John Doe v. State
| Citation | 158 Idaho 778,352 P.3d 500 |
| Decision Date | 30 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 42372.,42372. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | John DOE, Petitioner–Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Idaho State Police Central Sex Offender Registry, Respondent. |
John Doe, pro se appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS
This is an appeal of the district court's dismissal of John Doe's Verified Petition for Declaratory Judgment. We reverse and remand.
John Doe, a Washington resident and registered sex offender in Washington, filed a petition in Idaho district court seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether he could be required to register with the Idaho Sex Offender Registry because of his Washington offenses. Doe's expanding work opportunities required him to spend more than 30 days a year in Idaho, but he had been spending less time than that in Idaho so as not to trigger a registration requirement. Doe was contemplating relocating to Idaho. Doe sought the court's determination of whether his Washington offenses were "substantially equivalent" to an Idaho sex offense that requires registration when an out-of-state offender moves to or is employed in Idaho.
Doe pled guilty in June 2011 in the Superior Court of Washington for King County to two counts of "Communicating with a Minor for Immoral Purposes," a misdemeanor, in violation of Washington Code Section 9.68A.090(1). Doe was required to register for 10 years with the county sheriff of his county of residence in Washington. At the time of filing his Petition, Doe was required to register for eight more years. Because his offense was a misdemeanor, Doe's registration does not place him on the publicly accessible Washington sex offender website; his registration information is used only for law enforcement purposes.
On July 5, 2012, Doe e-mailed the Idaho Sex Offender Unit asking whether his Washington offenses were substantially equivalent to any Idaho sex offense that would require him to register in Idaho. That e-mail was forwarded to Cheryl Meade, Deputy Attorney General, legal counsel for the Idaho State Police, who responded to Doe. Meade informed Doe that the Central Sex Offender Registry could not provide him with an official opinion without reviewing his Washington judgment, conviction order, charging documents, and any presentence investigation report. Some time later, in March 2013, Doe sent Meade a letter enclosing all those requested documents and again seeking a determination as to whether his Washington offense was substantially equivalent to an Idaho sex offense. Doe's letter explained that while he was not a current Idaho resident, his work would bring him to Idaho in the near future. Meade responded on March 28, 2013, with a letter stating she had reviewed the Washington statute and concluded that it was substantially equivalent to Idaho Code Section 18–1506(1)(a), an offense requiring registration. She informed Doe that because his victim was under 13 years old, he would be required to register in Idaho for life.
Doe then filed the Verified Petition for Declaratory Judgment on May 30, 2013. The district court, following a hearing, dismissed the Petition, finding that Doe did not have standing, as he demonstrated no injury in fact and his claim was based on hypothetical facts because he did not yet live here. Additionally, the court found there was also no injury because Doe had not been required to register, nor was there any threatened harm because Doe had not been threatened with prosecution for failing to register. The district court's Order and Final Judgment were entered July 21, 2014, and Doe timely appealed.
Doe states the following as the issues on appeal: 1) Did the district court err in dismissing Appellant's petition for declaratory judgment? 2) Does Appellant's misdemeanor conviction in Washington qualify as a sexual offense under Idaho Code?1
Dismissals for jurisdictional reasons are reviewed de novo. Jurisdiction is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 144–45, 158 P.3d 305, 307–08 (2007). This Court exercises free review of whether the law was properly applied to undisputed facts. Miller v. Bd. of Trustees, 132 Idaho 244, 246, 970 P.2d 512, 514 (1998).
Doe petitioned the district court for a declaratory judgment as to whether his Washington conviction for Communicating with a Minor for Immoral Purposes, under Revised Code of Washington Section 9A.68.090, was "substantially equivalent" to an Idaho sex offense as that term is used in Idaho Code sections 18–8304(1)(b) and (c). The district court found that Doe had no injury and therefore dismissed the petition for lack of standing.
The district court determined that Doe had no injury because he did not live in Idaho and had not been required to register or threatened with prosecution for failing to register. Therefore, the district court dismissed the petition. Doe argues this was error because he has injuries in that he fears prosecution for failing to register, and he avoids travel to Idaho necessary for his job.
Declaratory judgments are authorized by statute: "Any person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... statute ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." I.C. § 10–1202. A declaratory judgment action, however, is subject to the requirement that a justiciable controversy exist, and it must involve actual and existing facts. Wylie v. Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 31, 253 P.3d 700, 705 (2011). Both standing and mootness are subcategories of justiciability. Id.
The allegation of a future injury is sufficient to confer standing. Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006). To satisfy the standing requirement, a petitioner must allege "an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent ... the claimed injury." Id. In Schneider, the petitioner sought a declaratory judgment regarding the existence of an easement. He established by affidavit that he planned to subdivide his property, and without confirmation of the easement's existence, he would in the future have to undergo a lengthy, expensive process to determine whether he could subdivide the property. Id. at 772–73, 133 P.3d at 1237–38. This Court held that declaratory action was appropriate to avoid that potential injury. Id.
Doe alleges by affidavit that he plans to work more frequently in Idaho. He is presently working in Idaho fewer than 30 days a year, which is less than the demands of his job would require, because he received the letter stating he must register in Idaho if he is employed in Idaho. He also alleges that if he must register on Idaho's public registry before having standing to determine whether his offense requires registration, his photograph and personal information will be on the internet while he awaits a determination. Because his offense was a misdemeanor in Washington, Doe's information is not on the public Washington sex offender website.
The Idaho Sexual Offender Registration Notification Act (SORA) requires a person sentenced for an offense identified in the Act to register with the state's central sexual offender registry ("Registry"). I.C. § 18–8306(1). In particular, a person convicted of violating Idaho Code section 18–1506 is required to register. I.C. § 18–8304(1)(a). The Registry is maintained on a publicly accessible website. SORA applies in relevant part to anyone who "has been convicted of any crime ... in another jurisdiction ... that is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (1)(a) ... and enters this state to establish residence or for employment purposes...." I.C. § 18–8304(1)(b). "Employed" means full-time or part-time employment for more than 10 consecutive working days or an aggregate of more than 30 days in any calendar year. I.C. § 18–8303(6).
Doe's plans to work in or move to Idaho are analogous to the plan to subdivide property in Schneider, where allegations of threatened harm to a future plan were sufficient to confer standing. Further, Doe has alleged a current harm in that he is presently not working in Idaho as much as his job demands would dictate. Doe has also alleged that the requested relief is substantially likely to prevent injury, and this, coupled with the injuries alleged, satisfies the standing requirement. Therefore, we reverse the district court's dismissal for lack of standing.
The district court concluded that Doe's action for declaratory judgment was not appropriate because Doe did not live in Idaho. Additionally, the state argued that Doe failed to exhaust agency remedies. Even where an agency is charged with implementing a statute, declaratory judgment in the district court is permissible to determine the applicability of agency rules. I.C. § 67–5278. This is so regardless of the availability of agency remedies:
(1) The validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment in the district court, if it is alleged that the rule, or its threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner. (2) The agency shall be made a party to the action. (3) A declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has requested the agency to pass upon the validity or applicability of the rule in question.
Id. In this case, Doe alleged that the statute and rule requiring sex offender registration in Idaho for "substantially equivalent" offenses threatened to interfere with or impair his legal rights or privileges. Doe...
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