Jimeno v. Mobil Oil Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 September 1995
• Docket Number: 93-55850,Nos. 93-55768,s. 93-55768
• Parties: 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2472, 64 USLW 2272, 130 Lab.Cas. P 11,423, 4 A.D. Cases 1646, 7 NDLR P 113, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7564, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,951 Martin JIMENO, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1514

66 F.3d 1514

150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2472, 64 USLW 2272,

130 Lab.Cas. P 11,423,

4 A.D. Cases 1646, 7 NDLR P 113,

95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7564,

95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,951

Martin JIMENO, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 93-55768, 93-55850.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Oct. 4, 1994.

Decided Sept. 28, 1995.

Mary E. McInerny, Long Beach, California, for plaintiff-appellant.

Joel E. Krischer, William C. Bottger, Jr., Latham & Watkins, Los Angeles, California, for defendant-appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before D.W. NELSON, WILLIAM A. NORRIS and BOGGS, ^* Circuit Judges.

OPINION

D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant/Cross-Appellee Martin Jimeno appeals the district court's judgment as a matter of law in favor of Appellee/Cross-Appellant Mobil Oil Corporation ("Mobil") on Jimeno's claim of employment discrimination because of a physical disability, in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal.Gov't Code Secs. 12920-12940. The district court found that Jimeno had established a prima facie case of discrimination, but it held that section 301(a) of the federal Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a), preempts Jimeno's FEHA claim. The district court also ruled that Jimeno's claim is barred by the exclusivity provisions of California's workers' compensation laws, Cal.Labor Code Secs. 132a & 3600-3602. Jimeno appeals these rulings and the district court's decision that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support applicability of the workers' compensation provisions to Jimeno's impairment. In addition, Jimeno appeals the district court's denial of his motion to alter judgment to find Mobil liable as a matter of law and for a new trial on the issue of damages, contending that Mobil has not produced legally sufficient evidence to support its statutory affirmative defenses pursuant to the FEHA. Jimeno also challenges various evidentiary rulings excluding testimony and documents. Mobil cross-appeals the district court's finding that Jimeno established a prima facie case pursuant to the FEHA.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Jimeno began working for Mobil at its Torrance, California refinery on December 27, 1972. Throughout his employment at Mobil, Jimeno was a member of the Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers' International Union and its Local Union 1-547 (the "Union"). Pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, Jimeno submitted a bid for a new position in early 1984 and became a mechanic in the Torrance Refinery garage. He held that position throughout the remainder of his employment with Mobil.

On Saturday, January 20, 1990, Jimeno awoke with severe lower back pain, which caused him to take a short-term medical disability leave from January 23, 1990 until April 17, 1990. After his private doctor, Dr. Quinio, suggested that the back problem might be a work-related injury, Jimeno met with Dr. Wald of Mobil's medical staff on March 22, 1990 and discussed filing a claim for benefits under workers' compensation. As provided by the collective bargaining agreement, Dr. Wald referred Jimeno to an outside doctor, Dr. Dallas, who determined that Jimeno suffered from degenerative disc disease and released Jimeno to return to work on April 16, 1990.

Jimeno performed his job as a mechanic without further problems from April 17, 1990 until May 31, 1990, when Mobil placed him on a medical leave of absence after receiving three supplemental reports from Dr. Dallas. The first, dated April 16, 1990, reported the results of a CT scan that revealed for the first time that Jimeno suffered from spondylolysis, a congenital or developmental defect of the spinal vertebrae in which the bone does not form completely so that one or more vertebrae consist of two separate parts. The CT scan reconfirmed that Jimeno also suffered from degenerative disc disease. As a result of the new information, the report suggested that a job analysis would be appropriate. The second report, dated April 30, 1990, noted Dr. Dallas' understanding that Jimeno's treatment in Dallas' office had been authorized as treatment for a work-related injury, and released him to work without restriction. The third report, dated May 23, 1990, indicated that, because of the abnormal CT scan, Jimeno might be "at risk" if he performed heavy work with repetitive bending or lifting and suggested that a job analysis be performed. The report also released Jimeno to perform regular work without job restrictions.

