John Greer and Others, Plaintiffs In Error v. Mezes, Maria De La Solidad Ortega De Arguello, and Jose Ramon Arguello

• Decision Date: 01 December 1860
• Citation: 16 L.Ed. 661,24 How. 268,65 U.S. 268
• Parties: JOHN GREER AND OTHERS, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. S. M. MEZES, MARIA DE LA SOLIDAD ORTEGA DE ARGUELLO, AND JOSE RAMON ARGUELLO
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

65 U.S. 268

24 How. 268

16 L.Ed. 661

JOHN GREER AND OTHERS, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. S. M. MEZES, MARIA DE LA SOLIDAD ORTEGA DE ARGUELLO, AND JOSE RAMON ARGUELLO.

December Term, 1860

THIS case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of California.

It was an action of ejectment brought, by way of petition, by the defendants in error against Greer and twenty-nine other persons. The plaintiffs below represented the interests of Arguello, whose title was confirmed by this court in 18 Howard, 539, to that portion of the land described in the petition, bounded as follows, viz: on the south by the Arrogo or creek of San Francisquito, on the north by the creek San Mateo, on the east by the estuary or waters of the bay of San Francisco, and on the west by the eastern borders of the valley known as Ca nada de Raymundo, said land being of the extent of four leagues in length and one in breadth, be the same more or less.

A survey of this land was made by John C. Hays, United States surveyor general for California, who returned the field notes with a map to the Commissioner of the General Land Office on the 19th of December, 1856. This survey and map included 35,240 acres.

A patent was issued on the 2d of October, 1857, which followed the field notes, and granted the land as follows:

To Maria de la Solidad Ortega de Arguello, one equal undivided half.

To Jose Ramon Arguello, one equal undivided fourth part.

To Luis Antonio Arguello, one equal undivided tenth part.

To S. M. Mezes, three equal undivided twentieth parts thereof; but with the stipulation that in virtue of the fifteenth section of 3d March, 1851, the confirmation of this said claim and this patent shall not affect the rights of third persons.

At July term, 1858, of the Circuit Court of the United States for the districts of California, in and for the northern district, this ejectment was brought, at first in the name of Mezes alone, the bill having been filed on March 16, 1858. Pleas were put in to the jurisdiction upon the ground that Mezes was not an alien nor a subject of the Queen of Spain, as he had alleged. Afterwards, in October, 1858, an amended bill was filed, making parties of those persons who are named as defendants in error in the caption of this report, Luis Antonio Arguello having conveyed his interest to Mezes.

In November, 1858, the cause came on for trial. The principal points in that court and in this arose upon the rulings of the court upon the admission of evidence, under the following circumstances:

John Greer, the principal defendant, had married Maria Louisa, the widow of John Coppinger, and in behalf of his wife and of Manuela Coppinger, an infant child of John, had petitioned for the confirmation of a grant alleged to have been made to John Coppinger by Alvarado on 3d of August, 1840, containing twenty-seven square miles of territory.

On 23d November, 1853, the board of commissioners decided that the claim was valid, and decreed that it should be confirmed.

On the 8th of January, 1855, Mr. Cushing, Attorney General, filed a notice that the United States would appeal to the District Court of the United States for the northern district of California.

On the 14th January, 1856, the district judge, Ogden Hoffman, decreed that said decision be and the same is hereby affirmed. And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the claim of the appellees be confirmed to the tract of land known as 'Ca nada de Raymundo,' being the same now occupied by the said appellees, and bounded and described as follows, viz: bordering to the west on the Sierra Morena, to the east on the rancho de las Pulgas, to the south on the rancho of Maximo Martinez, and to the north on the Great Lagune. Reference for further description to be had to a map, which is made a part of document marked C, and filed in this case.

In November, 1856, in consequence of a notice by the Attorney General that no appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States would be taken, Judge Hoffman decreed that the claimants have leave to proceed under the decree of that court heretofore rendered in their favor as on final decree.

What other steps were taken by Greer, the record did not show. As his title stood at the time of the trial, it appeared to be an equitable title only, the decision of the board of commissioners not passing the legal title, and there having been no subsequent survey and patent.

