Jodka v. City of Cleveland

• Decision Date: 23 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 99951.,99951.
• Citation: 6 N.E.3d 1208
• Parties: Sam JODKA, Plaintiff–Appellant v. City of CLEVELAND, Ohio, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

6 N.E.3d 1208

Sam JODKA, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.City of CLEVELAND, Ohio, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 99951.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Jan. 23, 2014.

Andrew R. Mayle, Ronald J. Mayle, Jeremiah S. Ray, Mayle, Ray & Mayle, L.L.C., Fremont, OH, John T. Murray, Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., Sandusky, OH, for appellant.

Barbara Langhenry, Director of Law, City of Cleveland, by Gary S. Singletary, Assistant Director of Law, Cleveland, OH, for appellee.

Chris Bator, Gregory V. Mersol, Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland, OH, for Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., et al.

Before: S. GALLAGHER, P.J., ROCCO, J., and KILBANE, J.

KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.

{¶ 1} This appeal presents another challenge to the constitutionality of a city's automated camera civil traffic enforcement system.SeeMendenhall v. Akron,117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255;Cleveland v. Posner,193 Ohio App.3d 211, 2011-Ohio-1370, 951 N.E.2d 476(8th Dist.);State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland,166 Ohio App.3d 293, 2006-Ohio-2062, 850 N.E.2d 747(8th Dist.), aff'dState ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland,112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923;Balaban v. Cleveland, 6th Cir.No. 07–CV–1366, 2010 WL 481283(Feb. 5, 2010);Gardner v. Cleveland,656 F.Supp.2d 751(N.D.Ohio2009);Mendenhall v. Akron, N.D.OhioNos. 06–CV–139and06–CV–154, 2008 WL 7484179(Dec. 9, 2008);Walker v. Toledo,2013-Ohio-2809, 994 N.E.2d 467.

{¶ 2} Herein, plaintiff-appellantSam Jodka appeals from the trial court's order that granted the motions to dismiss and for summary judgment that defendants-appellees the city of Cleveland, Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., Boulder Acquisition Corp., and Xerox Corporation¹ filed in response to Jodka's complaint.Jodka's complaint asserted that Cleveland Codified Ordinances (“CCO”) 413.031, which adopts an automated camera civil traffic enforcement system with a concomitant quasi-judicial process for that city, violates the Ohio Constitution's Article IV, Section 1.That section of the constitution gives the Ohio General Assembly the exclusive power to create a court.Jodka further asserted in his complaint that, because the city wrongfully collected monies from purported violators of this unconstitutional ordinance, he was entitled to class certification in order to pursue a claim of unjust enrichment against the appellees.

{¶ 3} Jodka presents three assignments of error.He argues in his first and second assignments of error that the trial court's decision to dismiss his complaint was improper because: (1) several sections of CCO 413.031 impair the jurisdiction of the Cleveland Municipal Court; and (2)he presented a cognizable common law claim for unjust enrichment.In his third assignment of error, he asserts that the trial court improperly granted ACS's motion for summary judgment.

{¶ 4}This court finds that sections CCO 413.031(k) and ( l ) violate Article IV, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution.Therefore, the trial court improperly dismissed that count of Jodka's complaint, and Jodka's first assignment of error is sustained.

{¶ 5} However, because Jodka lacks standing to pursue a claim for unjust enrichment, his second assignment of error is overruled.This court declines to address Jodka's third assignment of error because he presents no authority for his argument as required by App.R. 16(A)(7).The trial court's order is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

{¶ 6} Jodka filed his complaint on June 6, 2012.Therein, he made the following pertinent allegations.

{¶ 7} Cleveland adopted a “civil enforcement system for red light and speeding offenders” pursuant to CCO 413.031.ACS provided the physical components for implementing the system.By means of this system, an electronic photographic, video or electronic camera and vehicle sensor automatically captures images of each vehicle that violates a speed limit or a red light.ACS employees review the images, obtain the names and addresses of the vehicle owners, then send them to Cleveland employees.Appellees“jointly” send “tickets” for these violations to the vehicle owners, and the vehicle owners are assessed a monetary penalty of between $100.00 and $200.00.Appellees“jointly” reap the benefits of the monies collected under traffic camera enforcement system pursuant to CCO 413.031.In 2007, appellees sent Jodka a ticket for a violation of the ordinance, and he“paid the associated monetary penalty.”²

{¶ 8} In the first count of his complaint, Jodka alleged that CCO 413.031 violated Art. IV, Sec. 1 of the Ohio Constitution because it “stripped” the municipal court of jurisdiction over violations of “any ordinance” as conferred by R.C.1901.20.Jodka alleged that actions over which CCO 413.031 purported to apply were under the exclusive jurisdiction of municipal courts pursuant to R.C.1901.20 because, “[b]y definition, 413.031 violations (i.e., speeding and red light) are not ‘parking infractions.’ ”Jodka asserted that his payment of the penalty did not waive his claim, but “created” it.

{¶ 9} In the second count of his complaint, Jodka further alleged that, prior to its 2009amendment, when he paid his fine, CCO 413.031 also violated the Art. I, Sec. 2 of the Ohio Constitution, because “owners” were the only class of persons who were liable for violations.Jodka asserted there was no rational basis to differentiate drivers who violated the ordinance between vehicle “owners” and vehicle “lessees.”He demanded a “return of the monies collected or held under former 413.031” by appellees, and asserted this claim was brought “in equity.”

{¶ 10} In the third count of his complaint, Jodka requested the trial court to certify a class pursuant to Civ.R. 23 for every person who paid a penalty for a ticket issued under the unconstitutional ordinance.He sought to establish a “sub-class” of owners like himself who had paid a fine for violating the ordinance prior to its 2009amendment.

{¶ 11} ACS filed a “motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment” with respect to Jodka's complaint, attaching an affidavit to its motion.³On August 20, 2012, Cleveland filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss Jodka's complaint.Neither appellee filed an answer.

{¶ 12}Appellees maintained in their motions that the ordinance is constitutional.ACS also argued that Jodka could not support his unjust enrichment claim against it because, rather than “splitting” ticket monies with ACS, Cleveland simply paid for ACS's services pursuant to a contract.

{¶ 13} On September 11, 2012, the trial court issued a journal entry that stated as follows:

By agreement of the parties, Defendant ACS' argument that Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claims against ACS fail as a matter of law (found at pp. 16–17 of ACS' August 17, 2012 motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment) is hereby severed from the motion, without prejudice.ACS will have the opportunity to reassert the argument, and the parties will have the opportunity to engage in discovery, in the eventCourtdenies ACS' motion to dismiss.* * *

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 14} On September 21, 2012, Jodka filed a single brief in opposition to appellees' motions.He attached to his brief copies of: (1) the 1985 Cleveland Municipal Court order that permitted the city to establish a “Parking Violations Bureau” with the authority “to handle all parking infractions occurring within the territory of the municipal corporation,” and (2)CCO Chapter 459, the enabling legislation for that bureau.As set forth in CCO 459.01(a), violation of CCO 413.031 was not listed within the definition of a “parking infraction.”

{¶ 15} On May 3, 2013, the trial court issued an opinion and journal entry that granted appellees' motions and dismissed Jodka's complaint.The trial court stated in pertinent part as follows:

Under CCO 413.031(k), violations are handled along the same lines as parking violations.As such, when an alleged violator disputes the claim, there is an appeal process where appeals are heard by the Parking Violations Bureau through an administrative process established by the Clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court.

* * * [T]he Complaint indicates that in 2007, PlaintiffSam Jodka(hereafter “Plaintiff”) was issued a ticket for violation of CCO 413.031.Plaintiff paid the monetary penalty and did not appeal the violation.However, five years after the ticket was issued, Plaintiff brought suit based upon the receipt of his ticket on the theory that CCO 413.031 violates Article IV, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, and that the version of CCO 413.031 in effect in 2007 violated the Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.

Plaintiff now seeks monetary relief against ACS and the City of Cleveland * * *.Defendants * * * have moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment * * *.

* * *

The General Assembly exercised its exclusive power to establish courts and determine their jurisdiction under Ohio Const. Art. IV, Sec. 1 by enacting R.C.1901.20(A)(1), under which municipal courts were granted jurisdiction over the “violation of any ordinance * * * unless the violation is required to be handled by a parking violations bureau pursuant to Chapter 4521 of the Revised Code.”

* * *

* * * [T]he precise issue of a constitutional violation has already been considered and rejected by Ohio Courts.* * *

Based on the applicable standards, and a review of case law, this Court finds CCO [413.031] does not violate Article IV, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, and finds the logic of both [State ex rel.] Scott[ v. Cleveland,112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923], andMendenhall [ v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255] persuasive.Accordingly, this Court gran[t]s Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Motions [sic] for Summary Judgment.

[As to]Plaintiff's claim that the earlier version of CCO 413.031 in effect prior to March 11, 2009...