Jochum v. Jackson Twp., Case No. 2013CA00013
Citation | 2013 Ohio 3592 |
Decision Date | 19 August 2013 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2013CA00013 |
Parties | RICHARD T. JOCHUM Plaintiff - Appellant v. JACKSON TOWNSHIP Defendant - Appellee |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
JUDGES:
Appeal from the Stark County Court
of Common Pleas, Case No.
For Plaintiff-Appellant
DAVID M. WATSON
For Defendant-Appellee
MEL L. LUTE, JR.
Baker, Dublikar, Beck
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Richard T. Jochum appeals from the December 20, 2012 Judgment Entry of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas granting the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant-appellee Jackson Township.
{¶2} Appellant Richard T. Jochum is the owner of real property located on Marshall Drive in Jackson Township. He has lived at the Marshall Road address in excess of 32 years.
{¶3} In 1978, appellant brought an action against appellee, seeking to compel the township to construct a storm water pipe line to alleviate flooding at his house. As memorialized in a Judgment Entry filed in June of 1979, the Stark County Court of Common Pleas ordered the Jackson Township Trustees to furnish all pipes necessary to construct a storm water sewer pipeline along Marshall Drive and to maintain the same. A pipeline was installed in accordance with the court's order.
{¶4} Appellant alleges that because appellee issued an excessive number of building permits for the construction of residential homes between 1979 and the present, the natural flow and absorption of natural surface water was disrupted. He further alleges that as a result, the storm water pipe located in the public right-of-way in front of his home could no longer adequately handle water flow, causing flooding of his property. Appellant installed a number of sump pumps to pump water out of his basement. Appellee eventually installed a small pipeline in appellant's front yard and connected it to the Marshall Road pipeline to allow appellant to attach his hose from the sump pumps directly into the pipeline.
{¶5} On July 25, 2012, appellant filed a verified complaint for mandamus, trespass, nuisance and negligence against appellee. Appellant, in his complaint, alleged that appellee had failed to maintain the storm water pipeline by not replacing the Marshall Drive storm water pipes to accommodate the increase in water flow. Appellant also alleged that the resultant flooding occurring on his property constituted a taking of his property for public use. In response, appellee, on November 19, 2012, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellee, in its motion, argued, in part, that it was immune from liability under R.C. Chapter 2744. Appellant filed a response in opposition to appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment on December 6, 2012 and appellee filed a reply brief on December 18, 2012.
{¶6} Pursuant to a Judgment Entry filed on December 20, 2012, the trial court sustained appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court, in its Judgment Entry, found that appellee was immune from liability and also that appellant's takings (mandamus) claim failed as a matter of law.
{¶7} Appellant now raises the following assignment of error on appeal:
{¶8} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DETERMINING THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AND THAT DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
I
{¶9} Appellant, in his sole assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred in sustaining appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. We disagree.
{¶10} Civ.R. 56 states, in pertinent part:
{¶11}
{¶12} When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment, an appellate court applies the same standard used by the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987). This means we review the matter de novo. Doe v. Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 2000-Ohio-186, 738 N.E.2d 1243.
{¶13} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis of the motion and identifying the portions of the record which demonstrates absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the non-moving party's claim. Drescher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 1996-Ohio-107, 662 N.E.2d 264. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material factdoes exist. Id. The non-moving party may not rest upon the allegations and denials in the pleadings, but instead must submit some evidentiary materials showing a genuine dispute over material facts. Henkle v. Henkle, 75 Ohio App.3d 732, 600 N.E.2d 791 (12th Dist.1991).
{¶14} At issue in the case sub judice is whether or not appellee is immune from liability. The Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act affords political subdivisions immunity from certain types of actions. Determining whether a political subdivision is immune from liability involves a three-tiered analysis. Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 1998-Ohio-421, 697 N.E.2d 610. In the first tier, R.C. 2744.02(A) provides broad immunity to political subdivisions and states that, a "political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function." In the second tier of the analysis, R.C. 2744.02(B) provides five exceptions that may lift the broad immunity provided for in R.C. 2744.02(A). Of relevance is R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) which provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in sections 3314.07 and 3746.24 of the Revised Code, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the negligent performance of acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political subdivisions." (Emphasis added).
{¶15} In the third tier, immunity may be reinstated if the political subdivision can demonstrate the applicability of one of the defenses found in R.C. 2744.03(A)(1) through (5).
{¶16} There is no dispute that appellee, a township, is a political subdivision. The parties disagree as to whether or not a proprietary or governmental function is at issue in this case. R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(l) states that a "governmental function" includes "(l) The provision or nonprovision, planning or design, construction, or reconstruction of a public improvement, including, but not limited to, a sewer system." In turn, R.C. 2744.01(G)(2(d) states that a "proprietary function" includes "[t]he maintenance, destruction, operation, and upkeep of a sewer system."
{¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court, in Coleman v. Portage Cty. Engineer, 133 Ohio St.3d 28, 2012-Ohio-3881, 975 N.E.2d 952, recently addressed the issue of what constituted a governmental function as opposed to a proprietary function in relation to a sewer system. In Coleman, the plaintiffs alleged that the existing storm drainage system was unable to accommodate all of the drainage water it collected and thus overflowed, causing flooding and damage to their property. After the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Portage County Engineer, alleging that the engineer negligently designed, constructed, and maintained the drainage system, the trial court granted the engineer's motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis of political-subdivision immunity. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal to the extent the claims were based on negligent design and construction, but reversed to the extent the claims were based on negligent maintenance of the sewer system.
{¶18} The homeowners then appealed and the engineer cross-appealed. The Ohio Supreme Court accepted the engineer's discretionary appeal which asserted the following proposition of law:
{¶19} In reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "failure to upgrade is different from the failure to maintain or upkeep." Id. at ¶ 24. The Court stated that to "upgrade means '[t]o exchange a possession for one of greater value or quality; trade up." Id, citing American Heritage Unabridged Dictionary 1890 (4th Ed,. 2000). In its decision, the Ohio Supreme Court further stated, in relevant part, as follows:
{¶20} "...
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