John R. Loftus, Inc. v. White
| Decision Date | 04 May 1989 |
| Citation | 150 A.D.2d 857,540 N.Y.S.2d 610 |
| Parties | JOHN R. LOFTUS, INC., Appellant, v. David R. WHITE et al., Defendants, and Henry J. Klersy, Jr., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle (Robert J. Alessi, of counsel), Albany, for appellant.
Tobin & Dempf (R. Christopher Dempf, of counsel), Albany, for respondents.
Before CASEY, J.P., and MIKOLL, YESAWICH, LEVINE and MERCURE, JJ.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Conway, J.), entered January 26, 1988 in Albany County, which granted the motion of various defendants to dismiss the third and fourth causes of action of the amended complaint.
Defendants David R. White and Mary C. White purchased certain land from defendant Klersy Building Corporation. * Prior to the Whites gaining title to the property, they orally agreed with plaintiff that plaintiff would supervise the construction of a single-family residence on the newly acquired land for a fee of $90,000 plus expenses and costs. The agreement also provided that plaintiff would be paid its full fee and expenses whether the Whites subsequently withdrew or otherwise decided not to proceed in furtherance of the contract. Plaintiff commenced working on the contract and had already incurred approximately $6,200 in costs and expenses before being notified that it would not be building the residence.
Plaintiff then initiated this action alleging in an amended complaint causes of action against the Whites for breach of contract and against Klersy for tortious interference with a contract and malicious interference with a business relationship. Specifically, in the third and fourth causes of action, plaintiff charged that Klersy, with knowledge of plaintiff's agreement with the Whites, intentionally interfered with the contract by refusing to transfer title to the Whites and impeded the issuance of necessary permits unless the Whites ended their contract with plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleged that thereafter the Whites were coerced into executing a contract with Klersy for the construction of the house. Plaintiff seeks $250,000 compensatory damages and $500,000 punitive damages in each cause of action alleged against Klersy.
Klersy moved to dismiss both causes of action alleged against it for failure to state a cause of action, claiming that the allegations were not sufficiently specific to establish a tortious interference with a contract or business relationship. Plaintiff served an affidavit in opposition to Klersy's motion which stated the terms of the oral contract with the Whites, explained the basis for its belief that Klersy coerced the Whites into breaching the contract, and more fully set forth the reasoning for the damages demanded.
Supreme Court, in granting Klersy's motion to dismiss, held that the conclusory allegations of the complaint were not buttressed in any way by plaintiff's opposing affidavit finding the affidavit replete with hearsay and essentially bald, conclusory allegations. Plaintiff's motion to reargue was denied and this appeal from the order granting Klersy's motion to dismiss ensued.
In our view Supreme Court improperly dismissed the third cause of action alleged in the amended complaint. "On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, 'the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail' " (Tellier-Wolfe v. Viacom Broadcasting, 134 A.D.2d 860, 521 N.Y.S.2d 597, quoting Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275, 401 N.Y.S.2d 182, 372 N.E.2d 17). "The complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and all factual allegations must be accepted as true * * * " (Holly v. Pennysaver Corp., 98 A.D.2d 570, 572, 471 N.Y.S.2d 611 [citations omitted] ).
Viewing the pleadings in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we find that plaintiff has adequately pleaded each substantive element of the cause of action for tortious interference with a contract: (1) a valid contract, (2) Klersy's knowledge of the contract, (3) Klersy's intentional interference with the...
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