Mobil then hired an outside consultant to prepare a job analysis of the mechanic's position. After reviewing the job analysis, Dr. Dallas reported to Mobil on September 24, 1990 that Jimeno should be deemed a "Qualified Injured Worker" under California's workers' compensation laws. Mobil arranged for vocational rehabilitation training and informed Jimeno on May 14, 1991, in accord with its undisputed policy of terminating "unfit" workers, ¹ that he would be administratively terminated or placed on unpaid leave at the expiration of his short-term disability benefits.

Shortly thereafter, in May and June of 1991, Mobil received two additional orthopedic evaluations of Jimeno from Dr. Van Pelt, a physician selected by Jimeno's attorney. Dr. Van Pelt found that because of the spondylitic defect, there was a potential for injury from repetitive lifting of heavy objects. Mobil then wrote to Jimeno on August 8, 1991, to inform him that he had been administratively terminated, effective July 29, 1991.

On August 28, 1991, the Union filed a grievance in Jimeno's behalf, alleging that his termination violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Pursuant to the grievance discussions, Jimeno returned to Dr. Dallas for a reevaluation. Mobil refused reinstatement after Dr. Dallas reported in June 1992 that Jimeno's X-rays continued to show degenerative disc disease and spondylolysis. The Union initially demanded arbitration when Mobil denied the grievance, but later withdrew from the grievance process.

B. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Jimeno filed at least one claim for workers' compensation benefits, and he also filed a petition before the California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board for increased compensation for violation of Labor Code Sec. 132a, which prohibits discrimination against workers who suffer work-related injury, and Labor Code Sec. 4553, which increases compensation when an employer engages in willful misconduct. The petition before the workers' compensation board was still pending at the time of oral argument before this court.

On May 20, 1991, Jimeno filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing alleging discrimination because of a physical handicap. Jimeno claimed that Mobil terminated him because of his non-work-related developmental defect, which required only minimal accommodation to avoid a risk of injury, and not, as Mobil asserted, because of a work-related back injury that might occasionally be aggravated by his continuing to work as a mechanic. After receiving a right-to-sue letter, Jimeno brought suit pursuant to the FEHA in California state court. Mobil removed the case to federal district court where a jury trial commenced on January 12, 1993.

The district court concluded that Jimeno had met his burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination under the FEHA, but that workers' compensation provided the exclusive remedy because the injury for which work restrictions were imposed was job-related. Although the court did not so note in its Order, it also ruled from the bench that the LMRA preempted Jimeno's claim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews a directed verdict granting judgment as a matter of law de novo. In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 816 (9th Cir.1992). The standard applied by the reviewing court is the same as that of the district court. McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 816 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 399 121 L.Ed.2d 325 (1992). "[A] directed verdict is proper when the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Id. at 816.

III. ANALYSIS

A. FEHA PRIMA FACIE CASE

We first consider the threshold issue, raised by Mobil in its cross-appeal, whether the district court erred in finding that Jimeno established a prima facie case of physical handicap discrimination under the FEHA. Section 12940(a) prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of physical disability, as well as other characteristics. Under the regulations interpreting the FEHA, "[p]hysical handicap discrimination is established by showing that an employment practice denies, in whole or in part, an employment benefit to an individual because he or she is a handicapped individual." Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2, Sec. 7293.7. There are two elements of a prima facie case: (1) the complainant must satisfy one of the statutory definitions of "handicapped" individual and (2) the employer must have "discriminated on that basis." Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 5 Cal.4th 1050, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 287, 290 n. 4, 856 P.2d 1143 (1993).

The statutory definition of "handicapped individual" includes both those who actually "ha[ve] a physical handicap which substantially limits one or more major life activities" and those who are "regarded as having such a physical handicap." Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2, Sec. 7293.6(i). "Major life activities" include normal functions such as speaking or working. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 2, Sec. 7293.6(f). The interpretation of "substantially limits" is fact-specific. Inability to continue at the particular position for which the individual was responsible...