JLN v. State
Decision Date | 25 October 2002 |
Parties | J.L.N. v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Kyla L. Groff Kelim, Alexander City, for appellant.
William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Cedric B. Colvin, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, the appellant, J.L.N., pleaded guilty to establishing a residence in violation of the residence restrictions set forth in the Community Notification Act ("the CNA"),1 specifically a violation of § 15-20-26(b), Ala.Code 1975. The trial court sentenced him to six years in prison. The appellant did not file any postjudgment motions. This appeal followed. We reverse and render a judgment for J.L.N.
The appellant was previously convicted of the second-degree rape of his girlfriend, L.N.P., who was 15 years old at the time of the crime.2 The appellant was incarcerated for a time, and, after he was released on probation, L.N.P.'s mother and L.N.P. moved into his house. The appellant was indicted in this case on a charge that he, an adult sex offender, had established a residence within 1,000 feet of the property on which his former victim or any of his victim's immediate family members resided. § 15-20-26(b). The appellant filed an unverified motion to dismiss the indictment, to which he attached police statements from L.N.P. and her mother that indicated that L.N.P. and the appellant had L.N.P.'s mother's permission to marry and that L.N.P. and her mother had moved into the appellant's house. After a hearing was held, at which no additional evidence or testimony was presented and after the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to the charge that he had established a residence in violation of the restrictions established by the CNA. He reserved his right to challenge the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss.
This is an unusual case, in which the parties agree that the appellant was previously convicted of second-degree rape for having consensual sexual relations with his then-underage girlfriend, L.N.P. and that L.N.P. and her mother later moved into the appellant's residence. L.N.P. gave a statement to the police in which she stated that she and the appellant were engaged to be married and that her mother had granted L.N.P. permission to marry the appellant. L.N.P.'s mother gave a statement to the police in which she said that she knew that the appellant was a convicted sex offender when she and her daughter moved into his house because she had signed the warrant against him for the second-degree rape charge on which he was convicted. L.N.P.'s mother also stated that after she had signed the warrant she gave her daughter permission to marry the appellant. The State provided these statements to the appellant in response to a discovery request, and the appellant attached them to his motion to dismiss. The parties and the trial court referred to the substance of the statements at the hearing on the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated, (R. 35.) The next day, the trial court entered an order summarily denying the motion to dismiss.
(C. 18.) Section 15-20-26(b) provides:
"Unless otherwise exempted by law, no adult criminal sex offender shall establish a residence or any other living accommodation within 1,000 feet of the property on which any of his or her former victims, or the victims' immediate family members reside."
The appellant argued in the trial court, as he does on appeal, that the CNA is unconstitutional because, he says, it is overbroad and vague and violates his procedural- and substantive-due-process rights.3 Specifically, he contends that the CNA implicates the fundamental right to family integrity because it prevents certain people from marrying, prevents certain children from living with their parents, and prevents certain siblings and relatives from living in the same household. He further contends that the CNA violates his rights to procedural and substantive due process because, he says, it infringes upon the right to be free from physical restraint and punishment, the right to travel, the right to intimate association with family members, the right to marital privacy, and the right to contract and to pursue employment of one's own choosing.
Initially, we must determine whether the appellant has standing to raise these constitutional challenges to the CNA.
Taylor v. State, 442 So.2d 128, 130-31 (Ala.Crim.App.1983). In State v. Woodruff, 460 So.2d 325, 327 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), we addressed the question whether the trial court properly addressed Woodruff's claim that § 13A-6-65(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975, was unconstitutional because, Woodruff alleged, it violated "the right of privacy of consenting adults to engage in deviate sexual intercourse." In finding that the trial court did not properly address the claim, we held:
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