Jobe v. State ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Safety

• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: OPALA
• Citation: Jobe v. State ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 243 P.3d 1171, 2010 OK 50 (Okla. 2010)
• Decision Date: 04 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. 106,504.,106,504.
• Parties: Jordan J. JOBE, Plaintiff/Appellee v. STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant/Appellant.

243 P.3d 1171

2010 OK 50

Jordan J. JOBE, Plaintiff/Appellee

v.STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 106,504.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

June 29, 2010.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 2010.

ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. 4

¶ 0 The Department of Public Safety revoked the appellee's driver's license for a period of three years pursuant to the mandate of 47 O.S.Supp.2006 § 6-205.1 because he was subject to three license revocations within a five-year period. The District Court, Cleveland County, Tom Lucas, Judge, reduced the revocation period on appeal from three years to one year, determining that the first revocation commenced more than five years before motorist's arrest for the third DUI offense. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the one-year revocation. On certiorari granted upon the Department's petition,

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED, THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER IS REVERSED AND THE ORDER ENTERED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY STANDS REINSTATED.

A. DeAnn Taylor, Deputy Chief Legal Counsel, Department of Public Safety, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant/Appellant.

Wiley L. Williams, Oklahoma City, OK, and Rick Powell, Foshee and Yaffe, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff/Appellee.¹

OPALA, J.

¶ 1 The dispositive issue on certiorari is whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred when it affirmed the district court's order that reduced a driver's license revocation period from three years to a single year. We answer in the affirmative.

ITHE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

¶ 2 The Department of Public Safety (DPS) revoked Jordan J. Jobe's (motorist, licensee or Jobe) driver's license for a three-year period for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) following his third alcohol-related offense committed within five years. Motorist claimed a one-year revocation should have been applied because the third DUI arrest occurred more than five years after the first "revocation commenced" within the meaning of that phrase in 47 O.S.Supp.2006 § 6-205.1.²

¶ 3 The quoted phrase is central to the controversy before us. We are called upon to ascertain when a revocation takes effect under the terms of § 6-205.1 for the purpose of computing the length of the revocation period applicable to a motorist's 2007 DUI offense.

¶ 4 The critical facts are undisputed. Motorist's first DUI arrest took place on July 30, 2002. He refused to submit to a state chemical test. On July 31, 2002 his driver's license was seized and he was served an officer's affidavit and notice of revocation. The officer's affidavit was usable as a temporary license with full driving privileges.³ Motorist timely requested an administrative hearing which operated to stay the revocation order.⁴ He (a) withdrew the request prior to the hearing, (b) agreed to an 180-day revocation beginning October 22, 2002 and (c) accepted from DPS a restricted driver's license.⁵ Jobe enjoyed full driving privileges from the date of his arrest through October 21, 2002.

¶ 5 Motorist's second DUI arrest occurred on February 18, 2003. A mandatory one-year revocation of his driving privilege followed effective March 20, 2003. He was issued another restricted driver's license which remained in effect during the entire revocation period.

¶ 6 The third DUI arrest occurred August 30, 2007. When motorist failed the blood alcohol test the next day,⁶ his driver's license was seized and he was served an officer's affidavit and notice of revocation.⁷ His timely request for an administrative hearing operated to stay DPS's revocation order.⁸ Followingthe hearing on November 9, 2007, DPS sustained the three-year revocation of Jobe's driving privilege and ordered that revocation take effect December 10, 2007.⁹

¶ 7 Motorist brought an appeal to the district court only from that portion of the November 9 order which revoked his driving privilege for a period of three years.¹⁰ He argued the three-year revocation would apply only if the 2002 revocation commenced within five years of his 2007 DUI arrest. According to motorist, the one-year revocation applies in this case because his first license revocation occurred on July 31, 2002, more than five years before his third arrest on August 30, 2007. In support of his position motorist relies on (1) the seizure of his driver's license on July 31, 2002, (2) the revocation notice in the arresting officer's affidavit and (3) the issuance of a temporary driver's license on that date. DPS argued the license revocation in question did not commence until October 22, 2002, the date when the restrictions on his driving privilege first took effect.

