John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. S003000,S003000
• Citation: 48 Cal.3d 438,256 Cal.Rptr. 766,769 P.2d 948
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 769 P.2d 948, 57 USLW 2591, 52 Ed. Law Rep. 638 JOHN R., a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 766

256 Cal.Rptr. 766

48 Cal.3d 438, 769 P.2d 948, 57 USLW 2591, 52 Ed. Law Rep. 638

JOHN R., a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S003000.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

March 30, 1989.

Rehearing Denied June 14, 1989.

[769 P.2d 949] Taylor R. Culver, William A. Barnes, Oakland, and William C. McNeill III, for plaintiffs and appellants

Robert M. Aran, Sherman Oaks, Starnes & Drapiewski, Jennifer A. Becker, Venice, and Christopher N. Wu, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants.

Ralph A. Lombardi, Oakland, Owen T. Rooney, Pleasant Hill, and Hardin, Cook, Loper, Engel & Bergez, Oakland, for defendant and respondent.

Breon, O'Donnell & Miller, Margaret E. O'Donnell, Emi R. Uyehara and Nancy B. Bourne, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and respondent.

ARGUELLES, ^* Justice.

John R., then a 14-year-old junior high school student, allegedly was sexually molested by his mathematics teacher while he was at the teacher's apartment participating in an officially sanctioned, extracurricular program. The principal question before us is whether the school district that employed the teacher can be held vicariously liable for the teacher's acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior. We hold that the doctrine is not applicable in these circumstances and that while the school district may be liable if its own direct negligence is established, it cannot be held vicariously liable for its employee's torts.

FACTS ¹

At the time of the incidents giving rise to this case, John R. was a ninth grade student at a junior high school in the Oakland Unified School District district). His mathematics teacher, who had also taught John in the seventh grade, asked John to participate in the school's instructional, work-experience program, under which students received both school credit and monetary payments for assisting teachers by, for example, helping to correct other students' papers. The nature of the tasks would suggest that the program was aimed mainly at high-performing students. John had a history of poor grades in mathematics, but his marks in this teacher's class reflected what his attorney, no doubt ironically, termed "a remarkable increase in his ability to do math...."

Whether legitimately or through artificially inflated grades, John was allowed to participate in the program. Performance of the required work by students at teachers' homes was an option authorized by the district, and the teacher either encouraged or required John to come to his apartment for this purpose. Over the course of many sessions at the teacher's apartment, the teacher sought to develop a close relationship with John as the boy's tutor and counselor, and ultimately endeavored to seduce him. The teacher attempted to convince John that engaging in sex acts with him would be a constructive part of their relationship and, at times, threatened to give John failing grades if John would not go along with his desires and said he would tell people that John had solicited sex from him. On one occasion in February of 1981, the teacher succeeded in pressuring John into sexual acts, including oral copulation and anal intercourse.

When John protested and told the teacher he would report the incidents to his parents, the teacher threatened to retaliate against him if he revealed what had taken place. As a result of these threats, and his embarrassment and shame at what had happened, John did not disclose the incidents John's mother reported the incident to the district that same month, speaking to the vice-principal of John's school and a district community relations representative and asking them how she should proceed. She was advised to put the matter in the hands of the police, who were then told of the molestation by the district representative. John's mother also contacted an attorney and was advised by him to wait for the criminal investigation to substantiate John's charges before she pursued any civil remedy. ²

to anyone for a number of months. John finally told his father about the molestation 10 months later in December 1981.

John's parents, on behalf of their son and on their own behalf, brought suit against the teacher and the district, alleging that the district was vicariously liable for the teacher's acts and directly liable for its own negligence. After two rounds of demurrers and amended complaints, the district's demurrer to plaintiffs' third amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend as to the four causes of action on which plaintiffs sought to hold the district indirectly liable for the teacher's acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The case then proceeded to trial against the teacher on all causes of action and against the district limited to those causes of action premised upon its direct liability for negligent hiring and supervision of the teacher. At the outset of trial, the district's motion for nonsuit as to those remaining claims was granted on grounds unrelated to the merits (post, pp. 768-769 of 256 Cal.Rptr., pp. 950-951 of 769 P.2d), and judgment was entered in the district's favor on all causes of action against it.

