Jimenez v. United States
| Decision Date | 05 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | SA-20-CV-00575-XR |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER PAUL JIMENEZ, ALVARO FIDEL ORTEGA, AUDREY ELENA DAVIS, Plaintiffs v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
On this date, the Court considered the Government's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for lack of jurisdiction (ECF No. 7), Plaintiffs' response (ECF No. 11), and the Government's reply (ECF No. 12). After careful consideration, the Government's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs Christopher Paul Jimenez, Alvaro Fidel Ortega, and Audrey Elena Davis bring this action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §2671 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) to recover for injuries they sustained as a result of a motor vehicle collision.
Plaintiffs allege that on or about July 28, 2018, they were traveling south on US Highway 281 near Encino Rio in San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas, when their vehicle was struck by a commercial tractor trailer (the "mail truck"), operated by Michael Gene Grayson, Jr. ("Grayson"), and owned or leased by Le Mar Holdings Inc. d/b/a Edwards Mail Service, Inc. ("EMS"). Plaintiffs assert that Grayson "was inattentive" and "failed to control his speed" while driving the mail truck and was at all times acting in the course and scope of his employment with the United States Postal Service ("USPS" or the "Postal Service").
At the time of the collision, Grayson was hauling U.S. mail pursuant to a four-year highway contract routes ("HCR") contract, HCR 780M3 (the "Transportation Contract"), between the Postal Service and EMS. See ECF No. 7-2 at 1, 120. According to Antoine Slaughter, the Manager of Local Distribution Transportation and Contracting Officer for the Postal Service, the Postal Service routinely enters into contract with independent contractors, known as "HCR Suppliers," when it determines that the use of contractors, rather than USPS employees, is "more cost-effective, fiscally prudent, or in furtherance of promoting a safer and more efficient distribution of the mail." ECF No. 7-1, Slaughter Decl. ¶¶ 2-4; see also Jones v. United States, No. 1:12-cv-00290-SEB-DKL, 2013 WL 2477288, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 7, 2013). HCR contracts are awarded based on a competitive process in which proposals are solicited and potential contractors submit offers to the USPS to perform the requested services. ECF No. 7-1, Slaughter Decl. ¶ 5. HCR Suppliers are required to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws as well as executive orders, rules and regulations applicable to their performance under the HCR contracts. Id. EMS has been awarded multiple contracts as an HCR supplier with the Postal Service to provide mail transportation services between USPS locations. ECF No. 7-1, Slaughter Decl. ¶ 6; see also In re Le-Mar Holdings, Inc., No. 17-50234-RLJ-11, 2017 WL 7050634, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2017).
Under the Transportation Contract, Postal Service officials were required to "supervise and administer" the Contract, id. at 61, and EMS was charged with "supervis[ing] its operations and the operations of its subcontractors." Id. at 72. The Contract included schedules addressing the frequency, timing, and service requirements for the transportation routes, with loading and unloading times and destinations determined by the Postal Service. Id. at 4-23. It did not, however, specify the routes that EMS drivers should take between USPS facilities. See id.
EMS was required to furnish its own vehicles and safety equipment in accordance with the exacting specifications of the Contract and to cover its own fuel costs. ECF No. 7-1, Slaughter Decl. ¶¶ 13-14; see ECF No. 7-2 at 24-34. Though USPS retained the right to perform random inspections of EMS vehicles and equipment to ensure compliance with the terms of the Contract, see id. at 42, 64, 66, EMS was solely responsible for the maintenance of its equipment and for adequately insuring motor vehicles used in the performance of its contractual duties. ECF No. 7-2 at 35, 38, 40-41. To the extent that EMS used any USPS equipment, it was liable to the Postal Service for any loss or damage to the equipment, without regard to negligence or fault. Id. at 37. The Postal Service was liable for EMS equipment, however, only when the damage or loss was caused by the negligence of a USPS employee. Id. Not only was EMS responsible for maintaining the safety of its own equipment and drivers, but it also agreed to bear responsibility for any damage to the persons or property of others arising from the performance of its duties under the Contract. Id. at 72.
EMS was also required to provide its own drivers. Though EMS was responsible for hiring the drivers, either as EMS employees or as subcontractors, all drivers were required to satisfy certain contractual screening and identification requirements, which included submitting to background checks in order to obtain the security clearance required to access postal facilities and the U.S. mail. Id. at 38-39. EMS was also required to immediately report any arrests or convictions of its hired drivers to the administrative official of the Postal Service. Id. at 38. However, EMS drivers were not entitled to participate in or receive USPS worker's compensation benefits, retirement benefits, or annual or sick leave. ECF No. 7-1, Slaughter Decl. ¶ 20. EMS was issued a Form 1099 annually by the Postal Service for payments received under the Transportation Contract as an independent contractor. Id. ¶ 18. EMS, in turn, was responsible for directly compensating itsemployees and subcontractors, including Grayson, for their work under the Contract. Id. ¶ 24; see ECF No. 7-2 at 71 (). The Transportation Contract mandated that EMS and its employees "maintain a neat, clean and professional appearance," though driver uniforms were not required. ECF No. 7-2 at 36.
Plaintiffs seek damages from the United States under three separate theories of liability: (1) respondeat superior liability for Grayson's alleged negligence; (2) direct liability against the USPS for negligently contracting with EMS and for its negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision of Grayson; and (3) gross negligence. The Government moves to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisction, arguing that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' claims. ECF No. 7. Rather than address the merits of the Government's immunity, Plaintiffs instead argue that the motion is premature and seek the Court's leave to conduct limited discovery on whether Grayson is in fact an independent contractor.
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the federal government cannot be sued in its capacity as a sovereign unless it consents to be sued. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). For the federal government to consent to be sued, Congress must waive sovereign immunity by explicitly extending to federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over a specified cause of action. Id. The FTCA waives sovereign immunity and allows private individuals to sue the federal government for the torts of its employees by granting federal courts exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over:
civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). However, the FTCA precludes recovery for punitive damages and contains a number of exceptions to this waiver of sovereign immunity, including the discretionary function and independent contractor exceptions at issue here. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674; 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
The Government moves the Court to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1). Dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(1) "when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). Typically, in determining whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, "[c]ourts must strictly construe all waivers of the federal government's sovereign immunity, [resolving] all ambiguities in favor of the sovereign." Linkous v. United States, 142 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that "this principle is 'unhelpful' in the FTCA context, where 'unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of defeating the central purpose of the statute.'" Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 491-92 (2006) (quoting Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 n.9 (1984)) (citations omitted). Thus, the proper objective of a court attempting to construe one of the exceptions to the FTCA's sweeping waiver of immunity is to identify 'those circumstances which are within the words and reason of the exception'—no less and no more." Id.
In ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court "has the power to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." United States v.Freeman, 556 F.3d 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2009). "Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction—its very power to hear the case—there is substantial authority that the...
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