Johnny S. v. Pojoaque Valley Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 1:13-CV-00027-MCA-KBM,1:13-CV-00027-MCA-KBM
• Parties: JOHNNY S., by and through his parents and next friends next friends DARLENE R. and JUAN S. Plaintiffs, v. POJOAQUE VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

JOHNNY S., by and through his parents and next friends next friendsDARLENE R. and JUAN S. Plaintiffs, v. POJOAQUE VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. Defendants.

No. 1:13-CV-00027-MCA-KBM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

SO ORDERED: March 31, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings and For Qualified Immunity and Memorandum in Support Thereof [Doc. 37] and the parties Joint Motion to Consolidate and For Further Relief as Described Herein [Doc. 34]. Having considered the submissions, the relevant case law, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings and For Qualified Immunity and Memorandum in Support Thereof [Doc. 37] and denies the Joint Motion to Consolidate and For Further Relief as Described Herein [Doc. 34].

I. BACKGROUND

On September 4, 2012, Plaintiff, Johnny S., by and through his parents and next friends Darlene R. and Juan S., filed a Complaint for Civil Rights Violations, DisabilityDiscrimination, and Negligence in the First Judicial District of the State of New Mexico. [Doc. 1-3] Defendants, Pojoaque Valley School District, the Board of Education for the Pojoaque Valley School District, Adan Delgado, Hoyt Mutz, Diana Quintana, and Norma Cavazos (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Defendants") removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. [Doc. 1]

The Complaint alleges the following relevant facts. Johnny is an eighteen year old student who is in the 12^th grade at Pojoaque Valley High School. [Doc. 1 at 3] Johnny is eligible for special education on the bases of multiple disabilities, including severe epilepsy and mental retardation. [Id.] Defendants developed an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) for Johnny that required him to have a 1:1 educational and safety assistant at all times while at school. Additionally, Defendants suggested that Johnny use a wheelchair when moving around the school to prevent injury in the event of a seizure. [Id. at 4]

On September 9, 2010,

an untrained educational assistant escorted Johnny from school to his father's car. Contrary to Johnny's IEP, the educational assistant had another disabled student with him. The educational assistant walked in front with the other disabled student, with Johnny walking behind the educational assistant. As a result, the educational assistant was not giving any attention to Johnny, as also required by Johnny's IEP. In the absence of the safety assistance required by his IEP, Johnny had a seizure and fell to the ground, landing on his face and shoulder. As a result of the chain of events put in motion by the District and the individual Defendants, the educational assistant had not been trained or even informed regarding Johnny's special needs or his Health Care Plan, and as a result did not know how to respond to Johnny's seizure. Johnny was taken to a local hospital by ambulance andreceived medical treatment for severe cuts, abrasions, and injury to his face, head and shoulder.

[Id. at 4-5]

Following the September 5, 2010 incident, Defendants delayed developing a Health Care Plan, training staff and securing an educational assistant, which caused Johnny to miss weeks of school. At some point, a 2010 to 2011 Health Care Plan was developed for Johnny. The 2010 to 2011 Health Care Plan

provided directions for first aid during seizures, documentation of seizures in a seizure log and supervision and safety measures to prevent falls and other injuries. The Plan specifically required that Johnny would wear a fitted helmet with a face guard at school and would be in his wheelchair while at school except when the District's Physical Therapist was working with him. The Plan also required that supervision be no more than arm's length away.

[Id. at 7]

On October 24, 2011, Johnny was at school when he stood up, had a seizure and fell, hitting the back of his head on the floor. Johnny was transported to the hospital where he received medical treatment and twelve staples in the back of his head. At the time of the incident, there was no education assistant in the room with Johnny or adult supervision within arm's length reach. Additionally, Johnny was not wearing his helmet and was not harnessed in his wheelchair. [Id. at 7-8] After the October 24, 2011 fall, Johnny missed approximately six weeks of school.

Plaintiff's Complaint raises three causes of action: (1) violation of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-6, which waives the state's sovereign immunity for "damages resulting in bodily injury, wrongful death or property damagecaused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any building, public park, machinery, equipment or furnishings" against all Defendants; (2) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 against the school district; and (3) deprivation of due process of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants.

On May 10, 2013, Defendants filed Defendants' Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings and For Qualified Immunity and Memorandum in Support Thereof [Doc. 37]. In their Motion, Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), arguing that: (1) Plaintiff's Complaint states a claim for negligent supervision, negligent hiring or training, and negligence per se, all of which are barred by the New Mexico Tort Claims Act; (2) this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's New Mexico Tort Claims Act claim because Plaintiff failed to plead that tort claims notice had been provided to Defendants; (3) Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts in support of his disability discrimination claim; (4) Plaintiff's Section 504 and ADA claims are barred because they are duplicative of his Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) claim or, alternatively, because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; (5) Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim must fail because he was not deprived of a constitutionally protected property right; (6) Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for supervisory liability or failure to train under Section 1983; (7) Defendant Delgado should be dismissed because all claims against him are duplicative of the claims against the District; and (8) Defendants Mutz, Quintana and Cavazos are entitled to qualified immunity becausePlaintiff was not deprived of a constitutional right and, even if he was, the right was not clearly established. On June 17, 2013, this Court granted Defendants' unopposed motion to stay proceedings in the present case pending resolution of the qualified immunity issue. [Doc. 52]

On May 10, 2013, the parties also filed a Joint Motion to Consolidate and For Further Relief as Described Herein. [Doc. 34] In their joint motion, the parties seek to consolidate the present case with Plaintiff's IDEA appeal in Johnny S. v. Pojoaque Valley School District, et al., 13-CV-145 RHS/ACT, since the two cases involve common questions of law and fact, as well as common parties. However, on July 8, 2013, Plaintiff withdrew his consent to the joint motion. [Doc. 57] Plaintiff opposes consolidation because he does not want the stay imposed in the present case to delay proceedings on his administrative IDEA appeal.

II. STANDARD

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." "Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only when the moving party has clearly established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Sanders v. Mountain America Federal Credit Union, 689 F.3d 1138, 1141 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), the Court applies the standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000).

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law, and when considering and addressing a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, view those allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 2006). Further, in order to withstand a rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation omitted) (Iqbal). If a plaintiff cannot nudge the claims "across the line from conceivable to plausible," the complaint must be dismissed. Id. at 680.

In handing down Twombly, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the longstanding rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The Conley standard has proved problematic over the years because it suggests that "a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might...