Jimenez v. Servicios Agricolas Mex Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 September 2010
• Docket Number: Array
• Citation: 742 F.Supp.2d 1078
• Parties: Reynaldo Guerra JIMENEZ, et al., Plaintiffs,v.SERVICIOS AGRICOLAS MEX, INC., et al., Defendants.Juan Abarca Figueroa, et al., Plaintiffs,v.Servicios Agricolas Mex, Inc., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

742 F.Supp.2d 1078

Reynaldo Guerra JIMENEZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.SERVICIOS AGRICOLAS MEX, INC., et al., Defendants.Juan Abarca Figueroa, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Servicios Agricolas Mex, Inc., et al., Defendants.

Nos. CV–07–01492–PHX–GMS

CV–07–02581–PHX–GMS.

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

Sept. 20, 2010.

Joshua Karsh, Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym Ltd, Marni Willenson, Farmworker Justice, Chicago, IL, George Holl McKay, Pamela Marie Bridge, Community Legal Services, Phoenix, AZ, Virginia E. Ruiz, Farmworker Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.Tom Crowe, Crowe & Scott PA, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.

ORDER

G. MURRAY SNOW, District Judge.

Two motions for summary judgment are pending before the Court: one filed by Defendants, (Doc. 179), and one filed by Plaintiffs, (Doc. 181). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendants' motion and grants Plaintiffs' motion in part and denies it in part.

BACKGROUND

This case results from the consolidation of two matters, each with multiple Plaintiffs. In total, Plaintiffs are a group of United States citizens or legal permanent residents who allegedly worked picking lemons for Defendants Marlin Ranching, Inc. (“Marlin Ranching”), Marlin Growers, Inc. (“Marlin Growers”) Servicios Agricolas Mexicano (“SAMCO”), Servicios Agricolas Mex Inc. (“SAMI”), Richard De Leon, and Ralph De Leon. Plaintiffs allege that they worked for the Defendants in two relevant growing seasons, 2004–05 and 2005–06.

Defendants are several corporations and individuals that Plaintiffs allege work together as one joint employer. Specifically, Marlin Ranching is an Arizona corporation that farms citrus and owns or leases land on which Plaintiffs picked the lemons. Marlin Ranching also would determine the dates and times when workers would be allowed to pick lemons. Marlin Growers is a cooperative of citrus growers that received and paid the invoices for the labor Plaintiffs performed. SAMCO was a now-dissolved California farm-labor contracting corporation. SAMCO provided citrus harvesting and pruning services in California and Arizona. SAMI is an Arizona farm-labor contracting corporation that allegedly provided labor contracting services to the Marlin entities. Ralph De Leon was the president of SAMCO and allegedly exercised operational and day-to-day control over SAMCO. Richard De Leon is Ralph De Leon's son and is a shareholder and president of SAMI. Richard De Leon allegedly had control over SAMI's overall business and day-to-day operations. At the same time he managed SAMI, he was employed by SAMCO, but the parties dispute the extent of that employment relationship. During the two relevant seasons, Plaintiffs were on the payroll of SAMCO and/or SAMI. While working on the payroll of SAMCO and/or SAMI, Plaintiffs allegedly picked lemons on behalf of the Marlin entities in and around Yuma County, Arizona and Imperial County, California.

Plaintiffs contend that they were required to wait at various times and places to be given permission to start picking lemons. Lemons may be picked only under certain weather conditions. Therefore, farmers must measure the humidity in the air before commencing harvesting. Plaintiffs allege that the unpredictable conditions caused them to have to wait to begin work, even though their work days arguably had begun. Specifically, Plaintiffs raise four scenarios in which they frequently had to wait, but were not compensated.

First, they allegedly waited at the “corralon,” which was the bus stop where many Plaintiffs waited for a company bus to take them to the fields for work. Although taking the bus was optional, Defendants apparently strongly encouraged Plaintiffs to take the bus to the fields and required those workers choosing to take the bus to arrive at the bus stop by a particular time each morning. Plaintiffs then would wait for the bus to arrive; the bus would sometimes arrive at the announced time, but it would arrive late on days when the lemons were not ready to be picked in the early morning. Plaintiffs could engage in various personal activities while waiting for the bus, but, as a practical matter, were limited in the distance they could travel from the corralon for fear that the bus would arrive and leave without them. Similarly, Plaintiffs contend they would sometimes arrive at the fields, only to be informed that the lemons were not ready for picking. On those days, Plaintiffs allegedly were forced to wait at the fields until picking was allowed. In addition to the time spent waiting at the fields and in the corralon, Plaintiffs assert that they were not fully compensated for time spent traveling on the bus from the corralon to the fields in Arizona and California and that they were not compensated for time allegedly spent traveling from one field to another field during the work day. Plaintiffs further offer evidence that Defendants did not accurately record this waiting and travel time.

Aside from Defendants' alleged failures to record and compensate certain time, one group of U.S.-citizen Plaintiffs alleges that Defendants refused to rehire them based on their status as U.S. citizens. Until the 2006–07 harvest, Defendants' practice was to recruit and rehire its U.S. workforce from previous seasons. On June 19, 2006, however, Defendants filed an application to import one hundred and fifty temporary foreign workers for the 2006–07 harvest. On this application, Defendants represented that they would independently contact potential qualified workers by letter and/or telephone. Contrary to U.S. Department of Labor instructions, however, Defendants made no attempt by telephone, in-person solicitation, or correspondence, to solicit the return of its U.S. workforce as it had done in previous seasons. Ultimately, Defendants did not rehire this group of U.S.-citizen Plaintiffs for the 2006–07 season, but instead hired immigrant H–2A workers.

Plaintiffs filed the two now-consolidated actions. The Jimenez Plaintiffs allege four claims: (1) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”), (2) violation of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (“AWPA”), (3) breach of contract, and (4) violation of California labor laws and regulations. The Figueroa Plaintiffs raise two claims: (1) violation of AWPA, and (2) discrimination based on alienage/citizenship under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on claims based on the FLSA, AWPA, breach of employment contract, and California wage laws. Defendants, meanwhile, move for summary judgment on the discrimination claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court should grant summary judgment only if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Substantive law determines which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.1994). The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Then, the burden is on the nonmoving party to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must—by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule—set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Such “supporting or opposing affidavit[s] must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(1). Finally, because “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, ... [t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his [or her] favor” at the summary judgment stage. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In their Motion, Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on the following issues: (1) that Defendants SAMI, SAMCO, Marlin Ranching, Marlin Growers, Ralph De Leon, and Richard De Leon were joint employers of Plaintiffs; (2) that Defendants are liable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) for failure to compensate Plaintiffs for the time spent waiting in parking lots and fields; (3) that Defendants are liable under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”) for failure to pay wages due, for violation of the working arrangement, and for record-keeping violations; and (4) that Defendants are liable under California labor laws and regulations for failure to pay wages due for labor performed by Plaintiffs in California.

I. ANALYSISA. United States Citizens May Bring a Section 1981 Claim for Discrimination on the Basis of Citizenship.

The parties...