Upon the trial below, the plaintiffs made out their title by the patent and map, and proved that some of the defendants were residing upon the land.

The defendants then offered to prove that the grant to Coppinger, and the confirmation thereof, embraced all the land in controversy in this suit, and that all the defendants at the time of the institution of this suit were in possession of such portions of the premises as were occupied by them under the grant to Coppinger, and deriving title therefrom.

The defendants further offered to prove that the survey and patent given in evidence by the plaintiffs were erroneous in respect to the location of the western line of the Las Pulgas ranch, and that if said line was properly located, according to the grant to Luis Arguello's heirs, or according to the decree of the Supreme Court of the United States confirming said claim, it would not embrace any of the land occupied by the defendants, or either of them.

The defendants further offered to prove that the western line of the Las Pulgas ranch, as established by the patent and survey given in evidence by the plaintiffs, does not stop at the eastern borders of the Ca nada de Raymundo, but embraces a large portion of the level valley land of the said ca nada, occupied and held by the defendants, or some of them, under the grant to Coppinger.

All of which proof, both oral and documentary, was objected to by the plaintiffs, and ruled out by the court as incompetent, to which ruling the defendants duly excepted at the time.

The statement of this case has occupied so much room that but little space is left for the arguments of counsel in this court.

It was argued by Mr. Blair, upon a brief filed by himself and Mr. Crockett, for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Janin for the defendants. The points given below were amply illustrated, but there is not room to insert any more.

The counsel for the plaintiffs in error made, amongst others, the following points:

1. The Coppinger grant is by metes and bounds, and not by quantity, and is without the usual provision as to the surplus. No survey was necessary to locate and segregate the land. A grant or confirmation of a specific parcel of land conveys the title proprio vigore, without a survey.

Guitard v. Stoddard, 16 How., 494.

Bissell v. Penrose, 8 How., 317.

Stanford v. Taylor, 18 How., 409.

United States v. Sutherland, 19 How., 363.

2. The grant to Coppinger conveyed the legal and not a mere equitable title. It purports to convey the property in fee, and was issued by the Governor, who had the lawful authority to grant lands. On its face it is designated as a 'patent,' and purports to be final and definitive. The fact that it is made subject to the approval of the Departmental Assembly does not impair its effect as a valid legal title. This created only a defeasance, by which the title might be defeated, if the Departmental Assembly refused to ratify the grant; but until such refusal, the legal title was in the grantee. Even this refusal did not impair the title, unless the supreme Government ratified the action of the Assembly.

Ferris v. Coover, 10 California R., 589.

3. If the title was before only equitably, the final confirmation by metes and bounds has converted it into a complete legal title, conclusive as against the United States; and after such confirmation there was no title, either legal or equitable, in the United States, which it could convey by patent to a third person. The United States was estopped by the confirmation to deny that the title was in the claimant, and being thus estopped by the record, it could convey no title to another.

Lafayette's Heirs v. Kenton, 18 How., 197.

Guitard v. Stoddard, 16 How., 494.

Stanford v. Taylor, 18 How., 409.

Ledoux v. Black, 18 How., 473.

Roche v. Jones, 9 How., 155.

Grignon v. Astor, 2 How., 319.

Chouteau v. Eckhart, 2 How., 344.

Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet., 410.

Same, 3 Dallas, 456.

Harrold v. Bailey, 9 Missouri R., 323.

Mr. Janin, after stating the case, said:

Under these circumstances, it is clear that the defendants in error have the legal title to the land in dispute, whereas the plaintiffs in error have only an equitable claim, such as cannot be offered in opposition to a legal title in an action of ejectment.

I. By the uniform legislation of Congress, the title passed out of the Government only by the patent. In respect to California land claims, this is specially provided for by the 8th section of the act of March 3, 1851, entitled 'An act to ascertain and settle the private land claims in the State of California.' (9 Stat. at Large, 632.)

In Hooper v. Scheimer, 23 How., 249, the court say: 'This court held, in the case of Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Pet., 450, that Congress had the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of a patent issuing from the United States; that a patent carries the fee, and is the best title known to a court of...