¶ 8 The trial court agreed the revocation period should be reduced to one year. According to its decision, a revocation "commences" either at the time of arrest or no later than thirty days after the "notice of revocation" is served on licensee. The trial court found that DPS records incorrectly show October 22, 2002 as the commencement date of the first revocation. The trial court changed the date for the beginning of the third revocation period from December 10, 2007 to September 30, 2007 ( i.e., thirty days from the date motorist was served notice of revocation following his third arrest on August 30, 2007).

¶ 9 DPS brought an appeal from the trial court's order. It claimed the trial court erred in finding (a) that it had jurisdiction to determine the commencement date of the first revocation and in finding (b) that revocation commences either at time the arresting officer serves the motorist notice of revocation or, at the latest, 30 days thereafter. DPS further argued that the manner in which the trial court construed relevant statutes operates to render them constitutionally infirm.

The Court of Civil Appeals' Opinion And The Parties' Arguments on Certiorari

¶ 10 The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) (a) affirmed the trial court's reduction of the revocation period from three years to a single year, but (b) vacated that part of its order which determined the commencement date of the 2002 revocation. According to COCA, Jobe's first DUI-related revocation commenced July 31, 2002, the date he was required to surrender his driver's license, which occurred more than five years before the arrest date that brought about the 2007 revocation. COCA held the trial court had jurisdiction to hear motorist's appeal from the 2007 revocation and found unpersuasive DPS's argument that the trial court's construction of the relevant statutes renders them constitutionally infirm.

¶ 11 DPS claims COCA has misinterpreted the law by erroneously determining that a license revocation commences when a person is required to surrender his driver's license, even though the actual termination effect may be stayed during the appeal process. DPS urges that in this case the critical period would be calculated from October 22, 2002 (the date when Jobe's driving privileges became restricted) to August 30, 2007 (the arrest date preceding his third revocation).The three-year revocation period would hence apply because the first (2002) revocation took effect within five years of the third (2007) arrest.

IISTANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12 The dispositive issue on certiorari presents a question of statutory construction: when does a driver's license revocation take effect ( i.e. "commence") within the meaning of 47 O.S.Supp.2006 § 6-205.1(A)(2)(a) and (3)(a) ¹¹ (the statute in effect at the time of the 2007 revocation) for the purpose of ascertaining the length of the revocation period imposable for multiple DUI-related offenses occurring within a five-year period.

¶ 13 Statutory construction presents a question of law¹² which stands before us for de novo review.¹³ In that review we have plenary, independent and non-deferential authority to determine whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. ¹⁴ The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.¹⁵ That intent is first divined from the language of a statute.¹⁶ If a statute is plain and unambiguous, it will not be subjected to judicial construction, but will receive the effect its language dictates.¹⁷ Only when the intent cannot be ascertained from a statute's text, as when ambiguity or conflict (with other statutes) is shown to exist, may rules of statutory construction be invoked for use.¹⁸

IIITHE REVOCATION PERIOD OF A DRIVER'S LICENSE BEGINS ( i.e. COMMENCES) PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF 47 O.S.SUPP.2006 § 6-205.1 WHEN ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS OCCUR WHICH IMPOSE ACTUAL LOSS OF (OR RESTRICTIONS ON) THE LICENSEE'S DRIVING PRIVILEGE

A.The Statutory Scheme Governing Motorist's 2007 Driver's License Revocation

¶ 14 When a valid driver's license has been surrendered or seized for an alcohol-related offense under the implied consent laws, the arresting officer is required to issue to the arrestee a dated receipt which serves as a temporary driver's license. 47 O.S.Supp.2005 § 754.¹⁹ The receipt operates as a temporary driver's license for a period of 30 days and constitutes DPS's "notice of revocation of driving privilege ... effective in thirty (30) days." ²⁰ If an arrestee's blood alcohol content is over the legal limit or if he (or she)refuses to submit to a breath or blood alcohol test, DPS is required to revoke the driver's license for a period provided by the terms of § 6-205.1.²¹

¶ 15 According to the pertinent terms of 47 O.S.Supp.2006 § 6-205.1(A)(2) and (3), the statute in effect at the time of the critical 2007 arrest, ²² a revocation shall be for a period of one year if within five years preceding the date of arrest a "prior revocation commenced" or for a period of three years if, within a five-year period, "two or more prior revocations commenced."

¶ 16 The Legislature defines "revocation of driving privilege" as "[t]he termination by formal action of the Department of a person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways. Such action shall include the...