Joe Adams v. Tanner

• Decision Date: 11 June 1917
• Docket Number: No. 273,273
• Citation: 244 U.S. 590,61 L.Ed. 1336,37 S.Ct. 662
• Parties: JOE ADAMS et al., Appts., v. W. V. TANNER, Attorney General of the State of Washington, and George H. Crandall, Prosecuting Attorney of Spokane County, State of Washington
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

244 U.S. 590

37 S.Ct. 662

61 L.Ed. 1336

JOE ADAMS et al., Appts.,

v W. V. TANNER, Attorney General of the State of Washington, and George H. Crandall, Prosecuting Attorney of Spokane County, State of Washington.

No. 273.

Argued May 7, 1917.

Decided June 11, 1917.

Messrs. Dallas V. Halverstadt, George Ferris, Edward J. Cannon, and Samuel H. Piles for appellants.

Mr. L. L. Thompson and Mr. W. V. Tanner, Attorney General of Washington, for appellees.

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:

Initiative Measure Number 8—popularly known as 'The Employment Agency Law'—having been submitted to the people of Washington at the general election, received a majority vote and was thereafter declared a law, effective December 3, 1914, as provided by the state Constitution. Wash Laws 1915, chap. 1. It follows:

'Be it enacted by the people of the state of Washington:

'Section 1. The welfare of the state of Washington depends on the welfare of its workers and demands that they be protected from conditions that result in their being liable to imposition and extortion.

'The state of Washington therefore exercising herein its police and sovereign power declares that the system of collecting fees from the workers for furnishing them with employment, or with information leading thereto, results frequently in their becoming the victims of imposition and extortion and is therefore detrimental to the welfare of the state.

'Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any employment agent, his representative, or any other person to demand or receive either directly or indirectly from any person seeking employment, or from any person on his or her behalf, any remuneration or fee whatsoever for furnishing him or her with employment or with information leading thereto.

'Section 3. For each and every violation of any of the provisions of this act the penalty shall be a fine or [of] not more than $100 and imprisonment for not more than thirty days.'

In Huntworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 Pac. 523, the supreme court held schoolteachers were not 'workers' within the quoted measure, and that it did not apply to one conducting an agency patronized only by such teachers and their employers. And in State v. Rossman, 93 Wash. 530, L.R.A.1917B, 1276, 161 Pac. 349, the same court declared it did not in fact prohibit employment agencies, since they might charge fees against persons wishing to hire laborers; that it was a valid exercise of state power; that a stenographer and bookkeeper is a 'worker;' and that one who charged him a fee for furnishing information leading to employment violated the law.

As members of copartnerships and under municipal licenses, during the year 1914 and before, appellants were carrying on in the city of Spokane well established agencies for securing employment for patrons who paid fees therefor. November 25, 1914, in the United States district court, they filed their original bill against W. V. Tanner, attorney general of the state, and George H. Crandall, prosecuting attorney for Spokane county, asking that Initiative Measure Number 8 be declared void because in conflict with the 14th Amendment, Federal Constitution, and that the defendants be perpetually enjoined from undertaking to enforce it. On the same day they presented a motion for preliminary injunction, supported by affidavits which were subsequently met by countervailing ones. Appellees thereafter entered motions to dismiss the original bill because (1) 'said bill of complaint does not state facts sufficient to warrant this court in granting any relief to the plaintiffs; (2) that plaintiffs have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law; (3) this court has no jurisdiction over the persons of these defendants or either of them, or the subject-matter of this action.' A temporary injunction was denied. The motions to dismiss were sustained and a final decree to that effect followed.

Considering the doctrine affirmed in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131, L.R.A.1916D, 545, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, and cases there cited, the record presents no serious question in respect of jurisdiction.

The bill alleges 'that the employment business con- sists in securing places for persons desiring to work,' and unless permitted to collect fees from those asking assistance to such end the business conducted by appellants cannot succeed and must be abandoned. We think this conclusion is obviously true. As paid agents their duty is to find places for their principals. To act in behalf of those seeking workers is another and different service, although, of course, the same individual may be engaged in both. Appellants' occupation as agent for workers cannot exist unless the latter pay for what they receive. To say it is not prohibited because fees may be collected for something done in behalf of other principals is not good reasoning. The statute is one of prohibition, not regulation. 'You take my house when you do take the prop that doth sustain my house; you take my life when you do take the means whereby I live.'

We have held employment agencies are subject to police regulation and control. 'The general nature of the business is such that, unless regulated, many persons may be exposed to misfortunes against which the legislature can properly protect them.' Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U. S. 340, 343, 60 L. ed. 1034, 1036, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561. But we think it plain that there is nothing inherently immoral or dangerous to public welfare in acting as paid representative of another to find a position in which he can earn an honest living. On the contrary, such service is useful, commendable, and in great demand. In Spokane v. Macho, 51 Wash. 322, 324, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 263, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1100, 98 Pac. 755, the supreme court of Washington said: 'It cannot be denied that the business of the employment agent is a legitimate business; as much so as is that of the banker, broker, or merchant; and under the methods prevailing in the modern business world it may be said to be a necessary adjunct in the prosecution of business enterprises.' Concerning the same subject, Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 236, 66 L.R.A. 928, 103 Am. St. Rep. 82, 77 Pac. 924, 1 Ann. Cas. 428, the supreme court of California said: 'The business in which this defendant is engaged is not only innocent and innocuous, but is highly beneficial, as tending the more quickly to secure labor for the unemployed. There is nothing in the nature of the business, therefore, that in any way threatens or endangers the public health, safety, or morals.' And this conclusion is fortified by the action of many states in establishing free employment agencies charged with the duty to find occupation for workers.

It is alleged: 'That plaintiffs have furnished positions for approximately ninety thousand persons during the last year, and have received applications for employment from at least two hundred thousand laborers, for whom they have been unable to furnish employment. . . . That such agencies have been established and conducted for so long a time that they are now one of the necessary means whereby persons seeking employment are able to secure the same.' A suggestion in behalf of the state, that while a pursuit of this kind 'may be beneficial to some particular individuals or in specific cases, economically it is certainly nonuseful, if not vicious, because it compels the needy and unfortunate to pay for that which they are entitled to without fee or price, that is, the right to work,' while possibly indicative of the purpose held by those who originated the legislation, in reason, gives it no support.

Because abuses may, and probably do, grow up in connection with this business, is adequate reason for hedging it about by proper regulations. But this is not enough to justify destruction of one's right to follow a distinctly useful calling in an upright way. Certainly there is no profession, possibly no business, which does not offer peculiar opportunities for reprehensible practices; and as to every one of them, no doubt, some can be found quite ready earnestly to maintain that its suppression would be in the public interest. Skilfully directed agitation might also bring about apparent condemnation of any one of them by the public. Happily for all, the fundamental guaranties of the Constitution cannot be freely submerged if and whenever some ostensible justification is advanced and the police power invoked.

The general principles by which the validity of the challenged measure must be determined have been expressed many times in our former opinions. It will suffice to quote from a few.

In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589, 41 L. ed. 832, 835, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427, we held invalid a statute of Louisiana which undertook to prohibit a citizen from contracting outside the state for insurance on his property lying therein because it violated the liberty guaranteed to him by the 14th Amendment. 'The liberty mentioned in that Amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.'

'If, looking at all the circumstances that attend, or which may ordinarily attend, the pursuit of a particular calling, the state thinks that certain admitted evils cannot be successfully reached unless that calling be actually prohibited, the courts cannot interfere, unless, looking through mere forms and at the substance of the matter, they can say that the statute enacted professedly to protect the public...