John T. Finley, Inc. v. Curtis
| Decision Date | 20 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 359249 |
| Parties | JOHN T. FINLEY, INC., Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. JANICE G. CURTIS, Trustee of the JANICE G. CURTIS LIVING TRUST, Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Benzie Circuit Court LC No. 21-011511-CK
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and SAWYER and BOONSTRA, JJ.
Defendant appeals by right the trial court's order granting plaintiff's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) with respect to this boundary dispute. We affirm.
Plaintiff and defendant own adjoining parcels of real property that abut the shoreline of Crystal Lake in Benzie County. A fence in the area of the parcels had been erected in 1951 by defendant's familial predecessors in title, but it was torn down in 2018. In August 2020, defendant installed a new fence in the same location where the old fence had been situated. Plaintiff filed its complaint on March 31, 2021 alleging that "[d]efendant erected a fence that is outside of its property's boundary line and encroaches on [p]laintiff's property." Count I of the complaint alleged trespass. In Count II, plaintiff sought a permanent injunction. And Count III requested declaratory relief and an order to quiet title. In support of its allegations plaintiff attached a certified survey prepared and executed by Patrick Bentley of Spicer Group, Inc., that was performed in December 2020.
Defendant filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and a counterclaim. In the answer, defendant asserted that plaintiff's survey "incorrectly identifies the boundary lines between the subject properties." Defendant attached an uncertified and unsigned "survey" by Crystal Surveying, LLC. But it stated that the "drawing is intended to show only the 'existing conditions' of the . . . properties for illustrative and discussion purposes[, and] it is not intended to be a boundary survey of their lands." (Original in all caps.)[1] In her affirmative defenses, defendant contended that "[p]laintiff's claims fail due to the doctrine of adverse possession and/or the doctrine of acquiescence." There was no elaboration, and the reference to adverse possession and acquiescence appeared to be boilerplate, as defendant cursorily listed a litany of defenses.
In the counterclaim, defendant indicated that she sought "equitable relief pursuant to MCL 211.72 to quiet title against . . . [d]efendant regarding the subject real property."[2] Defendant maintained that she had valid ownership of the disputed land, that her ownership had never been terminated, that plaintiff's claim was wrongful, and that defendant was entitled to an order quieting title in her favor. Defendant alleged that her ownership was based on deeds and the same survey referenced in her answer. The counterclaim contained no allegations whatsoever regarding adverse possession or acquiescence or the elements thereof.
Discovery had not yet commenced, and plaintiff had not yet filed an answer to the counterclaim when plaintiff moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). With respect to the (C)(8) argument, plaintiff argued that defendant "ha[d] failed to state a claim through a statement of title" relative to the counterclaim. In regard to the (C)(10) argument, which related to the complaint and counterclaim, plaintiff maintained that defendant's proofs failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether defendant held an ownership interest in the disputed property. Plaintiff contended that defendant's survey did not create any factual disputes and could not be considered because the survey was not certified or signed and was not intended to be a boundary survey of the lots. Plaintiff further asserted that its survey was valid and established plaintiff's title to the property at issue as a matter of law.
In response, defendant first argued that the fence was situated on defendant's property as it had been for nearly 70 years. Defendant claimed that its survey could be considered in light of the notation that it was based on field measurements, actual locations, deed descriptions, and proposed lines from a prior survey. Defendant also maintained that plaintiff's survey did not control simply because it was certified. Defendant then observed that the fence represented the boundary line because it had been acquiesced to as the true line for more than 15 years. Defendant further indicated that a base map by the county equalization department mirrored the boundary line in defendant's survey. Defendant next argued that even if the boundary line identified in plaintiff's survey were accurate, the doctrines of adverse possession and acquiescence propelled defendant into owner status. In support, defendant submitted old family photographs of the fence and her affidavit, in which she averred, in pertinent part:
In a reply brief, plaintiff argued that defendant had not adequately pleaded in her counterclaim a cause of action premised on adverse possession or acquiescence. Plaintiff further contended that defendant's affidavit failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to all of the elements of adverse possession and acquiescence.
The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiff under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). The trial court initially reviewed the procedural and factual history of the case, along with the parties' arguments on the motion for summary disposition. The court then quoted most of defendant's counterclaim and concluded that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court observed that the cited tax statute, MCL 211.72, had been repealed. The court then touched on defendant's affirmative defenses, observing that defendant had advanced the doctrines of adverse possession and acquiescence. The trial court next indicated that Michigan is a notice-pleading state, MCR 2.111. The court explained that a party needs to give notice of the nature of a claim or a defense and that conclusory statements unsupported by allegations of fact are insufficient. After reciting the principles attendant to properly pleading a cause of action, the court ruled that defendant's "claims of adverse possession and/or acquiescence have not been properly pled." The trial court then ruled that it was summarily dismissing plaintiff's counterclaim under MCR 2.116(C)(8) due to insufficient pleading. The court did not expressly state that adverse possession and acquiescence were inadequately pleaded in defendant's affirmative defenses, nor did the trial court specifically state that it was rejecting those affirmative defenses. Of course, MCR 2.116(C)(8) does not concern affirmative defenses.
With respect to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and plaintiff's complaint, the trial court first found that the warranty deed conveying the pertinent property to plaintiff was admissible under MRE 803(14). The court also determined that plaintiff's survey was admissible under the hearsay exception in MRE 803(15), which pertains to statements contained in documents affecting an interest in property. In turn, the trial court ruled that defendant's survey did not satisfy MRE 803(15) because it was neither signed nor certified and because it explicitly stated that it was not intended to be used as a boundary survey. The trial court then found that the county base map supplied by defendant was inadmissible under MRE 803(15) because it stated that the information contained therein was for general reference purposes only.[3] The court further stated, "This [c]ourt also finds the affidavit . . . and the various photographs are largely irrelevant to the color of title claim but may be relevant to support claims of adverse possession and/or acquiescence."[4] Finally, the trial court ruled that based on its evidentiary determinations, it was granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff under MCR 2.116(C)(10) with regard to plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclaim.
Defendant moved for reconsideration. Defendant argued that plaintiff's survey did not comply with the certified surveys act (CSA), MCL 54.211 et seq.[5] Defendant additionally contended that plaintiff's survey did not take into account either the riparian rights attached to defendant's property or the ever-changing meander line of Crystal Lake.[6] Defendant then argued that her survey was admissible under MRE 803(15) and that the county base map was admissible under MRE 803(8), which pertains to the hearsay exception for public records. Defendant maintained that her survey, the base map, the deeds, and the photographs established a genuine issue of material fact concerning the location of the boundary line. Next, defendant asserted that her counterclaim stated a cause of action for purposes of determining an interest in land-quieting title-under MCL 600.2932. Defendant then argued that the trial court erred by finding that defendant had inadequately pleaded the affirmative defenses of adverse possession and acquiescence. Finally, defendant...
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