John v. Gen. Motors Corp.

• Citation: 13 N.W.2d 840,308 Mich. 333
• Decision Date: 03 April 1944
• Docket Number: No. 13.,13.
• Parties: ST. JOHN v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

308 Mich. 333

13 N.W.2d 840

ST. JOHN

v.GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.

No. 13.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 3, 1944.

Action by Florence St. John, in her own behalf and as assignee of 28 other women, against General Motors Corporation, to recover the difference in wages paid them as women employees, and men engaged in similar industrial employment in the Olds Motor Works Division of the defendant. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Judgment in accordance with opinion.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Ingham County; Charles H. Hayden, judge.

Before the entire Bench, except BUTZEL, J.

Henry M. Hogan, of Detroit (Jacob A. Tolonen, of Detroit, of counsel), for appellant.

Pierce, planck & Ramsey, of Lansing, for appellee.

Cook, Smith, Jacobs & Beake, of Detroit, amicus curiae.

WIEST, Justice.

This action at law was commenced April 7, 1938, by plaintiff in her own behalf and as assignee of 28 other women, against the General Motors Corporation to recover the difference in wages paid them, as women employees, and men engaged in similar industrial employment in the Olds Motor Works Division of defendant at the city of Lansing, Michigan. This civil action is based upon Act No. 239, Pub.Acts 1919, Comp.Laws 1929, §§ 8497, 8498, now § 556 of the penal code, Act No. 328, Pub. Acts 1931, Comp.Laws Supp.1940, § 17115-556 (Stat.Ann. § 28,824), which provides:

‘Any employer of labor in this state, employing both males and females in the manufacture or production of any article, who shall discriminate in any way in the payment of wages as between sexes or who shall pay any female engaged in the manufacture or production of any article of like value, workmanship and production a less wage, by time or piece work, than is being paid to males similarly employed in such manufacture, production or in any employment formerly performed by males, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor: Provided, however, That no female shall be given any task, disproportionate to her strength, nor shall she be employed in any place detrimental to her morals, her health or her potential capacity for motherhood.’

This is an action at law and, upon review, it is not for this court to go through the record of 1739 pages and point out the specific amount due to each of the 29 claimants.

In General Motors Corp. v. Attorney General, 294 Mich. 558, 293 N.W. 751, 130 A.L.R. 429, we held the statute constitutional.

If plaintiff has suffered financial damage by reason of defendant's noncompliance with the mandatory provisions of the statute applicable to claimants' employment then civil action may be maintained. Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Corp., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241, 53 A.L.R. 183. The statute establishes specified personal civil rights and if there has been discrimination between sexes in the instances at bar the remedy by action at law is available to claimants.

By subpoena duces tecum plaintiff required defendant to produce its employment records at the trial. When offer was made of such records defendant objected thereto and claimed the right agaist self-incrimination. This was overruled by the court. We are here considering a penal statute, inclusive of civil remedy. If the records produced and objected to established, in whole or in part, the fact that defendant had committed a misdemeanor in not paying women wages like wages paid to men in similar employment, was there any merit in the claim of self-incrimination? Of course, the right against self-incrimination is a constitutional right, but does it apply to the situation here involved? It does not apply. In Re Moser, 138 Mich. 302, 101 N.W. 588,5 Ann.Cas. 31, it was held that the privilege against self-incrimination is personal to a witness and cannot be claimed in behalf of another, inclusive of an employing corporation unless guilt of the witness producing the record is also involved.

Counsel for defendant state that the statute ‘provides a penalty if an employer pays a less wage to female employees than he does to male employees similarly employed, or a less wage than he formerly paid to male employees similarly employed * * *,’ and claims the “formerly' clause prohibits the reducing of the rates, ever, of women employees where they are engaged in work ‘similar’ to that formerly performed by males,' and, therefore, the statute is arbitrary and unconstitutional. The two provisions in the statute are counterparts and, reasonably construed, prevent exploitation of women workers in industrial production. The work formerly performed by men relates to the time when men employees were supplanted by women employees and does not run back indefinitely.

Defendant claims that plaintiff in order to recover had the burden of showing to a computable certainty the damage sustained by her and each of her assignors. We think there is merit in this point and the court should have determined, with reasonable certainty, the amount of damage to be awarded to each of the claimants and the manner in which he has determined the same and, upon such computation, when made, enter judgment in behalf of plaintiff. See Court Rule No. 37, § 11(c).

The issue upon right and amount, if any, of recovery by plaintiff depended upon 29 individual instances and in each instance required the court to specifically find as to which of the many rates paid to men should have been paid to plaintiff and each of her assignors. This barred computation of an average differential.

Plaint...