Johnides v. St. Lawrence Hosp.

• Decision Date: 16 July 1990
• Docket Number: Docket No. 117599
• Citation: 184 Mich.App. 172,457 N.W.2d 123
• Parties: Tim A. JOHNIDES, Claimant-Appellee, v. ST. LAWRENCE HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant, and Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendant-Appellee. 184 Mich.App. 172, 457 N.W.2d 123
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 123

457 N.W.2d 123

Tim A. JOHNIDES, Claimant-Appellee, v. ST. LAWRENCE HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant and Michigan Employment Security Commission Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 117599.

184 Mich.App. 172, 457 N.W.2d 123

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 12, 1990.

Decided June 5, 1990.

Released for Publication July 16, 1990.

[184 MICHAPP 173] Legal Aid of Central Michigan by Daniel Bamberry, Lansing, for Tim A. Johnides.

Clary, Nantz, Wood, Hoffius, Rankin & Cooper by Philip F. Wood and Douglas H. Wiegerink, Grand Rapids, for St. Lawrence Hosp.

Before BRENNAN, P.J., and MAHER and NEFF, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Tim A. Johnides' claim for unemployment benefits under the Michigan Employment Security Act, M.C.L. Sec. 421.1 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 17.501 et seq., was denied by a Michigan Employment [184 MICHAPP 174] Security Commission hearing referee on the ground that claimant had left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer. M.C.L. Sec. 421.29(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 17.531(1)(a). The basis of the referee's decision was that claimant failed to first pursue alternate procedures for remedying his employer's actions prior to leaving employment. The decision was affirmed by the Board of Review. Claimant appealed to the Ingham Circuit Court, which reversed the hearing referee's decision. Claimant's employer, St. Lawrence Hospital, now appeals as of right from the circuit court's reversal. We affirm.

As the employer states in its brief on appeal, "the crucial issue in this appeal is whether an employee can ignore a grievance procedure specifically designed to address employee complaints, voluntarily quit work, and yet remain eligible for unemployment compensation."

Claimant had been employed by St. Lawrence Hospital as a psychiatric technician for approximately eight years. On January 9, 1987, claimant was employed in the third shift in psychiatric unit A. When claimant entered the intensive care area, he found no staff present. Because this situation had occurred before, claimant complained to the head nurse, who indicated she would investigate the matter. Claimant called in sick the following two days. On January 12, claimant met with acting personnel director Heather Fritzler, who then arranged a meeting between claimant and David Finkbeiner, the hospital's administrative director. Because of the problems he had with the night shift, claimant expressed a desire to work in another location. Claimant was informed he would be placed on administrative leave for two weeks while an attempt was made to find another position for him. The hospital was unable to place claimant in [184 MICHAPP 175] another position and claimant eventually agreed to work a different shift in the same unit. When claimant inquired about being paid for the period of administrative leave, he was told he would not be paid. Finkbeiner, who apparently admitted he was somewhat confused over claimant's administrative leave status, later informed claimant that he would be paid for four of the nine days missed. Claimant did not accept this proposal and on January 25, 1987, he quit. After bringing an action in small claims court, claimant was awarded a judgment compensating him for the full period of his administrative leave.

Claimant's application for unemployment benefits was denied by the Employment Security Commission pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 421.29(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 17.531(1)(a), which provides, in pertinent part:

(1) An individual shall be disqualified for benefits in the following cases in which the individual:

(a) Left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer or employing unit.

Thus, the Employment Security Act recognizes that, where there exists good cause attributable to the employer, an employee may voluntarily leave his employment and yet remain eligible for unemployment compensation. This Court has held that good cause exists "where an employer's actions would cause a reasonable, average, and otherwise qualified worker to give up his or her employment." Warblow v. The Kroger Co., 156 Mich.App. 316, 321, 401 N.W.2d 361 (1986); Carswell v. Share House, Inc., 151 Mich.App. 392, 395, 390 N.W.2d 252 (1986).

A reviewing court may reverse a decision of the Employment Security Commission only if the decision is contrary to law or if it is not supported by [184 MICHAPP 176] competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. M.C.L. Sec. 421.38; M.S.A. Sec. 17.540; Chrysler Corp. v. Sellers, 105 Mich.App. 715, 720, 307 N.W.2d 708 (1981). If there is no dispute as to the underlying facts, questions presented on appeal are to be treated as matters of law. Id.

In this case, the hearing referee concluded that good cause attributable to the employer did not exist because claimant failed to avail himself of alternate procedures for remedying the employer's actions. The referee stated:

Taking a position most favorable to the claimant, that he was entitled to the entire nine days of administrative leave pay, that he was only offered four days of administrative pay, this Referee finds, under the circumstances in the instant case, that the claimant still has not established a good cause attributable to the employer for quitting his job, and therefore, he is disqualified for benefits under Section 29(1)(a) of the Act. The reason this Referee comes to this conclusion is because the claimant failed to follow alternate procedures that were available to him. The claimant could have continued to work, and contacted the Department of Labor and filed a wage complaint with that Department. The claimant could have continued to work and do what he did after he quit his job, and that is, file a claim in the Small Claims Court. However, the most obvious option open to the claimant was for him to file a grievance, which he was aware that he had the right to do. Employer's [sic] are not perfect, employer's [sic] make mistakes, and this is what the grievance procedure is for. The claimant may have been wronged, but he did not avail himself of the remedies he had to correct the wrong that was done to him. The claimant did not give the employer the opportunity to correct the situation that existed. [Emphasis added.]

It is clear to us that, but for claimant's failure to [184 MICHAPP 177] pursue his alternate remedies, the referee found good cause attributable to the employer for claimant's decision to leave. This is apparent from both the referee's acknowledgment that claimant was entitled to be paid for the full period of his administrative leave and the referee's conclusion that the hospital acted wrongfully in refusing to pay the same. Further, had the referee found that good cause was not established, it would have been unnecessary to discuss the matter of claimant's alternate remedies. Having reviewed the record, we agree that, but for the issue of claimant's alternate remedies, a finding of good cause attributable to the employer is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. See Degi v. Varano Glass Co., 158 Mich.App. 695, 405 N.W.2d 129 (1987). Accordingly, resolution of the case at hand turns on whether the hearing referee acted improperly by going one step further and determining that a finding of good cause was precluded because claimant failed to avail himself of his alternate remedies prior to leaving his employment.

To begin with, we cannot accept that portion of the referee's decision implying that an employee must seek either judicial or administrative relief as a prerequisite for preserving eligibility for unemployment benefits that may otherwise be due. Although the provisions of the Employment Security Act are to be liberally construed, the disqualification provisions are to be construed narrowly. Wilkerson v. Jackson Public Schools, 170 Mich.App. 133, 136, 427 N.W.2d 570 (1988), lv. den. 432 Mich. 878 (1989). Nowhere does the act require, nor does it suggest, that a claimant must first file a complaint in either a judicial forum or with the Department of Labor in order to preserve his eligibility for unemployment compensation. Therefore, in [184 MICHAPP 178] the absence of such a provision, and in...