Joel v. Cross

• Decision Date: 02 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10CA1881.,10CA1881.
• Citation: 404 P.3d 1251
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Furrukh JOEL, Appellee and Cross–Appellant, and Aneela ROOHI, Appellant and Cross–Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

404 P.3d 1251

In re the MARRIAGE OF Furrukh JOEL, Appellee and Cross–Appellant, and Aneela ROOHI, Appellant and Cross–Appellee.

No. 10CA1881.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

Aug. 2, 2012.

Kimberley A. Cotter, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross–Appellant.

Lucero & Associates, R. Antonio Lucero, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross–Appellee.

Opinion by Judge J. JONES.

¶ 1 Aneela Roohi (wife) appeals the judgment declaring her marriage to Furrukh Joel (husband) invalid. She also appeals, and husband cross-appeals, the court's permanent orders regarding marital property and maintenance. We affirm the judgment of invalidity, affirm the permanent orders in part, reverse the permanent orders in part, vacate the permanent orders in part, and remand.

I. Background

¶ 2 Husband, a United States citizen, and wife, a citizen of Pakistan, met and married in Pakistan on September 3, 2006. Husband returned to Colorado shortly after the marriage, and began the application process to allow wife to obtain permanent immigration status in the country. One year later, in September 2007, wife arrived in the United States. She received her conditional green card in February 2008.

¶ 3 In approximately May 2009, wife left Colorado without telling husband of her departure or where she was going. Husband eventually located her at her sister's house in New York, and thereafter filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. The dissolution proceeding was eventually dismissed, however, after the parties' reconciled for disputed reasons. In September 2009, wife returned to the marital home.

¶ 4 In February 2010, wife received final approval for her permanent green card. A few days after receiving notice of the approval, wife left the marital home and never returned. Husband then filed a second petition for dissolution of marriage, which he later converted to a petition for a declaration of invalidity of marriage.

¶ 5 Following an invalidity hearing, the court found that the evidence established that wife entered into the marriage to obtain legal residency in the United States and be closer to her sister, and not, as she had claimed, because she loved husband. The court declared the marriage invalid, and wife appealed.

¶ 6 This court issued an order requiring wife to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for a lack of a final order. Specifically, the show cause order noted that the court had never held a permanent orders hearing on property and maintenance as provided by subsection 14–10–111(6), C.R.S.2011.

¶ 7 In light of wife's response, we stayed the appeal pending entry of permanent orders. Following a permanent orders hearing, the court (1) divided equally the marital increase in husband's 401(k) retirement account and the value of a Caravan automobile purchased during the marriage; (2) awarded certain jewelry to wife as her separate property; and (3) awarded wife maintenance of $150 per month for twelve months.

¶ 8 Wife thereafter renewed her appeal, and amended it to include the property division. Husband cross-appealed the property division and award of maintenance.

II. Declaration of Invalidity

¶ 9 In her appeal, wife contends that the district court erred by declaring the marriage invalid. We are not persuaded.

¶ 10 Section 14–10–111 provides that a court may declare a marriage invalid for a number of reasons. As relevant here, subsection (1)(d) of section 14–10–111 provides that a district court shall enter a decree declaring a marriage invalid where "[o]ne party entered into the marriage in reliance upon a fraudulent act or representation of the other party, which fraudulent act or representation goes to the essence of the marriage."

¶ 11 Whether a marriage should be declared invalid for fraud is a fact-based inquiry for the court to resolve. See Jones v. Milliken, 96 Colo. 279, 281, 42 P.2d 467, 468 (1935) (a marriage is presumed valid, but if a question of invalidity arises, the court must determine invalidity in light of all the facts and circumstances in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom); see also Feit v. Donahue, 826 P.2d 407, 412 (Colo.App.1992) (whether there was a misrepresentation was a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact); Pittman v. Larson Distrib. Co., 724 P.2d 1379, 1386–87 (Colo.App.1986) (question whether employer fraudulently induced employee to change jobs was for the jury to resolve). Because the issue whether a marriage should be invalidated for fraud is one of fact, we will defer to the district court's finding unless the party challenging it demonstrates that it is clearly erroneous. See Gebhardt v. Gebhardt, 198 Colo. 28, 30, 595 P.2d 1048, 1050 (1979) (a trial court's factual findings "are not to be disturbed upon appeal unless clearly erroneous and not supported by the record"); In re Marriage of Bregar, 952 P.2d 783, 785 (Colo.App.1997) ; see also In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 335 (Colo.App.2007) (when there is record support for a court's factual findings, "its resolution of conflicting evidence is binding on review").¹

