John Deere Plow Co. v. City Hardware Co.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1912
• Parties: JOHN DEERE PLOW CO. v. CITY HARDWARE CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

57 So. 821

175 Ala. 512

JOHN DEERE PLOW CO. v. CITY HARDWARE CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 8, 1912

Appeal from City Court of Anniston; Thomas W. Coleman, Jr., Judge.

Detinue by the John Deere Plow Company against the City Hardware Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The contract referred to was a regular contract of sale of certain farming implements manufactured by plaintiff, and contained a great many conditions, but with a retention of title in the John Deere Plow Company, and a right to retake. The body of the contract contains this agreement: "It is expressly agreed and understood that the terms named therein which hold good until October 1, 1910, are not to be considered a precedent for the future." The seventh clause, referred to in the opinion, is as follows: "It is also agreed that the title to, the ownership of, and the right to immediate and exclusive possession, upon demand either oral or written, to all goods which may be shipped as herein provided, or during the current season shall remain in, and their proceeds in case of sale shall be the property of, said plow company, and subject to its order until full payment shall have been made for the same by the undersigned in money; but nothing in this clause will release the undersigned from making payment as herein agreed." The payments referred to were to be made in cash when any of the goods were sold for cash, and when the goods were sold on time they were to be settled for by note, due at regular maturity date, and the notes taken for the machinery or implements sold were to be sent to the plaintiff as collateral, listed by them, and returned to the defendant for collection. The suit was filed on the 22d day of April, 1910.

Lapsley & Arnold, for appellant.

Tate &amp Walker, Willett & Willett, and Knox, Acker, Dixon & Sterne for appellee.

MAYFIELD J.

This is an action of detinue by appellant against appellee, to recover certain chattels mentioned in the complaint. The right of the respective parties to maintain or defend the action depends solely upon the construction to be given a certain contract of sale, by which appellant sold to appellee the chattels in question. The contract in question is a conditional one of sale, by which the vendor, appellant here, retained the title to the chattels sold upon certain conditions specified in the contract of sale. The real difference between the contentions of the parties is as to whether or not the vendor had the right to retake the possession of the property sold and delivered, at the time the action was brought, or whether the time at which it could retake possession, on account of the breach of the conditions of the contract, was postponed to a later date than that at which the suit was brought.

It is not denied by the vendee, appellee here, that the sale was a conditional one, and that under certain provisions of the contract the vendor could retake possession of the property sold; but it contends that the time at which the contract provided the vendee might retake possession was fixed at October 1, 1910, while the action was brought in April, 1910. If this be true, of course, the plaintiff had no right to recover, at the time it brought the action, and therefore must fail.

On the other hand, it is contended, by the vendor that by paragraph 7 of the contract of sale (which the reporter will set out) the plaintiff was entitled...