John Irvine, Appellant v. William Marshall and Thomas Barton

Decision Date01 December 1857
Citation15 L.Ed. 994,61 U.S. 558,20 How. 558
PartiesJOHN R. IRVINE, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM R. MARSHALL AND THOMAS BARTON
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

THIS was an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Minnesota.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Cooper for the appellant, and by Mr. Bradley for the appellee, upon which side there was also filed a brief by Mr. Brisbin and Mr. Stevens.

Mr. Justice DANIEL delivered the opinion of the court.

The proceedings in this cause, though in form somewhat anomalous and peculiar, may be regarded as presenting substantially the case of a bill for the specific performance of a contract; a demurrer to the relief sought by that bill, a decree (or what in the proceedings is called a judgment) sustaining the demurrer, although there is no express or formal direction or order for a dismission of the bill; and a general affirmance, by what is styled the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory, of the decision of the District Court.

The appellant, in his complaint in the District Court of the Territory, alleges, that at a sale of public lands which occurred on the 11th day of September, in the year 1854, at the land office at Stillwater, in the Territory of Minnesota, in pursuance of the proclamation of the President of the United States, the appellee, Marshall, as the agent, and with the funds and under the authority of the complainant, and of the appellee, Barton, purchased for them the southwest quarter of section number seven, in township number twenty-eight north, of range twenty-three west, in the county of Ramsey, containing one hundred and sixty acres, at the price of one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, making an aggregate of two hundred dollars for the entire purchase; the certificate for which purchase was, with the assent of the complainant and Barton, issued in the name of their said agent, Marshall. That notwithstanding the equality of interest in the land in the complainant and Barton, and the fact that the price was furnished by them in equal portions, viz: one hundred dollars by each of these parties, the appellee, Barton, has claimed the entire tract of land; and the agent, Marshall, in consequence, or under the pretext of this pretension, refuses to convey to the complainant his rightful portion, viz: one full undivided moiety of these lands.

The bill next charges, that Marshall is about to convey the whole of the land to Barton, in fraud of the complainant's rights, and concludes with a prayer that Marshall may be enjoined from executing such a conveyance to Barton, and may be compelled to convey to the complainant his full undivided half part of the land, in conformity with the terms and objects of the purchase; it contains also a prayer for general relief. To this complaint there was no answer; but the record of the District Court discloses the following entries:

'Territory of Minnesota, county of Ramsey. District Court, second district. John R. Irvine against William R. Marshall and Thomas Barton. Then came the defendants, by their attorney, and demur to the complaint of the plaintiff herein, and specify the following grounds of demurrer:

'First. The complaint does not state on its face facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

'Second. The complaint alleges that the defendant, Marshall, purchased the land mentioned therein, in trust for the plaintiff and the defendant, Barton. No trust arises or can grow out of the facts stated.

'Third. Admitting that a trust could arise upon the facts, the complaint does not show the plaintiff entitled to the relief sought, inasmuch as it does not specify the nature of the

'Fourth. There is a defect

'Fourth. There is a defeect of the parties defendants; it does not appear that the defendant, Barton, has any interest in the event of the action. It does not appear that the defendant Barton, has any interest 'in the event of the suit, adverse to the plaintiff."

Next follows the decision, judgment, or decree, by whichsoever of these titles it may be appropriately designated, in these words: 'There is no allegation in the complaint that the conveyance was taken without the knowledge or consent of the complainant, nor that the purchase was made in violation of some trust. The complainant does not therefore bring himself within the provisions of sec. 9, p. 202, of the revised statutes, and the demurrer must be sustained. See also sec. 5, of the same chapter. I do not discover any defect of parties. The plaintiff has twenty days to amend, so as to bring his complaint within the provisions of sec. 9 referred to, if he shall be advised that the facts will warrant it.'

There having been no amendment of the pleadings in the District Court, either proposed or allowed, the decision of that court must be regarded as final between the parties upon the case, as disclosed on the face of the record; and that decision having been taken by appeal to the Supreme Court of the Territory, the following transcript is certified as containing the proceedings of the latter tribunal in this cause:

'July 15, 1856. John R. Irvine, appellant, v. Marshall and Barton, respondents. This cause having been argued and submitted, after due consideration of the matters at issue herein, it appears to the court that in the order and judgment thereon in the court below, there is no error. It is therefore ordered that said judgment be in all things affirmed, with costs to respondents.'