¶ 12 Following the hearing on invalidity, the court found that: (1) husband was vulnerable, despondent, and lonely when he met wife because of the deaths of his first wife and their child; (2) wife knew that marrying husband would secure her legal entry into the United States; (3) wife pursued husband and convinced him to marry; (4) upon arriving in the United States, wife opened a separate bank account and kept her finances separate from those of husband, and she purchased her own cell phone and maintained a cell phone plan in her own name; (5) by her own admission, wife knew that her conditional green card would expire in February 2010; (6) wife returned from New York only to obtain her permanent green card; (7) wife "left [husband] for good" after receiving approval for her permanent green card; and (8) the parties never had sexual relations. The court also found that wife's testimony was not credible based on her demeanor at the hearing, other evidence introduced at the hearing, and her "greater motive to be untruthful as her legal residence in the United States could be placed in jeopardy if the marriage was found to be invalid."

¶ 13 Viewing the testimony in connection with its credibility assessment, the court found that wife entered into the marriage solely to obtain legal residency in the United States and not because she loved husband, as she had led him to believe. The court ultimately concluded that wife's fraudulent misrepresentations to husband in this regard went to the essence of the marriage and, accordingly, it declared the marriage invalid.

¶ 14 Wife's contentions essentially invite us to reweigh the evidence presented at the invalidity hearing. That is not our role. Because there is record support for the court's findings, we will not disturb the court's declaration of invalidity. See Jones, 96 Colo. at 281, 42 P.2d at 468 ; In re Marriage of Blietz, 538 P.2d at 116 (affirming declaration of invalidity where there was evidence husband married wife for material gain and not out of love for wife); see also In re Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d at 269–70 ; In re Marriage of Plesich, 881 P.2d 379, 381 (Colo.App.1994) (appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's order).

III. Property Division and Maintenance

¶ 15 Wife contends that the district court erred when it divided the marital property as of the date of the decree of invalidity and not as of the later permanent orders date. In his cross-appeal, husband contends that the court erred by awarding wife part of the increase in the value of his retirement account (to which he was the sole contributor), part of the value of a vehicle (which he claimed to have purchased with his own funds), and maintenance. He argues that in doing so, the court effectively rewarded wife for her fraud, contrary to the principles of equity applicable in this context. We resolve husband's contention first, because if he is correct, wife's contention is largely moot.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 16 In dividing the property at issue and awarding maintenance the court relied at the outset on subsection 14–10–111(6), which provides:

The provisions of this article relating to the property rights of spouses, maintenance, and support of and the allocation of parental responsibilities with respect to the children on dissolution of marriage are applicable to decrees of invalidity of marriage.

¶ 17 Husband argues that this statute is not applicable to the facts of this case, because applying it here would allow wife to benefit unfairly from her fraud. Wife responds that the plain language of subsection (6) controls, and entitles her to retain the property and maintenance awarded by the court. We conclude that, even assuming that the statute applies to marriages invalidated because of fraud, the awards of property and maintenance to wife cannot stand.

¶ 18 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 162 (Colo.2005). When interpreting a statute, we strive to give effect to the legislative purposes by adopting an interpretation that best effectuates those purposes. Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186, 1189 (Colo.2010). To ascertain the legislative intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the language used therein its commonly accepted and understood meaning. Id. If, upon doing so, we determine that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute as written. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 500 (Colo.2000). In that event, we do not resort to legislative history or further rules of statutory construction. See Smith, 230 P.3d at 1189 ; Spahmer, 113 P.3d at 162.

¶ 19 Also, we must read the relevant provisions of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA), sections 14–10–101 to – 133, C.R.S.2011, together, harmonizing them...