JM Mechanical Corp. v. U.S. by U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development

Decision Date02 September 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-5437,82-5437
Citation716 F.2d 190
PartiesJM MECHANICAL CORPORATION, a New York corporation, Appellant, v. The UNITED STATES of America, By its agent, the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Martin H. Cowen (argued), Slavitt, Fiah & Cowen, Newark, N.J., for appellant.

Bette E. Uhrmacher (argued), W. Hunt Dumont, U.S. Atty., Samuel Rosenthal, Chief of Appeals, Trenton, N.J., for appellee.

Before HUNTER and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges, and STAPLETON, * District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a final order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granting the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development's ("HUD") motion to dismiss the complaint of the JM Mechanical Corp. ("JM"), based on the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2671-2680 (1976), against HUD under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissing the case with prejudice. We will reverse and remand.

I

HUD was the insurer of a mortgage on a project known as Corinthian Towers, pursuant to Sec. 221(d)(4) of the National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1715 l (d)(4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also 24 C.F.R. Sec. 221 (1982); App. at A2. The purpose of that section of the Act is to "assist private industry in providing housing for low and moderate income families and displaced families." 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1715l (a) (1976). As insurer of the mortgage, HUD could, in its discretion, acquire the mortgage from a lender upon a default by the mortgagor. 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1715l (g)(3) (1976); see also 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1715 l (g)(1), (2) (1976). Pursuant to HUD regulations the mortgagor must furnish assurances of completion of the project, which include corporate surety bonds for payment and performance. All surety companies issuing such bonds must be satisfactory to HUD. 24 C.F.R. Sec. 221.542(a) (1982); see App. at A23.

The mortgagor and owner of the Corinthian Towers project was 67 Corinthian Associates. The general contractor was Index Construction Company. Index obtained payment and performance bonds for the project which listed Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland as surety. Those bonds were dated November 27, 1978. Thereafter, on June 20, 1980, Index defaulted under the terms of its construction contract causing all work on the project to cease.

HUD had learned on February 7, 1979, that Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, the alleged surety of the payment and performance bonds, denied the validity of the bonds. The revelation occurred after construction had begun but before JM became a subcontractor on the project. HUD allowed construction to continue without the required assurances of payment. It informed no one of this turn of events. However, by letter dated October 15, 1980 it explained its actions as follows:

You are correct that HUD regulations require the provision of a payment and performance bond on every project in excess of $500,000 where HUD mortgage insurance involved. In the case of Corinthian Towers, our bonding requirements were met at the time of the initial loan closing. Subsequently, during construction, it became apparent that the bond that had been presented to the Department was a forgery and was not valid. Our review of the situation at that time indicated that none of the parties to the insured transaction were culpable in providing the fraudulent bond. Since the developer was not able to obtain a replacement bond at that point, HUD had no viable alternative but to allow construction to proceed without the normal performance and payment bond.

Letter from Lawrence B. Simons, Assistant Secretary, HUD, to Herbert Hoffman, Executive Vice President, Subcontractor's Trade Ass'n (October 15, 1980), reprinted in App. at A28.

JM became a heating, ventilating and air conditioning system subcontractor on the Corinthian Towers Project on May 29, 1979. JM had previously worked on HUD funded projects, as well as with the principals of Index. While JM had no direct contacts with HUD, JM alleged in its complaint that the principals of Index had represented to JM that Index had "acquired payment and performance bonds from a reputable bonding company and that these bonds had been reviewed and approved by the defendant HUD." JM began work on the project unaware of the absence of valid surety bonds. Thereafter Index breached its contractual commitment before JM was fully paid for the work performed. It was only after the default, when work on the project was halted, that JM learned from Index that the bonding on the project was allegedly counterfeit.

In an effort to secure payment, JM filed suit against Index in New Jersey state court. A judgment was entered against Index for the balance due JM in the amount of $78,880.02 together with interest. That judgment remains unsatisfied. JM Mechanical Corp. v. Index Construction Co., Nos. L-67474-80, J-13,647-81 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.1981).

Thereafter, on January 25, 1982, JM filed suit against HUD for the $78,880.02 it had yet to recover from Index. JM alleged in its complaint that "defendant HUD represented that it guaranteed the mortgage on the project and that the general contractor complied with its rules and regulations including the posting of appropriate payment and performance bonds," Complaint p 5, and that JM "relied upon the aforesaid assurance of the defendant HUD and entered into its contract with the general contractor," Complaint p 6.

JM further stated three other claims in its Complaint:

9. The defendant HUD was negligent in its investigation and verification of the payment and performance bonds, was negligent in the enforcement of its own regulations, was negligent in failing to notify subcontractors that the bonds had been declared counterfeit and was negligent in failing to secure another surety bond or other assurances of payment as required by Federal Regulations.

10. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid, there is a balance due to the plaintiff on its contract in the amount of $78,880.02 which was the reasonable value of the labor and materials devoted for which the plaintiff has not been paid.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands Judgment against the defendant HUD for the sum of $78,880.02 together with interest, counsel fee and costs of suit.

Complaint paragraphs 9, 10.

On June 14, 1982, HUD moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint alleging that any wrongful conduct on the government's part fell within the exception to the availability of a cause of action for damages pursuant to the FTCA involving actions for misrepresentation, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h) (1976). That section provides in relevant part:

Sec. 2680. Exceptions

The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to--

* * *

* * *

(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights....

28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h) (1976).

At the hearing on HUD's motion counsel for JM agreed with the court that the reason for the suit against the government was JM's belief that HUD "should have told it that the bonds were no good." App. at A36. However, JM, also contended that "what we have is a reliance on the rules and regulations of HUD setting forth that there are to be payment and performance bonds for this particular project." App. at A38.

"The negligent performance of an operational task--" and that's what we have in our case before your Honor, a task that has been dictated by statutory regulations of HUD as applies to this particular type of project, and that is to make sure there is a payment and performance bond.

Having failed to achieve that responsibility or having learned that the bond was ineffective, and having assumed some responsibility for the supervision and the inspection of the project as it proceeded, especially as it related to the requisition and the disbursal of funds for the subcontractors, we believe that HUD breached its responsibility of using due care on behalf of the contractors and therefore has violated the standard and made itself liable for the damages that have been incurred by the plaintiff.

App. at A40.

The government argued that no matter how JM attempted to characterize its action, the complaint was an action for injuries resulting from a negligent misrepresentation by omission of the government. As such, a suit for recovery under the FTCA was barred by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h) (1976). See United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 81 S.Ct. 1294, 6 L.Ed.2d 614 (1961).

The district court concluded that JM's claim was one for misrepresentation and that it fell within the misrepresentation exception to the FTCA, and thus the court granted HUD's motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.

II
A

On appeal both JM and HUD renew the arguments they made before the district court. The government further argues that even if a non-misrepresentation claim arose out of the transaction, where the "government's misrepresentation of a material fact is just one of the factors relied upon to maintain the suit for economic injury," then the "claim arises out of misrepresentation." A review of the cases makes plain that the government's arguments are incorrect and that subject matter jurisdiction exists in this case.

The Supreme Court in Block v. Neal, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1089, 75 L.Ed.2d 67 (1983), restated the principles to be used in determining the applicability of the 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h) (1976) misrepresentation "exception" to otherwise assertable causes of action under the FTCA. In that case Neal contracted with Home Marketing Associates (HMA) for the construction of a prefabricated house which required HMA's work to conform to plans approved by Farmers...

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