Joaquin v. Friendship Pub. Charter Sch.

• Citation: 188 F.Supp.3d 1
• Decision Date: 27 May 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 14-1119 (RC)
• Parties: Barbara Joaquin, Plaintiff, v. Friendship Public Charter School, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

188 F.Supp.3d 1

Barbara Joaquin, Plaintiff,

v.Friendship Public Charter School, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 14-1119 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed May 27, 2016

Douglas Tyrka, Tyrka & Associates, LLC, McLean, VA, for Plaintiff.

Ellen Douglass Dalton, Friendship Public Charter School, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

I. INTRODUCTION

In this action, Plaintiff Barbara Joaquin seeks from Defendant Friendship Public Charter School ("FPCS") an award of the attorneys' fees and costs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 –1482. Ms. Joaquin argues that she was the prevailing party and that her requested fees and costs are reasonable. See Pl.'s Mot. Fees & Costs at 4–15, ECF No. 24 ("Pl.'s Mot."); see also Pl.'s Reply Opp'n Mot. Fees & Costs at 1, ECF No. 26 ("Pl.'s Reply") (seeking the "total sum" of amounts identified in her itemized exhibits); Pl.'s Reply Ex. 1 at 27 (seeking $119,636.31 in fees and costs). FPCS disputes Ms. Joaquin's prevailing party status as well as the reasonableness of the fees she seeks. See Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Fees & Costs, ECF No. 25 ("Def.'s Opp'n"). The Court concludes that Ms. Joaquin was the prevailing party, but that only some of Ms. Joaquin's requested fees are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court will grant in part and deny in part her motion for fees and costs.

II. BACKGROUND

In January 2014, Ms. Joaquin filed an administrative due process complaint alleging that FPCS had denied her son, G.H., a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") in violation of the IDEA. Joaquin v. Friendship Pub. Charter Sch. , No. 14–1119, 2015 WL 5175885, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2015) ; Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1. Ms. Joaquin alleged that FPCS had failed to implement G.H.'s individualized education program ("IEP") or, in the alternative, that FPCS had failed to provide or develop an appropriate IEP for G.H. Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *2. After an administrative hearing, a hearing officer rejected Ms. Joaquin's claims and denied all her requests for relief. See Compl. ¶ 3.

In June 2014, Ms. Joaquin appealed to this Court. Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *3. Her federal complaint asked this Court to (1) declare that FPCS denied G.H. a FAPE in violation of the IDEA; (2) order FPCS to provide G.H. with comprehensive psychological, functional, behavioral, vocational, and other assessments; (3) order FPCS to convene an IEP team meeting to review and revise G.H.'s IEP; and (4) mandate compensatory education. See Compl. at 3. After reviewing the administrative record, this Court found that FPCS denied G.H. a FAPE and violated the IDEA by failing to provide G.H. with any of his IEP-mandated transition services. See Joaquin , 2015 WL 5175885, at *10. The Court remanded the case to the administrative hearing officer to allow the hearing officer (1) to determine whether Ms. Joaquin's requested compensatory education would be pertinent to G.H.'s wrongfully denied transition services, and (2) if yes, to develop a reasonably calculated award of compensatory education. See id.

On remand, the parties reached an agreement on an appropriate award of compensatory education, and the hearing officer issued a consent order that reflected their agreement. See Pl.'s Mot. Ex. 12 at 2, ECF No. 24-12. The consent order required FPCS to provide Ms. Joaquin with funding, to a maximum amount of $1950, for third-party transition services of Ms. Joaquin's choosing. Id. After the hearing officer dismissed Ms. Joaquin's administrative case, id. , Ms. Joaquin filed a motion for fees and costs, which is before the Court now. See Pl.'s Mot.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the IDEA, this Court may award "reasonable attorneys' fees" to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). In doing so, the Court follows a two-step inquiry: first, the court must determine whether the party seeking attorneys' fees is the prevailing party; second, the court must determine whether the requested fees are reasonable. See McAllister v. District of Columbia , 21 F.Supp.3d 94, 99 (D.D.C.2014) ; Jackson v. District of Columbia , 696 F.Supp.2d 97, 101 (D.D.C.2010).