The Court of Appeal reversed both the grant of nonsuit and the earlier order sustaining the district's demurrer to those causes of action against it premised on a theory of vicarious liability, reasoning that the facts as pleaded by plaintiffs could allow the trier of fact to find the district responsible for the tort of its employee because the teacher's misconduct, although not within or contemplated by his official duties, was made possible by his use, and abuse, of the official, job-created authority he was given over the boy. We granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeal correctly resolved this unsettled and significant question.

DISCUSSION

Timeliness of Claim

Before we turn to the vicarious liability issue, we must first address a threshold question--whether plaintiffs complied in timely fashion with the requirements of the California Tort Claims Act (Gov.Code, § 900 et seq.)--for if we were to conclude they did not, all of their claims against the district would be barred on that ground (Gov.Code, § 945.4; see Whitfield v. Roth (1974) 10 Cal.3d 874, 883, 112 Cal.Rptr. 540, 519 P.2d 588), and we would have no occasion to consider whether the district could be held vicariously liable for the tort of its employee. The question arises here because plaintiffs did not present a written claim to the district within 100 days of the accrual of their causes of action--measured from the date that John was molested--as then required by Government Code section 911.2, nor did they present an application for leave to file a late claim within 1 year of that time, as required by Government Code section 911.4, subdivision (b). ³

Although the trial court initially found that plaintiffs should be excused from the statutory claim requirement, it later granted a nonsuit in favor of the district on this issue. The Court of Appeal, however, reversed the trial court on this point, holding that plaintiffs' late-claim application, presented to the district in May 1982 some 15 months after the assault, was made within the allowable 1-year period because, under the "delayed discovery" doctrine (see Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 187, 98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421), plaintiffs' causes of action should not be deemed to have accrued until John told his parents about the incidents in December 1981. The district contends the Court of Appeal erred in finding the claim timely on that basis.

Our initial review of this issue raised a serious question in our minds whether the relevant authorities supported application of a delayed-discovery theory of accrual on the facts of this case, but it appeared that, under the reasoning of a number of recent Court of Appeal decisions (see, e.g., Snyder v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1318, 1324, 253 Cal.Rptr. 156; DeRose v. Carswell (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1026, 242 Cal.Rptr. 368), the facts alleged in the complaint, if proven, might well demonstrate that the claim was timely filed under a theory of equitable estoppel. We accordingly requested the parties to file supplemental briefs on the question and, having fully considered the issue, now conclude it is appropriate to remand the timeliness question for a factual determination on the applicability of equitable estoppel. ⁴

It is well settled that a public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute where its agents or employees have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act. (See, e.g., Fredrichsen v. City of Lakewood (1971) 6 Cal.3d 353, 357-359, 99 Cal.Rptr. 13, 491 P.2d 805; Rand v. Andreatta (1964) 60 Cal.2d 846, 850, 36 Cal.Rptr. 846, 389 P.2d 382; Bruce v. Jefferson Union High Sch. Dist. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 632, 635, 26 Cal.Rptr. 762.) Estoppel most commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim; actual fraud or the intent to mislead is not essential. (See Industrial Indem. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 684, 689-690, 252 P.2d 649.) A fortiori, estoppel may certainly be invoked when there are acts of violence or intimidation that are intended to prevent the filing of a claim. (See, e.g., DeRose v. Carswell, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1026, 242 Cal.Rptr. 368; Longo v. Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Co., N.Y.C. Sys. (3d Cir.1966) 355 F.2d 443, 444.) And here, the teacher's threats to retaliate against John if the boy reported the incidents of sexual molestation allegedly did just that.

Although the teacher's alleged threats in this case were no doubt motivated largely by self-interest, rather than to prevent John from filing a claim against the district, it would clearly be...