John Jenkins v. Barzillai Neff 1897

• Decision Date: 02 June 1902
• Docket Number: No. 198,198
• Citation: 186 U.S. 230,22 S.Ct. 905,46 L.Ed. 1140
• Parties: JOHN G. JENKINS and One Hundred and Forty Other Stockholders of the First National Bank of Brooklyn, Plffs. in Err. , v. BARZILLAI G. NEFF, President, and John Drescher, Jr., et al. , Assessors, Constituting the Board of Assessors of the City of Brooklyn for the Taxing Year 1897
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

186 U.S. 230

22 S.Ct. 905

46 L.Ed. 1140

JOHN G. JENKINS and One Hundred and Forty Other Stockholders of the First National Bank of Brooklyn, Plffs. in Err.,

v BARZILLAI G. NEFF, President, and John Drescher, Jr., et al., Assessors, Constituting the Board of Assessors of the City of Brooklyn for the Taxing Year 1897.

No. 198.

Argued March 20, 1902.

Decided June 2, 1902.

This case is before us on a writ of error to the supreme court of the state of New York, and is brought to review a final order of that court affirming an assessment of the shares of stock in the First National Bank of Brooklyn. Under the practice prevailing in that state a writ of certiorari was issued out of the supreme court on August 13, 1897, on the petition of the stockholders of the First National Bank of the city of Brooklyn, now plaintiffs in error, directed to the board of assessors of the city of Brooklyn, requiring them to return all their proceedings relative to the assessment of the shares of stock of said bank. A return having been made the assessment was on October 6, 1899, confirmed, with some modifications not material to the present controversy. This order was affirmed by the appellate division of that court on January 9, 1900. 47 App. Div. 394, 62 N. Y. Supp. 321. On appeal to the court of appeals the order was by that court also affirmed (163 N. Y. 320, 57 N. E. 408), and the record remitted to the supreme court.

Messrs. Seymour D. Thompson and Frank Harvey Field for plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. James McKeen and George L. Rives for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

The right of the state to tax these shares of stock is not denied, but the contention of plaintiffs in error rests on the applicability of that part of § 5219, Rev. Stat. which reads 'that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state.' The purpose of this legislation was thus stated in Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 155, 30 L. ed. 895, 901, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826, 835:

'A tax upon the money of individuals, invested in the form of shares of stock in national banks, would diminish their value as an investment and drive the capital so invested from this employment, if at the same time similar investments and similar employments under the authority of state laws were exempt from an equal burden. The main purpose, therefore, of Congress in fixing limits to state taxation on investments in the shares of national banks, was to render it impossible for the state, in levying such a tax, to create and foster an unequal and unfriendly competition by favoring institutions or individuals carrying on a similar business and operations and investments of a like character. The language of the act of Congress is to be read in the light of this policy.'

The laws of New York in reference to taxation of the shares of stock in national banks are like those in respect to the taxation of shares of stock in state banks, and there are many of the latter in the state. So it is not suggested that the state makes any discrimination between state banks and national banks, but it is contended that the statutes of New York, in reference to the taxation of trust companies, are essentially different; that these trust companies are practically carrying on a banking business; that an enormous amount of moneyed capital is invested in them, and that as a result not merely a theoretical, but a practical and burdensome, discrimination is made against the moneyed capital invested in national banks. Commenting upon this it was said by Mr. Justice Woodward, delivering the opinion of the appellate division of the supreme court in the case at bar:

'It is conceded on the part of the relators that the stock of the First National Bank was assessed upon the same principle applied in the assessment of the stock of the state banks doing business in their immediate vicinity, and that this was done under the provisions of § 24 of the tax law of 1896. In order to pronounce this provision of the law invalid we must, therefore, convict the legislature, not alone of hostility to the national banks, but of hostility toward its own creations; we must reach the conclusion that the state of New York is seeking, by an exercise of its taxing power, to advance one class of moneyed corporations at the expense of another, both of which have been created by the legislature, and both of which are engaged, presumptively, in promoting the interests of the people. There are no presumptions in favor of this idea, and there is no evidence in the case to show that any of the state institutions have ever complained of an inequality in taxation.'

Further, in Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138, 30 L. ed. 895, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826, decided in 1887, the New York statutes in reference to the taxation of shares of stock of national banks were challenged on the ground of discrimination in favor of moneyed capital otherwise invested and several instances of such investment were called to the attention of the court, among them that of trust companies, and it received, as stated in the opinion, 'separate consideration.' It was held that the system of taxation prevailing in respect to them was not such as to vitiate the statutory methods of taxation of the shares of stock in national banks. It must be borne in mind that for a score of years prior to that decision there had been a series of cases coming to this court from different states, principally from New York, involving statutes with reference to state taxation of national banks, and that during these years changes had been going on in the legislation of the different states in order to conform to the rules laid down by this court in its successive opinions.

Counsel for plaintiffs in error insist that that case is not controlling, and for several reasons: One, because two amendments have been made in the legislation of New York, which it is said give full banking powers to trust companies, save in respect to the power of issuing circulating notes. The first is found in chap. 696, Laws of 1893, which added an 11th subdivision to § 156 of the banking law (Laws 1892, chap. 689), and which in terms authorizes trust companies: '11. To exercise the powers conferred on individual banks and bankers by § 55 of this act, subject to the restrictions contained in said section.'

Section 55, referred to, provides:

'Every bank and individual banker doing business in this state may take, receive, reserve, and charge on every loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum; and such interest may be taken in advance, reckoning the days for which the note, bill, or evidence of debt has run.'

This legislation simply places trust companies on an...