29.)
The following day, plaintiff's counsel submitted a motion requesting reopening of the record and a continuance of the hearing, which the ALJ denied "as improvident under the law." (Tr. 10, 27.) Plaintiff failed to submit any written arguments or evidence in the allotted seven days following the cancelled the hearing. (Tr. 15, 27-28.) On June 28, 2007, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Tr. 27-39.) Plaintiff timely filed a request for review of the ALJ's decision with the Appeals Council on August 17, 2007, along with a brief in support of his request for review. (Tr. 10-14, 20.) The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on June 17, 2009; therefore, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner" or "defendant"). (Tr. 5-7.)
On August 17, 2009, plaintiff filed the instant complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)2 and 5 U.S.C. § 706, requesting review of the Commissioner's decision, alleging that the decision was not based on substantial evidence. (Docket No. 1.) Both parties have filed memoranda of law. (Docket Nos. 13, 14, 17.)
Once the Commissioner has rendered his final determination on an application for disability benefits, a district court "shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing [that decision], with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court's review is limited to determining whether the ALJ employed the proper legal standards and whether his factual findings were grounded upon sufficient evidence. Id. Specifically, the court "must examine the record and uphold a final decision of the Commissioner denying benefits, unless the decision is based on a faulty legal thesis or factual error." López-Vargas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 518 F. Supp. 2d 333, 335 (D.P.R. 2007) ().
Additionally, "[t]he findings of the Commissioner [ ] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 292, 300 (1938)). The standard requires "'more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may besomewhat less than a preponderance' of the evidence." Hernández-Guzmán v. Astrue, Civil No. 08-2240, 2009 WL 3526485, at *2 (D.P.R. Oct. 23, 2009) (quoting Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146, 1148 (3d Cir. 1971)).
While the Commissioner's fact findings are conclusive when they are supported by substantial evidence, they are "not conclusive when derived by ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to experts." Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Da Rosa v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam)). Moreover, a determination of substantiality must be made based on the record as a whole. See Irlanda Ortiz, 955 F.2d at 769 (citing Rodríguez v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981)). However, "[i]t is the responsibility of the [ALJ] to determine issues of credibility and to draw inferences from the record evidence." Id. Therefore, the court "must affirm the [Commissioner's] resolution, even if the record arguably could justify a different conclusion, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence." Rodríguez Pagan v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
To establish entitlement to disability benefits, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 146-47 (1987). An individual is deemed to be disabled under the Social Security Act if he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in deathor which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S. C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
Claims for disability benefits are evaluated according a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25 (2003); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 804 (1999); Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-42. Step one requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is working and thus engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, then disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has "a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment" or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If he does, then the ALJ moves to step three to determine whether the claimant's impairment or impairments are equivalent to one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R part 404, subpart P, appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, then he is conclusively found to be disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If not, then the ALJ goes on to step four and assesses whether the claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from doing the type of work he has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the ALJ determines that the claimant can perform his past relevant work despite his impairment(s), then disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the ALJ concludes that the claimant's impairment or impairments do prevent him from performing his past relevant work, the analysis then proceeds to step five. At this final step, the ALJ evaluates whether the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"),3 combined with his age, education, and work experience, allows him to perform any other work that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the ALJ determines that there iswork in the national economy that the claimant can perform, then disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).
Under steps one through four, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he cannot return to his former job because of his impairment or combination of impairments. Ortiz v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 890 F.2d 520, 524 (1st Cir.1989) (per curiam). Once he has carried that burden, the Commissioner then has the burden under step five "to prove the existence of other jobs in the national economy that the plaintiff can perform." Id.
After evaluating the evidence on record, the ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2007. (Tr. 31.)
2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of June 18, 2002 through his date last insured. (Tr. 18.)
3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe impairments: "left carpal tunnel syndrome, cervical myositis, lower back pain with muscular spasms, herniated disc at the L4-L5 level to the right [shown] by [a] Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) study with bilateral radiculopathy at the L5 root to the left [shown] by Electromyographic and Nerve Conduction (EMG/NCV) studies, lumbar spondylosis, and a moderate major depressive disorder with...
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