JOHN DANZ CHARITABLE TR. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 13608.
Decision Date | 14 May 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 13608.,13608. |
Citation | 231 F.2d 673 |
Parties | The JOHN DANZ CHARITABLE TRUST, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
F. A. LeSourd, Little, LeSourd, Palmer & Scott, Seattle, Wash., for petitioner.
H. Brian Holland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Melva M. Graney, Carolyn Just, Ellis N. Slack, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., John Potts Barnes, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Chicago, Ill., for respondent.
Before POPE and FEE, Circuit Judges, and CLARK, District Judge.
The instant petition was filed to review a decision of the Tax Court, 18 T.C. 454, which ordered and decided that there were deficiencies in the income tax of petitioner for three years: 1943, 1944 and 1945. There are three questions presented:
John Danz and Jessie Danz were grantors in a written trust agreement whereby there were conveyed to Trustees 6,228 shares of stock in a theatre corporation, of which 900 shares were allocated to The John Danz Charitable Trust and the balance to six other private trusts. The powers of the Trustees as to all these trusts were broadly defined in the same instrument. They were permitted to
The Trustees were not intended, as the above provisions show, to act as a religious, educational or charitable institution. But, apparently, the profits of operations were to be turned over to The John Danz Charitable Trust, "Trust A", and to the six private trusts pro rata according as the funds of each were used in the particular business or speculation. Trust A, the funds of which were to be used in such business or speculation, was not a religious, educational or charitable institution. There were, however, clauses which required that, as beneficiaries, there were to be designated by John Danz or his successors in power of appointment, only a corporation or organization "of a type which is within the exemption from Federal Income Tax now granted by Paragraph 101 of the Internal Revenue Code," as it then stood or was thereafter restricted, and also of the type there specified in Sections 23(o), 812(d) and 1004(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 23(o), 812(d), 1004(a) (2), so that the contribution bequest or gift to such beneficiary would be deductible from income and exempt from estate and gift tax, then or in the future.
During the years in question, additional contributions were made to Trust A in the sum of $109,542.00. Stocks were bought and sold or held by the Trustees. Some real property was also bought and sold at a profit. Other pieces were held for rent. The Savoy Hotel was purchased in 1943 and operated at a handsome profit during the years in question. Three candy shops were purchased out of Trust A funds in 1943 and 1944 and operated at a great profit. Jessie Danz managed these stores without compensation in order to make a contribution to Trust A.
Trust A made no distributions in 1943. Thereafter, it made distributions to a number of organizations exempt from tax under § 101 and which met the other limitations above referred to. The total of the charitable contributions thus made was $65,637.54. Two-thirds of this sum, approximately, were contributed in 1947. The corpus of Trust A materially increased during the taxable years.
The Tax Court held petitioner Trust A was not exempt under § 101(6) and that petitioner was taxable as a trust and not as an association. It was decided that petitioner was not entitled to a deduction under § 162(a) for income not distributed during the taxable year. Full credit was given for distributions to the defined charitable institutions in each of the taxable years. Finally, it was held that the Statute of Limitations had not run against the collections of the deficiencies assessed.
So far as the claim of exemption under § 101(6) of the Code is concerned, the case is ruled by our opinion in Ralph H. Eaton Foundation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 Cir., 219 F.2d 527, at pages 528-529:
and again:
Subsidiary reliance is placed upon § 162 Net Income, 26 U.S.C.A. § 162, which reads:
If the first portion of this section be applied, there is no exemption beyond that allowed. All payments by Trust A to strictly charitable corporations or concerns have been allowed. Any others were not paid or permanently set aside during the current year.
If exemption is sought under the second clause, the attempt is futile. Otherwise, no meaning is given to the word "exclusively." It is plain that these funds, when mingled with the funds of private trusts for business or speculative purposes and considering the risk of loss, were not used exclusively for religious, charitable or other like purposes.1 Trust A did not expressly dedicate any funds beyond those it disbursed to such purposes. The mere fact that the remaining funds, after partial or complete recapture from the channels of business or the marts of trade, whenever in a future more or less removed, in the discretion of the Trustees, they chose to pay these over, would necessarily be paid to institutions defined as charitable, does not satisfy the statute. There is another circumstance which compels consideration. John Danz, as settlor, was under no compulsion to exercise his power to designate charitable beneficiaries. If he failed to do so, the funds might during his life have been devoted "exclusively" to business ventures and commercial pursuits.
The "ultimate destination"2 test is applicable in strictness to other phrases of the statute. It is not repudiated under circumstances which call for its application. But here an attempt to force the facts to fit the doctrine does violence to the language of the statute. The previous clause of the statutory definition requires that the money shall have been "paid or permanently set aside" in order to be exempt. Payment is a positive act. Payment could not be made until there was a designated beneficiary. The context then would seem to require that, to be "permanently set aside", a beneficiary should be pointed out with...
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