John Crane, Inc. v. Jones

• Decision Date: 14 September 2007
• Docket Number: Record No. 062164.
• Citation: 650 S.E.2d 851
• Parties: JOHN CRANE, INC. v. Wanda T. JONES, Administratrix, of the Estate of Garland F. Jones, Jr.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

650 S.E.2d 851

JOHN CRANE, INC. v. Wanda T. JONES, Administratrix, of the Estate of Garland F. Jones, Jr.

Record No. 062164.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

September 14, 2007.

Michael A. Pollard (Archibald Wallace, III; Thomas J. Moran; Michael C. McCutcheon; WallacePledger; Baker & McKenzie, on briefs), for appellant.

Robert R. Hatten (Donald N. Patten; Hugh B. McCormick, III; William W.C. Harty; Patten, Wornom, Hatten & Diamonstein, on brief), Newport News, for appellee.

Present: HASSELL, C.J., and KEENAN, KOONTZ, KINSER, LEMONS, and AGEE, JJ., and LACY, S.J.¹

OPINION BY Senior Justice ELIZABETH B. LACY.

Garland F. Jones, Jr. was employed as an outside machinist at Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company from 1963 to 1967. In January 2005, he was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, a fatal cancer in the lining of the lung which is caused only by exposure to asbestos dust or fibers. On March 22, 2005, Garland and Wanda T. Jones filed an amended motion for judgment against John Crane, Inc. (Crane) and other companies, alleging that Crane manufactured and/or sold asbestos-containing products to Garland Jones' employers, and that he was exposed to these products while building and repairing various marine vessels.² The Joneses sought $10 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. Garland Jones died in July of 2005. Wanda Jones, as administratrix of the estate of Garland F. Jones, Jr., (the Estate) filed a second amended motion for judgment adding a wrongful death count.

Following a seven day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Estate awarding $10.4 million in damages. The jury apportioned 34 percent of the damages to Crane, and the remaining 66 percent equally between two other defendant companies. The trial court reduced the damage award to $10 million to conform to the amount sought in the motion for judgment. Crane's damage liability amounted to $3.4 million.

Crane appeals to this Court asserting that the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded on four separate grounds. Crane first assigns error to the trial court's refusal to set aside the jury verdict as excessive. In two other assignments of error, Crane challenges the trial court's evidentiary rulings regarding the testimony of a Crane employee and two of Crane's expert witnesses. Finally, Crane asserts that the trial court should have applied Virginia law, rather than general maritime law. For the following reasons, we conclude that there was no error in the challenged rulings and we therefore will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

DISCUSSION

I. MARITIME LAW

We first address Crane's assertion that the trial court erred in applying general maritime law to the Estate's action.³ Whether general maritime law applies to this case presents a question of law which we review de novo.

The application of general maritime law has evolved from a simple "location test," under which maritime law "govern[ed] only those torts occurring on the navigable waters of the United States," Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971), to a location and connection test, initially established in Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990), and most recently discussed in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995). In Grubart, the United States Supreme Court explained that a party seeking to apply maritime law to a case

must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity. A court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water. The connection test raises two issues. A court, first, must assess the general features of the type of incident involved, to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Second, a court must determine whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.

Id. at 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

As the parties recognize, the location prong of the test is met in this case because the incident giving rise to Garland Jones' injury, inhalation of asbestos, occurred while repairing and constructing ships at the Newport News Shipyards in the James River. However, according to Crane neither prong of the connection test is met because the inhalation of asbestos does not have a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce and because Crane's activity in the manufacture of asbestos-containing products did not have a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. We disagree.

In applying the first prong of the connection test the impact of the incident is evaluated "at an intermediate level of possible generality" in order to determine whether the incident is "within a class of incidents that posed more than a fanciful risk to commercial shipping." Grubart, 513 U.S. at 538-39, 115 S.Ct. 1043 (citations omitted). The disruptive impact need only be potential, not actual. Id.

