Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton
Decision Date | 12 April 1971 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 15098. |
Citation | 326 F. Supp. 250 |
Parties | The JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY v. James M. HUTTON, Jr., et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
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John Henry Lewin, Edmund P. Dandridge, Jr., and Venable, Beatjer & Howard, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.
John A. Wilson, Michael J. DeSantis and Shearman & Sterling, New York City, and John F. King, Baltimore, Md., for defendants.
This seven count action was instituted by Hopkins in 1963. Five years later, after protracted and extensive discovery had been engaged in by both sides, this Court granted Hopkins' motion for summary judgment under the first count stated by Hopkins pursuant to Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the '33 Act). Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 297 F.Supp. 1165 (D.Md.1968). The Fourth Circuit, on appeal, held that "genuine issues of material fact precluded the entry of summary judgment on the issue raised by Hutton's plea of the statute of limitations" but that "on all other issues, the district court correctly entered summary judgment for Hopkins." Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1126 (4th Cir. 1970).1 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit "affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion." 422 F.2d, supra at 1132.
In its earlier opinion, this Court wrote (297 F.Supp., supra at 1172-1173):
Following the remand of this case by the Fourth Circuit to this Court, Hopkins pressed its claims for summary judgment, as to liability only, under the second,2 third,3 and fifth counts.4
Additionally, both sides have presented their respective contentions concerning standards applicable in connection with the determination of damages under one or more of the counts.5
Further, Hopkins has also filed motions to strike Hutton's demand for a jury trial under Count I (the Section 12(2) count) and to sever that count for separate trial.
While the earlier opinions in this case of the Fourth Circuit and of this Court were written in the context of Hopkins' Section 12(2) summary judgment motion, and not in the context of Hopkins' current 10b-3, 10b-5 and 17(a) motions, the underlying findings of fact previously made by this Court and approved by the Fourth Circuit provide the factual underpinnings for determination of those issues which are raised by Hopkins' pending summary judgment motions. After review and reconsideration of the record to date, this Court declines, as suggested by Hutton, to revise, and also declines, as suggested by Hopkins, to amplify, any of its earlier factual determinations.
The elements of the three counts, brought under 10(b) and 17(a), are almost identical. Many of those elements are also substantially similar to comparable elements in the 12(2) cause of action. Thus, Hutton violated Rules 10b-3 and 10b-5 and Section 10(b) of the purchase of the production payment (297 F.Supp., supra at 1220-1222; 422 F.2d, supra at 1129).
Under Section 12(2) of the '33 Act, the burden is upon the defendant to prove that "he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known" of the false or misleading nature of the misstatement or omission upon which liability under that section is alleged. In actions under Sections 10(b) of the '34 Act and 17(a) of the '33 Act, the element of scienter must be proved by the plaintiff. Sitting by designation in this Court as a District Judge in Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F.Supp. 128 (D.Md.1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969),9 cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037, 90 S.Ct. 681, 24 L.Ed.2d 681 (1970), Judge Winter noted (at 139):
* * * Numerous authorities have discussed the quantum of proof to sustain a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 and how a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 differs from a cause of action for common law fraud. * * *
After reviewing the authorities, Judge Winter concluded (at 140):
* * * In the view of the Court, Rule 10b-5 should be so construed to give effect to its remedial purpose and the remedial purpose of the Act under which it was adopted. S. E. C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195, 84 S.Ct. 275, 11 L.Ed.2d 237 (1963). It follows that proof of common law fraud is not required to sustain a cause of action under Rule 10b-5.
In Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913, 90 S.Ct. 913, 25 L. Ed.2d 93 (1970), a case involving both 10b-5 and 17(a), the Second Circuit, in approving the District Court's jury charge, wrote:
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