Johnny Shane Chadwell v. Ohio State Racing Commission

Decision Date30 September 1999
Docket Number99AP-275,99-LW-4416
PartiesJohnny Shane Chadwell, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Ohio State Racing Commission, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Johnny Shane Chadwell, pro se.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Matthew L. Westerman for appellee.

OPINION

DESHLER J.

This is an appeal by appellant, Johnny Shane Chadwell, from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting appellee's motion to dismiss for failure to file a timely appeal.

By order mailed August 25, 1998, appellee, the Ohio State Racing Commission ("commission"), denied appellant's application for a 1997 thoroughbred owner's license. On September 11, 1998, appellant filed a notice of appeal with the trial court from the commission's order.

On September 17, 1998, the commission filed a motion to dismiss asserting that appellant had failed to timely file a notice of appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12. On September 28, 1998, appellant filed a response to the commission's motion to dismiss.

By decision filed February 23, 1999, the trial court granted the commission's motion to dismiss. The decision of the trial court was journalized by judgment entry filed on March 18, 1998.

On appeal, appellant, pro se, sets forth the following "grounds for appeal," which we construe as his single assignment of error:

Appellant, Johnny Shane Chadwell, Pro Se, respectfully submits to this Court that Judge Richard S. Sheward's erred in granting Appellee's MOTION TO DISMISS filed September 17, 1998, case number 98CVF-09-7091, in that that ruling was not consistent with the evidence, argument presented and law.

The commission has filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that appellant has not submitted a brief in compliance with the scheduling orders of this court. In response, appellant has filed a motion to deny appellee's motion to dismiss.

In the present case, the trial court, in its decision granting the commission's motion to dismiss, noted that the commission's order denying appellant's application for a 1997 thoroughbred owner's license was mailed on August 25, 1998. The court further noted that "[i]t is undisputed that the Appellant filed his notice of appeal with the Ohio State Racing Commission and with this court on September 11, 1998." The court, citing the language of R.C. 119.12, held that appellant's failure to file his appeal within fifteen days constituted a jurisdictional defect which deprived the court of the ability to consider the appeal.

R.C. 119.12 provides in pertinent part:

Any party desiring to appeal shall file a notice of appeal with the agency setting forth the order appealed from and the grounds of the party's appeal. A copy of such notice of appeal shall also be filed by the appellant with the court. Unless otherwise provided by law relating to a particular agency, such notices of appeal shall be filed within fifteen days after the mailing of the notice of the agency's order as provided in this section.

In its decision, the trial court properly held that the filing requirements of R.C. 119.12 are jurisdictional. See, e.g., Williams v. Drabik (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d 295, 296 (failure to file notice of appeal within fifteen days after mailing of notice of adjudication order as set forth in R.C. 119.12 deprives court of jurisdiction "to do anything other than dismiss the appeal"); Harrison v . Ohio State Med. Bd. (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 317, 321 ("It is well settled that the failure to file a notice of appeal with the appropriate agency within the fifteen-day limit provided for in R.C.119.12 is a jurisdictional defect").

Appellant does not dispute that his notice of appeal was filed beyond the fifteen-day time period required under R.C. 119.12. Appellant argues, however, that his wife, who received the commission's mailing of the notice of its order on August 29, 1998, was required to pay part of the postage. Appellant contends that, because proper postage was not affixed until his wife paid the amount due on August 29, the notice should not be considered mailed until that time. In support, appellant relies on Sun Refining & Marketing Co. v. Brennan (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 306.

In Sun, the Ohio Supreme Court held in pertinent part that:

*** [T]he fifteen-day appeal period in R.C.119.12 does not commence to run until the agency whose order is being appealed fully complies with the procedural requirements set forth in R.C. 119.09. Were we to hold otherwise, it is conceivable that an affected party could lose its right to appeal before receiving notice of an agency's decision, and thereby be deprived of its due process rights. Id. at 309.

We find appellant's reliance on Sun to be unpersuasive, as that case is distinguishable from the instant action. Under the facts of Sun, the agency failed to serve a party with a certified copy of its decision by certified mail, return receipt requested, as specifically required under R.C. 119.09. Rather, the agency only sent a copy to the party's attorney. This court has previously noted, in considering the holding in Sun, that if a party "is not even sent a copy of the agency's order from which the party may wish to appeal, due process is not satisfied." Tandon v. Ohio State Medical Bd (Sept. 30, 1996), Franklin App. No. 96APE04-436, unreported (1996 Opinions 3970, 3976). However, the due process concerns in Sun are not present in the instant case. Appellant does not contend that he failed to receive a certified copy of the...

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