JL ex rel. Thompson v. N.M. Dep't of Health

• Decision Date: 24 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 12–CV–1145 MV/LAM,12–CV–1145 MV/LAM
• Citation: 165 F.Supp.3d 1048
• Parties: JL, through her next friend, Bruce Thompson, Esq., et al., Plaintiffs, v. New Mexico Department of Health, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

165 F.Supp.3d 1048

JL, through her next friend, Bruce Thompson, Esq., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.New Mexico Department of Health, et al., Defendants.

No. 12–CV–1145 MV/LAM

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Signed February 24, 2016

Charles Robert Peifer, Robert E. Hanson, Peifer, Hanson & Mullins, PA, John Ford Hall, Kelly K. Waterfall, Peter Cubra, Law Office of Peter Cubra, Nancy L. Simmons, Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons PC, Rachel E. Higgins, Rachel E. Higgins Attorney at Law, Zachary A. Ives, Garcia Ives Nowara, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiffs.

Jerry A. Walz, Walz And Associates, John K. Ziegler, Robert Conklin, Robin A. Goble, Sean E. Garrett, Conklin, Woodcock and Zigler PC, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARTHA VÁZQUEZ

, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the DOH Defendants'¹ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claims Under the Medicaid Act and Supporting Memorandum (“Motion to Dismiss Medicaid Act Claims”) [Doc. 215], the DOH Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Rehabilitation Act and Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) Claims and Supporting Memorandum (“Motion to Dismiss Rehabilitation Act and ADA Claims”) [Doc. 216], the DOH Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claims Under the Tort Claims Act (“NMTCA”) and Supporting Memorandum (“Motion to Dismiss NMTCA Claims”) [Doc. 217], and the DOH Defendants' Motion and Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Federal Constitutional Claims and Claims Asserted Under the New Mexico Developmental Disabilities Code on the Basis of the Statute of Limitations (“Motion to Dismiss Constitutional and Disabilities Code Claims”) [Doc. 292]. The Court, having considered the motions, briefs, and relevant law, and being otherwise fully informed, finds that the Motion to Dismiss Medicaid Act Claims is granted in part and denied in part, the Motion to Dismiss Rehabilitation Act and ADA Claims is granted in part and denied in part, the Motion to Dismiss NMTCA Claims is granted in part and denied in part, and the Motion to Dismiss Constitutional and Disabilities Act Claims is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs JL, EH, RH, DA, KC, and GS (“Plaintiffs”) assert various claims against the DOH Defendants, including, as relevant to the motions disposed of herein, claims pursuant to the Medicaid Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, as well as various constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983

. Plaintiffs' claims arise out of the DOH Defendants' alleged unilateral decisions (1) temporarily to transfer Plaintiffs from the Los Lunas Hospital and Training School and the Fort Stanton Hospital and Training School (collectively, the “Training School”)—which at the time of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims were State of New Mexico institutions operated by the DOH that housed people with developmental disabilities—to various privately-run, third-party settings, including Eastern New Mexico Mental Retardation Services (“ENMRSH”), and (2) permanently to discharge Plaintiffs from the Training School and transfer Plaintiffs to ENMRSH and/or another third-party setting. The allegations in the complaint supporting Plaintiffs' claims are set forth more fully in the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated September 30, 2015. [Doc. 375]. The Court incorporates those facts by reference instead of restating them herein.

STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

authorizes a court to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “The nature of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations as true.” Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir.1994). The sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law, and when considering a rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, view those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) ; Smith v. U.S., 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir.2009) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1148, 130 S.Ct. 1142, 175 L.Ed.2d 973 (2010).

A complaint need not set forth detailed factual allegations, yet a “pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)

(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Rather, to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff's complaint must contain sufficient facts which, if assumed to be true, state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir.2010). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). “Thus, the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complainant must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.2007) (emphasis omitted). The Tenth Circuit has explained,

“[P]lausibility” in this context must refer to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs “have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” The allegations must be enough that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff plausibly (not just speculatively) has a claim for relief.

Robbins v. Okla., 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2008)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ) (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

This Memorandum Opinion and Order resolves four motions: the Motion to Dismiss Medicaid Act Claims, the Motion to Dismiss Rehabilitation Act and ADA Claims, the Motion to Dismiss NMTCA Claims, and the Motion to Dismiss Constitutional and Disabilities Code Claims.

I. The Motion to Dismiss Medicaid Act Claims [Doc. 215].

Plaintiffs allege that the DOH, the LLCP, and the Training School violated various provisions of the Medicaid Act as well as regulations promulgated pursuant to the Medicaid Act.² [Doc. 102 ¶¶ 430–31]. The DOH Defendants argue in their Motion to Dismiss Medicaid Act Claims that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief because the Medicaid Act does not grant Plaintiffs a private right of action against state officials in their individual capacities or a private right of action against the state itself. [Doc. 215 at 3, 4].

A. The Court Denies as Moot the Motion to Dismiss Medicaid Act Claims Against the Individual DOH Defendants.

The DOH Defendants first move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Medicaid Act claims against the Individual DOH Defendants on the ground that there is no private right of action against state officials in their individual capacities. [Doc. 215 at 3 (citing LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999)

) ]. Plaintiffs, however, do not assert Medicaid Act claims against the Individual DOH Defendants. The complaint specifically alleges that Plaintiffs do not bring Medicaid Act claims against the Individual DOH Defendants and that Plaintiffs only assert their Medicaid Act claims against the DOH, the LLCP, and the Training School. [Doc. 235 at 3; Doc. 102 ¶ 427 (“Plaintiffs explicitly ... do not seek damages against the Individual DOH Defendants pursuant to the Medicaid Act”) ]. Moreover, Plaintiffs stipulate in their response to the Motion to Dismiss Medicaid Act Claims “that the Sixth Cause of Action for violations of the Medicaid Act do[es] not apply to any Individual DOH Defendants.” [Doc. 235 at 4]. Because the complaint does not assert Medicaid Act claims against the Individual DOH Defendants and because Plaintiffs have stipulated that they bring no such claims against the Individual DOH Defendants, the DOH Defendants' request that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs' Medicaid Act claims against the Individual DOH Defendants is moot. Accordingly, the Court denies as moot the DOH Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Medical Act Claims to the extent it seeks dismissal of Medicaid Act claims against the Individual DOH Defendants.

B. The Court Denies in Part and Grants in Part the Motion to Dismiss Medicaid Act Claims Against the DOH, the LLCP, and the Training School.

The DOH Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs' Medicaid Act claims against the DOH, the LLCP, and the Training School are subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

because the Medicaid Act does not grant Plaintiffs a private right of action against the state. [Doc. 215 at 4]. Plaintiffs ask the Court to deny the DOH Defendants' request to dismiss Plaintiffs' Medicaid Act claims against state, arguing that, while some sections of the Medicaid Act do not create a private right of action, “numerous subsections of the Medicaid Act do create a private right of action.” [Doc. 235 at 3, 4].

To determine whether Plaintiffs have stated a Medicaid Act claim against the DOH, the LLCP, and the Training School, the Court must assess whether the provisions of the Act allegedly violated confer a private right of action. See Gragert v. Lake, 541...