Jimenez v. Miami-Dade Cnty.
| Decision Date | 18 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-23131-Civ-SCOLA |
| Parties | JESUS JIMENEZ, and LAURA JIMENEZ, his wife and dependent, Plaintiffs, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY; CHARLES DANGER, individually; and RICARDO ROIG, individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs Jesus Jimenez and Laura Jimenez allege that Defendants Miami-Dade County (MDC), Charles Danger, and Ricardo Roig violated several provisions of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 501-597b, when Defendants instituted and continued to prosecute civil condemnation proceedings against three properties owned by Plaintiffs. Defendants have moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, contending in the alternative that it fails to state a valid claim for relief under the SCRA, that it fails to state a claim for governmental liability against Defendant MDC, and that Defendants Danger and Roig are entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Because one of the Jimenezes' claims survives, the Court also VACATES the discovery stay (DE 35). The Court will issue a separate amended scheduling order resetting the discovery and trial deadlines so that this case can proceed as normal.
This action seeks equitable and monetary relief for alleged violations of the SCRA. For the purposes of deciding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (DE 42), the Court takes the Jimenezes' well-pled factual allegations as true. At all relevant times, Jesus Jimenez is and has been on active duty in the United States Army. (DE 37 at 2.) Laura Jimenez is his wife and dependent. (Id.) Defendant Roig is an officer of the MDC Building and Neighborhood Compliance Department. (Id.) DefendantDanger is an officer—allegedly the director—of the MDC Building and Neighborhood Compliance Department. (Id. at 3.) Defendant MDC is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. (Id. at 2.)
Jesus Jimenez owns three parcels of realty within the county: 1488 NW 103 Street (the "1488 parcel"), 1487 NW 102 Street (the "1487 parcel"), and 1477 NW 102 Street (the "1477 parcel"). (Id. at 3.) On or about June 11, 2007, while Jesus Jimenez was on active military duty, Defendants instituted civil condemnation proceedings against all three of the properties (collectively, the "Subject Properties"). (Id.)
On July 11, August 31, October 2, October 11, and October 16 of 2007, the Jimenezes notified Defendants in writing of Jesus Jimenez's active duty status and requested extensions of time in writing regarding the condemnation proceedings. (Id.) These writings were also forwarded by then-Governor Charlie Crist to MDC's "other policymakers"—including the County Board of Commissioners—on October 29, 2007. (Id. at 3-4.) On November 5, 2007, Jesus Jimenez's commanding officer sent a letter to Defendants documenting Jesus Jimenez's active duty status and explaining that his military duties prevented him from appearing in the condemnation proceedings and that military leave was not authorized for him to attend. (Id. at 4.)
On November 7, 2007, Defendants took three significant actions: Roig and Danger responded that MDC had determined that the SCRA did not apply to the condemnation proceedings; Defendants refused to stay or delay the condemnation-proceedings hearing; and they ordered that the 1488 parcel be vacated and that electric power to the residence on that parcel be disconnected. (Id. at 4.) The Jimenezes imply that Laura Jimenez resided at that residence on that date. (See id. at 4-6.) In June 2011, the Defendants demolished that residence. (Id. at 4.) Laura Jimenez, who was pregnant, lived at that residence at that time. (Id.) Defendants then imposed a lien on that parcel for the cost of demolishing the residence. (Id. at 6, 8.) The Jimenezes also allege that as a result of Defendants' actions, the other parcels were condemned; electricity to them was disconnected; the Jimenezes, their dependents, and their tenants were evicted from them; and liens were imposed on them. (Id. at 5-6.)
The Jimenezes sued Defendants in August 2011, seeking monetary relief based on Defendants' violating the SCRA and several of the Jimenezes' constitutional rights. They brought the constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In September 2011, they filed an Amended Complaint that sought injunctive and anticipatory relief in addition to money damages. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (DE 13). Because Defendants Roig and Danger contended that they were entitled to qualified immunity, the Court in June 2012 granted Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order and stayed all discovery against Defendants, pending the Court's ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. (DE 35.) In July 2012, the Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, dismissing the Jimenezes' claimswithout prejudice and granting them leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (DE 36.) The discovery stay was not lifted. In accordance with the Court's Order, the Jimenezes did file a Second Amended Complaint, keeping their SCRA claims and discarding their constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 37.) Defendants moved to dismiss this complaint, contending in the alternative that it fails to state a valid claim for relief under the SCRA, that it fails to state a claim for governmental liability against Defendant MDC, and that Defendants Danger and Roig are entitled to qualified immunity. (DE 42.) That Motion is now before the Court.
Defendants contend that the Jimenezes fail to state a valid claim under the SCRA and that their Second Amended Complaint should therefore be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all of the Complaint's well-pled factual allegations as true, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The Rule does not require detailed factual allegations, but it does require "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (brackets, internal citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. Thus, a pleading that offers mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will be dismissed. Id.
The SCRA is the latest in a series of statutes aimed at helping servicemembers "devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation." 50 App. U.S.C. § 502(1). Its purpose is "to provide for the temporary suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect the civil rights of servicemembers during their military service." Id. at § 502(2). The SCRA's protections extend to all military personnel on active duty, including career servicemen and women. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511 (1993). Courts should liberally construe the SCRA in favor of those "who dropped their affairs to answer their country's call." Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943).
The Jimenezes allege that Defendants violated several sections of the SCRA. The Court will analyze each section in turn to determine whether the Jimenezes have asserted a valid claim under that section.
The Jimenezes allege that Defendants violated 50 App. U.S.C. § 531 by evicting the Jimenezes from the 1488 parcel and by subjecting the premises on that parcel to a distress. (DE 37 at 5.) During a period of military service of a servicemember, § 531(a)(1)(A) prohibits a landlord or another person with paramount title from evicting a servicemember or the servicemember's dependents from a premises that is occupied "primarily as a residence" and "for which the monthly rent does not exceed $2,400." Section 531(a)(1)(B) prohibits a landlord or other person with paramount title from "subject[ing] such premises to a distress during the period of military service." Neither of these prohibitions apply to a government condemning property. Based on the statute using the terms landlord, rent, eviction, and distress, courts have construed the substantially similar predecessor statute to § 531 as "contemplat[ing] a landlord-tenant relationship." Clinton Cotton Mills v. United States, 164 F.2d 173, 176 (4th Cir. 1947); accord Arkless v. Kilstein, 51 F. Supp. 886, 888 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (); Lesher, 49 F. Supp. at 89-90 (). But there is no landlord-tenant relationship between Defendants and the Jimenezes. And because the Jimenezes own the Subject Properties, t...
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