Applying the test enunciated in Sisson and Grubart, other courts have concluded that exposure to asbestos came within the general category of the risks of unsafe working conditions that have a potential impact on commercial shipping. In Lambert v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 70 F.Supp.2d 877, 884 (S.D.Ind. 1999), the court observed that "[u]nsafe working conditions aboard a vessel have consistently been held to pose a potentially disruptive impact upon maritime commerce." The Lambert Court concluded that "asbestos exposure in the boiler room of a ship — could potentially disrupt maritime commerce by rendering the boiler room too hazardous to operate." Id.See also Bartel v. A-C Product Liability Trust, 461 F.Supp.2d 600, 602 (N.D.Ohio 2006) (claim based on merchant seaman's exposure to asbestos while aboard a vessel was governed under admiralty law); Weaver v. Hollywood Casino-Aurora, Inc., 255 F.3d 379, 386 (7th Cir.2001) ("[W]ithout doubt an injury to . . . crew [of a `commercial boat'] disrupts its participation in maritime commerce."); Alderman v. Pacific Northern Victor, Inc., 95 F.3d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Unsafe working conditions aboard a vessel under repairs, maintenance, or conversion, therefore, pose a potentially disruptive impact upon maritime commerce."); Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir.1995) ("[W]orker injuries, particularly to those involved in repair and maintenance, can have a disruptive impact on maritime commerce by stalling or delaying the primary activity of the vessel.").

Accordingly, we conclude that Garland Jones' inhalation of asbestos fibers while engaged in the repair and construction of vessels on navigable waters had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce. Injury to Garland Jones that occurred during these activities could potentially slow or frustrate the work being done on the vessel. Such a result could, in turn, have a disruptive impact on maritime commerce.⁴

The second prong of the connection test — whether the activity giving rise to the incident bears a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity — requires a definition of the relevant activity "not by the particular circumstances of the incident, but by the general conduct from which the incident arose." Sisson, 497 U.S. at 364, 110 S.Ct. 2892. This inquiry demands a "broad perspective." Id. In Grubart, the Supreme Court explained that this inquiry is guided by principles of proximate causation, and that "[t]here is . . . no need . . . for imposing an additional nonremoteness hurdle in the name of jurisdiction." Id. at 538, 115 S.Ct. 1043.

We applied these principles in Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC v. Little, 270 Va. 381, 384-86, 620 S.E.2d 773, 775-77 (2005), and determined that the defendant's acts of omission and commission in manufacturing asbestos-containing material used by Little to create gaskets used on submarines "had a significant connection with maritime activity," and held that maritime law applied.

In the case now before us, Crane urges again that the manufacture and sale of asbestos-containing products into the stream of commerce is too far removed from traditional maritime activities to create the necessary relationship. Again we disagree. The record in this case reflects that during the time Garland Jones was exposed to asbestos-containing products manufactured by Crane, Crane marketed gaskets and packing material directly for the marine industry and advertised its products for "marine engine and general ship use." Crane also advertised its products in publications about maritime activity. This activity bore a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activities. The fact that Crane did not directly undertake any activity aboard a maritime vessel does not obviate this connection.

In summary, for the reasons set out above, we find that the circumstances of this case satisfied both the location and connection tests required under Grubart and therefore, the trial court did not err in applying general maritime law.

II. TESTIMONY OF TERRENCE MCNAMARA

Crane next asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the Estate to call Terrence McNamara as a witness "solely for the purpose of impeachment, when the substance of his testimony was unchallenged." McNamara was Crane's custodian of records and the designated corporate representative responsible for reviewing and certifying responses to discovery propounded upon Crane from 2000 until June 2004, including discovery in this case. A number of Crane's responses to interrogatories, submitted under McNamara's verification, were untruthful. Over Crane's objection, the trial court allowed the Estate to call McNamara as an adverse witness to impeach Crane's...