The omission in this latter decision of any statement of the particular grounds on which it has been placed, and the general reference made by it to the opinion of the District Court, not showing the principles and the authority on which the judgment of affirmance has been rested, lead necessarily to an examination of the opinion of the District Court as the true test of conclusions, adopting that opinion and relying upon it for their support. In such an examination, it would be unnecessary, and even irregular, to consider any points not ruled by the inferior court; as whatever has not been adjudged or passed upon by an inferior tribunal, cannot be embraced in a general judgment, either of affirmance or reversal, upon an appeal from its opinion.

The points intended to be ruled by the District Court, and affirmed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, if sought for solely upon the face of the judgments of those courts, or even with the aid of the references to the Territorial statute furnished by the former judgment, it might be difficult to discover. Connecting those references, however, with the seventh and eighth sections of the statutes of Minnesota, (Rev. Stat., pp. 202, 203,) we may perceive in the decisions of these Territorial courts the design to assert and establish the following positions, viz: That in every instance of a grant or purchase, or of an agreement for the purchase of lands for a valuable consideration, in which the price or consideration shall be paid by one person, and the conveyance or the contract for title shall be to another, no use or trust shall result in favor of the person by whom such payment shall be made, but the title and possession shall vest exclusively in the person named as the alienee in such conveyance or agreement. The position asserted by the court of Minnesota, in interpreting their statute, must be understood as broadly as it has just been stated, or it has no application to the case before us. It is a denunciation of everything like an equitable title or lien, or a resulting trust, with the exceptions contained in the eighth and ninth sections of the statute, of the interests of creditors of the equitable claimant, of instances in which the alienee or agent shall, without the knowledge and consent of him who paid the consideration, have taken the conveyance in his own name; or shall, in violation of some trust, have purchased the lands with moneys belonging to another person.

The authority and effect of the Territorial laws of Minnesota upon subjects within the legitimate bounds or cognizance of that Territorial Government, no person, it is presumed, will be disposed to question; but it seems equally clear that to respect the rights and interests which come not within the scope of that authority, but which are created by the Constitution and laws of the United States, imposes a duty as sacred as any which enjoins upon a State or Territory the obligation to protect and maintain whatever of power may justly belong to it. And it cannot without extravagance be supposed, that to secure these proper and necessary ends, the Territory should assume the power to control the acquisition or transmission of property never belonging to, and not acquired from, herself; to which, therefore, she could annex no conditions, much less conditions which might impair the interests of the citizens of every State, and of every State collectively in the Confederacy, and even of the United States, and render utterly worthless, and incapable of being disposed of, subjects in which the Territory has no legal right or property whatsoever. It cannot be denied that all the lands in the Territories, not appropriated by competent authority before they were acquired, are in the first instance the exclusive property of the United States, to be disposed of to such persons, at such times, and in such modes and by such titles, as the Government may deem most advantageous to the public fisc, or in other respects most politic. This right has been uniformly reserved by solemn compacts upon the admission of new States, and has heretofore been recognised and scrupulously respected by sovereign States within which large portions of the public lands have been comprised, and within which much of those lands is still remaining. Can this right co-exist with a power in a Territory (itself the property of the United States) to interpose and to dictate to the United States to whom, and in what mode, and by what title, the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
74 cases
  • United States v. State
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
    • October 6, 2021
    ...remedies have a long been established as tools available to courts, predating the Constitution itself. See Irvine v. Marshall , 61 U.S. 558, 20 How. 558, 565, 15 L.Ed. 994 (1857) ("[C]ases in equity are to be understood [as] suits in which relief is sought according to the principles and pr......
  • Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • November 24, 1915
    ...its exercise. United States v. Gratiot, 14 Peters, 526, 10 L.Ed. 573; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L.Ed. 565; Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 558, 15 L.Ed. 994; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92-99, 20 L.Ed. 'The means employed by the government of the Union are not given by the people of a p......
  • Annie Kean v. Calumet Canal Improvement Company
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • October 23, 1901
    ...cessions from France and Spain, and by cessions from the individual states.' The matter was aptly epitomized in Irvine v. Marshall (1858) 20 How. 558, 15 L. ed. 994, where it was said (p. 561, L. ed. p. 'It cannot be denied that all the lands in the territories, not appropriated by competen......
  • Peyton v. Desmond
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • February 15, 1904
    ... ... Pet. 498, 516, 10 L.Ed. 264; Irvine v. Marshall, 20 ... How. 558, 564, 15 L.Ed ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • EQUITY AND THE SOVEREIGN.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 97 No. 5, May 2022
    • May 1, 2022
    ...Code, which is that of the English Court of Chancery in 1789, did not extend to probate matters"). (160) See, e.g., Irvine v. Marshall, 61 U.S. 558, 565 (1857) ("In the interpretation of these clauses of the Constitution and the statute [the Judiciary Act], this court has repeatedly ruled........

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT