Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S.

• Decision Date: 29 April 2008
• Docket Number: 63.
• Citation: Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S., 889 N.E.2d 471, 10 N.Y.3d 364, 859 NYS2d 594 (N.Y. 2008)
• Parties: In the Matter of JOHNA M.S., Appellant, v. RUSSELL E.S., Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

889 N.E.2d 471

10 N.Y.3d 364

In the Matter of JOHNA M.S., Appellant, v. RUSSELL E.S., Respondent.

63.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 29, 2008.

Harlem & Harlem, Oneonta (Richard A. Harlem of counsel), for appellant.

Arroyo, Copland & Associates PLLC, Albany (Cynthia Feathers of Counsel), and Lester A. Sittler, Fly Creek, for Respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PIGOTT, J.

Petitioner wife and respondent husband, married in 1982, are the parents of three children. They separated in 1999 and executed a written separation agreement in 2003. No divorce action has been commenced.

The separation agreement provides that the husband would pay the wife $100 per week in spousal maintenance and $250 per week in child support. The section of the agreement pertaining to maintenance states:

"while this agreement will resolve these issues for the present time, the Wife shall not be foreclosed from seeking additional maintenance in negotiation with the Husband, or failing such negotiation, then filing in a court of appropriate jurisdiction for a modification of the present provisions concerning the payment of maintenance. Any application by the Wife shall be treated as a `de novo' application to the court, since it is not possible to set future maintenance at this time because it is impossible to forecast the Wife's needs or the Husband's income/earning capacity."

The wife commenced this Family Court Act article 4 proceeding seeking an upward modification of maintenance and child support. After a fact-finding hearing, the Support Magistrate dismissed that portion of the wife's application seeking additional spousal maintenance for lack of jurisdiction. The court noted that no proof was offered that the wife was likely to become a public charge (see Family Ct Act § 463); thus, the parties were bound by the terms of the separation agreement on the issue of spousal maintenance. Family Court affirmed, as did the Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting in part. The wife appeals as of right based on the two-Justice dissent on a question of law, and we now affirm.

Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction that cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute (see Matter of Silver v. Silver, 36 N.Y.2d 324, 326, 367 N.Y.S.2d 777, 327 N.E.2d 816 [1975]). It generally has no subject matter jurisdiction to reform, set aside or modify the terms of a valid separation agreement (see Kleila v. Kleila, 50 N.Y.2d 277, 282, 428 N.Y.S.2d 896, 406 N.E.2d 753 [1980]; Matter of Brescia v. Fitts, 56 N.Y.2d 132, 139, 451 N.Y.S.2d 68, 436 N.E.2d 518 [1982]). Nor can an agreement of the parties confer on Family Court the power to modify the terms of a separation agreement (see Kleila, 50 N.Y.2d at 282, 428 N.Y.S.2d 896, 406 N.E.2d 753). A statutory exception to the rule prohibiting the modification of separation agreements, not applicable here, exists where a spouse "is likely to become in need of public assistance or care" (Family Ct Act § 463).

Here, Family Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the wife's application for increased spousal maintenance. Although the parties' separation agreement purports to permit Family Court to treat any application by the wife as "de novo," such language cannot confer jurisdiction upon Family Court. As noted by the Appellate Division majority, the wife's petition to Family Court for increased maintenance expressly stated that it was "an application to the Court for an upward modification of spousal support," premised on the insufficiency of current maintenance due to a loss of certain Social Security benefits. Moreover, in practical terms, the wife is not presenting a new, or "de novo," application for maintenance to Family Court; rather, she is simply seeking increased maintenance from that provided under the separation agreement. Thus, because the wife is seeking a modification of a spousal maintenance award set forth in a separation agreement, Family Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the petition and grant the requested relief (see Kleila, 50 N.Y.2d at 282, 428 N.Y.S.2d 896, 406 N.E.2d 753).

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be affirmed, with costs.

SMITH, J. (dissenting).

Family Court Act § 411 says: "The family court has exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings for support or maintenance under this article." Since this is a proceeding for maintenance under article 4 of the Family Court Act, the majority's conclusion that Family Court lacks jurisdiction is at first glance puzzling. The explanation is to be found in cases holding that Family Court has no jurisdiction to "modify" an agreement (Kleila v. Kleila, 50 N.Y.2d 277, 282, 428 N.Y.S.2d 896, 406 N.E.2d 753 [1980]; Matter of Brescia v. Fitts, 56 N.Y.2d 132, 139, 451 N.Y.S.2d 68, 436 N.E.2d 518 [1982]). I think the majority errs by reading too much into these cases, and paying too little attention to the statute.

The rationale of Kleila and Brescia is that, as we explained in Brescia, Family Court is "lacking equity jurisdiction" (56 N.Y.2d at 139, 451 N.Y.S.2d 68, 436 N.E.2d 518). Thus, where a husband or wife seeks the intervention of equity to alter the terms of an agreement—a remedy amounting to reformation or rescission— he or she must seek it in Supreme Court. With a statutory exception not relevant here (Family Ct Act § 463 [relating to support of a spouse who is likely to become a public charge]), such a remedy is beyond the power of Family Court to grant in predivorce litigation.

But here, the wife is not asking for equitable relief that would change the terms of the parties' agreement. She is asking for relief expressly permitted by the agreement's terms: "[T]he...