John V. Farwell Co. v. Craney

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho
Writing for the CourtSULLIVAN, C. J.
Citation29 Idaho 85,157 P. 383
PartiesJOHN V. FARWELL COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent, v. GLENN B. CRANEY, as Trustee of the Interstate Mercantile Company, a Corporation, a Bankrupt, Appellant
Decision Date25 April 1916

157 P. 383

29 Idaho 85

JOHN V. FARWELL COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent,
v.

GLENN B. CRANEY, as Trustee of the Interstate Mercantile Company, a Corporation, a Bankrupt, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

April 25, 1916


APPEAL from the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District for Kootenai County. Hon. R. N. Dunn, Judge.

Appeal from certain orders made by the court in regard to compensation of the receiver and the approval of his final report. Orders of the court affirmed.

Affirmed, with costs in favor of the respondent.

Reed & Boughton, for Appellant.

An appeal will not lie from orders made upon ex parte application. (2 Cyc. 621; In re Dunn, 59 Hun, 626, 14 N.Y.S. 14; Stewart v. Stewart, 127 A.D. 672, 111 N.Y.S. 736; Wilson v. Martin, 43 Wash. 95, 86 P. 205, 10 Ann. Cas. 37; Board of Education v. Ward, 50 W.Va. 443, 40 S.E. 344.)

"An order allowing compensation to a receiver should be made only after notice and a hearing at which the parties interested have an opportunity of contesting the claim." (34 Cyc. 473; Joralmon v. McPhee, 31 Colo. 40, 76 P. 922; Ruggles v. Patton, 143 F. 312, 74 C. C. A. 450; Merchants' Bank v. Crysler, 67 F. 388, 14 C. C. A. 444.)

"Courts are usually indisposed to allow a receiver any payment made to counsel for services when the employment has not been authorized by the court." (High on Receivers, 4th ed., p. 956; Dalliba v. Winschell, 11 Idaho 364, 114 Am. St. 267, 82 P. 107; Hulings v. Jones, 63 W.Va. 696, 60 S.E. 874; Henry v. Henry, 103 Ala. 582, 15 So. 916; Clapp v. Clapp, 49 Hun, 195, 1 N.Y.S. 919.)

Ezra R. Whitla, for Respondent.

The orders made allowing compensation to the receiver are appealable. (Tompson v. Huron Lumber Co., 5 Wash. 527, 32 P. 536.)

"An order requiring payment of receiver's compensation and other expenses out of funds in the receiver's hands is a final order, from which an appeal lies." (Ogden City v. Bear Lake etc. Irr. Co., 18 Utah 279, 55 P. 385; Grant v. Los Angeles & P. Ry. Co., 116 Cal. 71, 47 P. 872; Union Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Mills, 103 Wis. 39, 79 N.W. 20; Guarantee Trust & S.D. Co. v. Philadelphia etc. R. Co., 69 Conn. 709, 38 A. 792, 38 L. R. A. 804; Crosby v. Morristown & C. G. R. Co. (Tenn.), 42 S.W. 507, 508; 2 Cyc. 612.)

The lower court's decision in such matters is practically conclusive, as he has personal knowledge of what the receiver did and the necessity for the appointment of counsel, and is in a position to know the correctness of the compensation. (Olson v. State Bank, 72 Minn. 320, 75 N.W. 378; Hickey v. Parrot Silver & C. Co., 32 Mont. 143, 108 Am. St. 510, 79 P. 698; Stuart v. Boulware, 133 U.S. 78, 10 S.Ct. 242, 33 L.Ed. 568; Welch v. Renshaw, 14 Colo. App. 526, 59 P. 967; Tompson v. Huron Lumber Co., 5 Wash. 527, 32 P. 536.)

"The receiver is entitled, as a matter of right, to the...

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