A "prevailing party" is one "who has been awarded some relief by the court." Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598, 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) ; see also Alegria v. District of Columbia , 391 F.3d 262, 264 (D.C.Cir.2004) (applying Buckhannon s prevailing party analysis in the IDEA context). Specifically, "plaintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties' for attorneys fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe , 581 F.2d 275, 278–79 (1st Cir.1978) ); see also Artis ex rel. S.A. v. District of Columbia , 543 F.Supp.2d 15, 22 (D.D.C.2008) (noting that "[a]lthough a hearing officer may make a prevailing party determination, it is the province of the district court to make the ultimate decision as to who prevailed in an IDEA action"). To determine whether the party moving for fees is a prevailing party, courts in this circuit apply a three-part test: "(1) there must be a ‘court-ordered change in the legal relationship’ of the parties; (2) the judgment must be in favor of the party seeking the fees; and (3) the judicial pronouncement must be accompanied by judicial relief." District of Columbia v. Straus , 590 F.3d 898, 901 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Thomas v. Nat'l Sci. Found. , 330 F.3d 486, 492–93 (D.C.Cir.2003) ); accord Arthur v. District of Columbia , 106 F.Supp.3d 230, 234 (D.D.C.2015).

If the Court determines that a plaintiff is a "prevailing party," the court must then determine whether the fees sought are reasonable. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). A reasonable fee is calculated by multiplying "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation ... by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; see also Jackson, 696 F.Supp.2d at 101 (applying Hensley in the IDEA context). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of any fee requests, and, specifically, whether both the hourly rate and the number of hours spent on any particular task are reasonable. See Eley v. District of Columbia , 793 F.3d 97, 104 (D.C.Cir.2015) ; Jackson , 696 F.Supp.2d at 101 (citing In re North , 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C.Cir.1995) ). A plaintiff may do so by submitting evidence of "the attorneys' billing practices; the attorneys' skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates of the relevant community." McAllister , 21 F.Supp.3d at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Covington v. District of Columbia , 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C.Cir.1995) ). Once the plaintiff has provided that evidence, the Court presumes that the number of hours billed is reasonable, and the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's showing. Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109–10 ; Blackman v. District of Columbia , 677 F.Supp.2d 169, 172 (D.D.C.2010). However, if both parties fail to present satisfactory evidence demonstrating that their proposed hourly rates are reasonable, the court may determine a reasonable hourly rate by reference to the Laffey Matrix. See Brown v. District of Columbia , 80 F.Supp.3d 90, 96 (D.D.C.2015).¹

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Prevailing Party

FPCS argues that Ms. Joaquin is not a prevailing party because the relief she obtained was not what she originally sought. See Def.'s Opp'n at 5–9. Ms. Joaquin argues that she is a prevailing party because "[i]n this Court's decision and the [administrative] remand decision together, Ms. Joaquin obtained the declaration that [FPCS] had denied her son FAPE and compensatory education." Pl.'s Mot. at 4.

To be considered a "prevailing party," Ms. Joaquin must have: (1) experienced a court-ordered change in her legal relationship with FPCS, (2) obtained a favorable judgment, and (3) received a judicial pronouncement accompanied by some judicial relief. See Straus , 590 F.3d at 901 (articulating the three-part test for determining prevailing party status). A party need not succeed on every claim to be a prevailing party, because a court has discretion to consider the extent to which a party prevails on various issues when calculating fee awards. See Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433–37, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (explaining that if a party enjoys limited success on the merits, a court may reduce an award accordingly). "The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute." Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist. , 489 U.S. 782, 792–93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989).

Here, Ms. Joaquin has experienced a material alteration of her legal relationship with FPCS through a court-ordered change, and so she satisfies the first prong of the three-part test for determining prevailing-party status. See Straus , 590 F.3d at 901. A consent order, like a consent decree, works as a court-ordered change. See, e.g. , Buckhannon , 532 U.S. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ("[S]ettlement agreements enforced through a consent decree may serve as the basis for an award of attorneys' fees. ... [They are] a court-ordered ‘chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant."’ (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n , 489 U.S. at 792, 109 S.Ct. 1486 )); Arthur v. District of Columbia , 106 F.Supp.3d 230, 234–35 (D.D.C.2015) (finding that an administrative consent order sufficed to establish the plaintiff's prevailing-party status). Because Ms. Joaquin brought...