Joaquin v. Friendship Pub. Charter Sch.

• Decision Date: 03 September 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 14-01119 (RC)
• Parties: BARBARA JOAQUIN, Plaintiff, v. FRIENDSHIP PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

BARBARA JOAQUIN, Plaintiff, v. FRIENDSHIP PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 14-01119 (RC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

September 3, 2015

Re Document Nos.: 10, 13, 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Barbara Joaquin brought this action against the Friendship Public Charter School under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Ms. Joaquin appeals from an administrative decision rejecting her claim that the defendant violated the Act by failing to provide her son G.H. with a free appropriate public education. Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons given below, the Court grants in part and denies in part both motions and remands the case to the hearing officer for further proceedings.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Framework

Congress enacted the IDEA "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." Henry v. District of Columbia, 750 F. Supp. 2d 94, 96 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). "A free appropriate public education entitles 'each child with a disability' to an 'individualized education program' that is tailored to meet his or her unique needs." Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)-(2)(A)).

The individualized education program ("IEP") is the "primary vehicle" for implementing the IDEA. Lesesne ex rel. B.F. v. District of Columbia, 447 F.3d 828, 830 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The IEP is "[p]repared at meetings between a representative of the local school district, the child's teacher, the parents or guardians, and, whenever appropriate, the disabled child." Id. (citation omitted). It "sets out the child's present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives." Id. (citation omitted).

When the parents of a student with a disability are dissatisfied with a school district or agency's "identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), the IDEA entitles them to present their arguments in an "impartial due process hearing," see id. § 1415(f). Any party aggrieved by the hearing officer determination may bring a civil action in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

B. Factual Background

In late February 2013, Ms. Joaquin's son G.H. was first identified as a student who suffers from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and other disabilities. See AR 413, 423, 429-50. At the time, he was a student in the District of Columbia's Friendship Collegiate Academy ("Collegiate"), which was part of the Friendship Public Charter School ("FPCS"). See AR 205.

Following the identification of these disabilities, G.H.'s IEP Team convened and developed an IEP to structure his schooling for the next twelve-month period, through late February 2014. See IEP, AR 429-50. The IEP called for 24.5 hours of "specialized instruction" and 60 minutes of "behavioral support services" per week. See id. at 439. The IEP also provided for "transition services" in the form of service field trips and 45 minutes per day of college and career preparation. See IEP, AR 445-46. Soon thereafter, in early March 2013, a team developed a Behavior Intervention Plan ("BIP") recommending, among other strategies, that G.H.'s teachers and support staff (1) "check in with [G.H.] frequently," (2) provide "constant, positive reinforcement for appropriate behavior," (3) "provide immediate verbal praise and/or public recognition for appropriate behavior and task completion," (4) offer "verbal praise . . . for any achievements," (5) assign him certain classroom "responsibilities [that] he prefers (i.e. handing out papers or being the group leader)," and (6) give him a "daily tracker" for use in monitoring his own performance and behavior. BIP, AR 217-18.

In April 2013, over Ms. Joaquin's objection, FPCS moved G.H. to Options Public Charter School ("Options"), citing G.H.'s lack of success at Collegiate. See AR 221-22.¹ The "co-located" instruction program at Options was designed for students with behavior management challenges and featured classrooms staffed with a special education teacher, a clinician, and a behavior technician. See id.; Tr. 440-45. At Options, during the remainder of the 2012-13 school year, G.H. had a poor attendance record, failed half of his classes, and received D's in the other two classes. See AR 598. In the summer of 2013, G.H. performed relatively well at Options on account of one-on-one instruction. See Tr. 136-37; AR 655. During the first quarter of the 2013-14 school year, however, G.H. again failed half of his classes and struggled with absences. See AR 604-10.

While at Options, G.H.'s weekly schedule consisted of 11 hours of instruction in English, Math, Science, and History. See AR 618. G.H. spent another approximately 7.1 hours in physical education, computer-based activities, and sessions called "Read Aloud." Id. The remainder of his days included time for community meetings, anger management, and sessions called "Fun Friday" and "Real Talk." Id. G.H.'s weekly schedule did not indicate that he received any of his IEP-mandated transition services. See id.; Tr. 128-29.² Before the hearing officer, G.H. testified that he spent nearly all of his time at Options sitting at a computer, see Tr. 112-13, that he never discussed college or career preparation, see id. at 128-29, that he was never given classroom responsibilities, and that, while he was aware of his behavior tracker, he was not given the tracker or tasked with monitoring his performance, see id. at 132-34. The clinical supervisor and special education coordinator at Options, by contrast, testified that G.H. received all of the services mandated by his IEP. See id. at 471, 511-12.

At Ms. Joaquin's request, in October 2013, FPCS asked the District of Columbia Office of the State Superintendent of Education to place G.H. at New Beginnings Vocational Program ("New Beginnings"), on the basis of G.H.'s aggressive behavior and lack of progress. See AR 558-64, 577-85. Days later, faced with G.H.'s persistent absences despite repeated communications with Ms. Joaquin, FPCS referred G.H. to the District of Columbia Superior Court for truancy. See AR 609-17. G.H. eventually was placed at New Beginnings, where at least initially, he was passing all of his classes. See AR 303.

In January 2014, Ms. Joaquin filed a due process complaint notice alleging that FPCS had denied G.H. a free appropriate public education, in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. See Due Process Compl. Notice, AR 3-14. Specifically, the due process complaint alleged that FPCS failed to implement G.H.'s IEP or, in the alternative, to provide or develop an appropriate IEP. See id. ¶¶ 76-108. Following a two-day due process hearing, the hearing officer rejected Ms. Joaquin's claims and denied all requests for relief. See Hearing Officer Determination ("HOD"), AR 730-44.

In June 2014, Ms. Joaquin filed a complaint in this Court. Her complaint alleges that from June 6, 2013, through October 26, 2013, FPCS failed to implement G.H.'s IEP and to provide an appropriate school placement, and that from June 6, 2013, through February 27, 2014, FPCS failed to provide G.H. with an appropriate IEP. See Compl. ¶¶ 10-13. By way of relief, Ms. Joaquin asks the Court to declare that FPCS denied G.H. a free appropriate public education in violation of the IDEA; order FPCS to provide G.H. with comprehensive psychological, functional behavioral, and level III vocational and other assessments; order FPCS to convene an IEP team meeting to review and revise G.H.'s IEP; and mandate compensatory education. See id. at 3.

Ms. Joaquin then moved for summary judgment. See ECF No. 10. FPCS subsequently cross-moved for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. 13, 14.³ Both motions are now fully briefed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Following an administrative proceeding under the IDEA, any party that is "aggrieved by the findings and decision" of the hearing officer may bring a civil action in federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). The reviewing court "(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(c). Given the court's authority to hear additional evidence, the "IDEA plainly suggests less deference than is conventional in administrative proceedings." Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). But the court's review based on the preponderance of the evidence is not to be confused with "unfettered de novo review." Roark ex rel. Roark v. District of Columbia, 460 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2006). Rather, the court must accord "due weight" to state administrative proceedings. Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)). And "a court upsetting the [hearing] officer's decision must at least explain its basis for doing so." Reid, 401 F.3d at 521 (citation omitted). Moreover, the party bringing the challenge "take[s] on the burden of persuading the court that the...