Johal v. Garland
| Decision Date | 30 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-CV-1315-LJV |
| Parties | SARANJIT SINGH JOHAL, [1]Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, [2]United States Attorney General, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
DECISION & ORDER
Saranjit Singh Johal is a citizen of India who has been detained at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility (“BFDF”) in Batavia, New York, during his removal proceedings. On September 16, 2020, Singh filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the validity of his detention at the BFDF. Docket Item 1.
On December 16, 2020, this Court granted that petition in part and denied it in part. Docket Item 8. More specifically, the Court ordered the government to “release Singh from detention unless a neutral decisionmaker conduct[ed] an individualized hearing to determine whether his continued detention is justified.” Id. at 17. At that hearing, the burden of proof was to be on the government to demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence that Singh's continued detention is necessary to serve a compelling regulatory purpose, such as minimizing risk of flight or danger to the community.” Id. The Court further ordered that “[t]he decisionmaker also must consider-and must address in any decision-whether there is clear and convincing evidence that there are no less-restrictive alternatives to physical detention, including release on bond in an amount the petitioner can reasonably afford, with or without conditions that also would reasonably address those same regulatory purposes.” Id. at 16.
Singh had a bond hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) on December 23, 2020. See Docket Item 13-3 at 1. At that hearing, the IJ found that the government had “met its burden by clear and convincing evidence” of demonstrating that Singh “is a danger to the community.” Id. at 23-24. The IJ then noted that because she “f[ound] that [Singh] is a danger to the community, ” she “d[id] not have to address whether or not [he] is a flight risk.” Id. at 24. Nevertheless, the IJ determined that Singh also posed a flight risk. Id. The IJ then concluded that there were no less-restrictive alternatives to physical detention that would adequately address the government's regulatory interest in detaining Singh. Id. The IJ also issued a written decision reiterating those findings. Docket Item 9-1.
On March 10, 2021, Singh, now represented by counsel, moved to enforce this Court's order of December 16, 2020. Docket Item 13. He claims that the bond hearing that the government provided did not comport with the Court's direction. Id.; Docket Item 13-1. On March 24, 2021, the government responded to Singh's motion, Docket Item 14, and on April 14, 2021, Singh replied, Docket Item 18.
For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part Singh's motion to enforce. More specifically, the Court determines that the IJ did not appear to run afoul of this Court's order in evaluating the danger that Singh posed to the community. But the IJ did not, as this Court ordered, determine that clear and convincing evidence established that “no less-restrictive alternatives to physical detention” could address any compelling regulatory interest in detaining him. Docket Item 8 at 16. Accordingly, this Court orders that the government shall release Singh unless, within fourteen days of the date of this order, he receives a bond hearing at which the government demonstrates that clear and convincing evidence establishes that “less-restrictive alternatives to physical detention” would not “reasonably address” the compelling regulatory interest in detaining him, Docket Item 8 at 16, or the IJ clarifies her decision by finding that “there is clear and convincing evidence that there are no less-restrictive alternatives to physical detention . . . that also would reasonably address those same regulatory purposes, ” id. In any decision, the IJ also may, but need not, address whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that Singh poses a risk of flight.[3]
Before addressing the merits of Singh's argument that his bond hearing did not comport with this Court's order, the Court must address a threshold jurisdictional issue. The government argues that this Court cannot consider Singh's motion because he has not exhausted his administrative remedies. More specifically, the government argues that Singh must first obtain a decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on an appeal of the IJ's bond decision he can seek relief in this Court. See Docket Item 14 at 3-5.
This Court disagrees. Administrative exhaustion is not required when this Court is deciding only whether the petitioner received the relief that the Court already ordered. See Blandon v. Barr, 434 F.Supp.3d 30, 37 (W.D.N.Y. 2020). Moreover, Singh argues in his motion that he did not receive a constitutionally adequate bond hearing-an issue that “the BIA does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Roque, 301 F.3d 39, 48 (2d Cir. 2002)). And the government concedes that under the doctrine they assert, exhaustion is “required [only] as a prudential matter.” Docket Item 14 at 4. Under the circumstances, it would make little sense for this Court to delay deciding Singh's motion until the BIA decides any appeal.
The government also argues that Singh “asks this Court to substitute its own judg[]ment for that of the immigration judge, ” which the government contends is a discretionary decision “protected from review . . . under 28 U.S.C. § 1226(e).” Id. at 5. This Court agrees that it does not have jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions of an IJ. But as this Court has previously explained, “a federal court always retains jurisdiction to enforce its lawful judgments, including habeas judgments, [and] the court has the authority to see that its judgment is fully effectuated.” Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F.Supp.3d 227, 325 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Gall v. Scroggy, 603 F.3d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 2010)). In other words, this Court has jurisdiction to decide the limited question of whether Singh's bond hearing complied with its prior order.
Singh argues that the IJ failed to comply with two different aspects of this Court's prior order. First, Singh contends that the IJ “impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Mr. Singh, requiring him to disprove dangerousness, flight risk, and inability to pay bond.”[4] Docket Item 13-1 at 9 (capitalization removed). Second, Singh argues that “the IJ did not meaningfully consider alternatives to detention at Mr. Singh's December 23 bond hearing.” Id. at 19. A. Dangerousness and Risk of Flight
To begin, “it is important to emphasize that the Court's task is narrow: it is to determine whether [the government] complied with the Decision and Order, not to review the hearing evidence de novo and determine whether [Singh] is in fact a flight risk” or a danger to the community. Apollinaire v. Barr, 2019 WL 4023560, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2019). The question, therefore, is whether the immigration judge “‘relied upon proof that could not possibly establish by clear and convincing evidence- as a matter of law-that [Singh] is a danger to the community' or a flight risk.” Concepcion v. Barr, 2021 WL 1807870, at *4 (quoting Nguti v. Sessions, 2017 WL 5891328, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2017)).
Singh argues that the IJ's determination that he posed a risk of flight is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Docket Item 13-1 at 12-16. Singh also contends that in finding that his proposed bond-$15, 000-could not mitigate that flight risk, the IJ effectively “placed the burden on Mr. Singh to demonstrate his ability to pay bond.” Id. at 15 (emphasis removed). The government effectively concedes that the IJ did not comply with this Court's order requiring that the government demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Singh posed a flight risk. See Docket Item 14 at 9 n.5 (). Because the IJ did not determine that clear and convincing evidence established Singh's risk of flight, his continued detention cannot be justified by the IJ's finding on this ground.
At the bond hearing, the IJ offered three reasons why Singh posed a danger to the community. First, the IJ addressed Singh's “recen[t]” and “sever[e]” conviction for “an extremely serious crime”-conspiracy to sell heroin.[5] Docket Item 13-3 at 23; Docket Item 9-1 at 2. The IJ also looked at Singh's “history of drug abuse, ” which began “back when he was 17 or approximately that age” and “was using marijuana.” Docket Item 13-3 at 23. And the IJ determined that despite this “history of drug abuse” and his prior conviction Singh had not “done anything to address his addiction other than being incarcerated.” Id. at 23-24.
At the hearing, the IJ questioned Singh about his efforts to remain drug-free prior to his incarceration. Id. at 9-11. Singh testified that he sought inpatient treatment for his drug use in 2016 before clarifying that this treatment was “just . . . a detox”; he also said that he resumed using heroin and marijuana and did not seek any further treatment afterward. Id. at 9-10. Singh testified that he continued to use heroin and marijuana until “some...
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