John Johnson v. Luman Hoy

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Lamar
• Citation: John Johnson v. Luman Hoy, 227 U.S. 245, 33 S.Ct. 240, 57 L.Ed. 497 (1913)
• Decision Date: 03 February 1913
• Docket Number: No. 842,842
• Parties: JOHN A. JOHNSON, Appt., v. LUMAN T. HOY, United States Marshal for the Northern District of Illinois

227 U.S. 245

33 S.Ct. 240

57 L.Ed. 497

JOHN A. JOHNSON, Appt.,

v LUMAN T. HOY, United States Marshal for the Northern District of Illinois.

No. 842.

Argued and submitted January 7 and 8, 1913.

Decided February 3, 1913.

Mr. Benjamin C. Bachrach for appellant.

Solicitor General Bullitt for appellee.

Mr. Justice Lamar delivered the opinion of the court:

On November 7, 1912, Johnson was indicted for a violation of the white slave traffic act (36 Stat. at L. 825, chap. 395, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1343). He was arrested, and the court fixed his bail at $30,000, but declined to accept as surety anyone who was indemnified against loss, or to permit the defendant to deposit cash in lieu of bond. The defendant thereupon applied for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground (1) that excessive bail was required, on terms onerous and prohibitive, and (2) that the act under which he had been indicted was unconstitutional and void. After a hearing the petition was denied and he appealed to this court, where a motion was made that he be admitted to bail pending the hearing. This was resisted by the Solicitor General, and, before a decision thereon, was abandoned. On appellant's motion the case was advanced, to be heard with others involving the constitutionality of the same act. The defendant's counsel took part in the argument of that question, January 6, 1913. From an affidavit attached to the brief of the government, submitted at that time, it ap- pears that, on November 15, 1912, Johnson had given bond, which had been approved by the district judge, and had been released from arrest under the indictment. The petitioner insists that the release on bail was known to the government when the motion to advance was made, and not then having been urged, he is now entitled to a decision on the constitutional question argued, so that, if in his favor, he would avoid re-arrest and trial.

The writ of habeas corpus is not intended to serve the office of a writ of error even after verdict; and, for still stronger reasons, it is not available to a defendant before trial, except in rare and exceptional cases, as pointed out in Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 29 L. ed. 868, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734. This is an effort to nullify that rule, and to depart from the regular course of criminal proceedings by securing from this court, in advance, a decision on an issue of law which the defendant can raise in the district court, with the right, if convicted, to a writ of error on...