Johns v. Housing Auth. for City of Douglas

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Johnson
• Citation: Johns v. Housing Auth. for City of Douglas, 678 S.E.2d 571, 297 Ga. App. 869 (Ga. App. 2009)
• Decision Date: 14 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. A09A0873.,A09A0873.
• Parties: JOHNS v. HOUSING AUTHORITY FOR the CITY OF DOUGLAS.

678 S.E.2d 571

297 Ga. App. 869

JOHNS v. HOUSING AUTHORITY FOR the CITY OF DOUGLAS.

No. A09A0873.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

May 14, 2009.

Brown & Scoccimaro, Jimmie H. Brown, Francis L. Morris Jr., Albany, for appellant.

Brown, Readdick, Bumgartner, Carter, Strickland & Watkins, Terry L. Readdick, Steven G. Blackerby, Brunswick, John T. Croley, Jr., Fitzgerald, for appellee.

JOHNSON, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment to the landlord in a premises liability action.

Tracy Johns rented an apartment from the Housing Authority for the City of Douglas. After Johns moved into her apartment, she placed an air conditioner window unit in her kitchen window. The unit did not fill the entire width of the window, so Johns placed a piece of cardboard in the space to fill the gap. One night, a man forcibly entered Johns' apartment and assaulted, battered and raped her. Afterward, Johns discovered that the cardboard she had placed in the window was gone, and the air conditioner unit had been moved to the side. Johns concluded that the intruder had gotten in by removing the cardboard, shoving the air conditioner unit to the side, and reaching through the opening to unlock the adjacent back door. There is no evidence indicating how the assailant entered the apartment complex, or whether he was on the grounds as a resident, guest, or trespasser.

Johns sued the Housing Authority, claiming it breached its duty of care to keep its tenants safe. According to Johns, the Housing Authority should have repaired a hole in the fence surrounding the complex, provided better exterior lighting in common areas, and improved its security patrols of the complex.

The Housing Authority moved for summary judgment asserting, among other things, that there was no evidence that anything it did or failed to do caused Johns' injuries. To support its motion for summary judgment, the Housing Authority pointed to: the lack of evidence showing that any of the allegedly unsafe conditions presented by its failure to repair the fence or increase common area lighting or security patrols proximately caused the attack; evidence that Johns had equal or superior knowledge of the allegedly unsafe conditions; and evidence that the unsafe condition that actually allowed the assailant to enter her apartment (i.e., the manner in which she installed the air conditioner window unit) was created by Johns.

In response, and to support Johns' claim that the Housing Authority had a duty to protect her from the third-party criminal attack because it knew the neighborhood was dangerous, Johns pointed to police reports for the area in which the complex is located for the five years preceding the attack— there were "more than fifty (50) stranger to stranger crimes that were investigated in and around the complex in the preceding five year period."¹ As proof that the Housing Authority breached its duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of its tenants, Johns pointed to evidence that it failed to repair the hole in the fence, improve exterior lighting in the common areas or improve security patrols of the complex. The trial court granted the Housing Authority's motion. We affirm.

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must give the opposing party the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and the evidence and all inferences and conclusions therefrom must be construed most favorably toward the party opposing the motion. When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, this Court conducts a de novo review of the law and the evidence.²

In order to make a claim for negligence in Georgia, a plaintiff must show: (1) a legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm; (2) a breach of this standard; (3) a legally attributable causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) loss or damage to plaintiff's legally protected interest.³

The general rule regarding premises liability is that a landlord does not insure a tenant's safety against third-party criminal attacks, and that any liability from such attacks must be predicated on a breach of duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.⁴ A landlord's duty to exercise ordinary care to protect a tenant against third-party criminal attacks extends only to foreseeable criminal acts.⁵ "Knowledge of a dangerous condition giving rise to the incident is necessary in order to show the existence of even an initial duty to provide preventive security measures for this type of attack."⁶ The incident causing injury to the plaintiff must be substantially similar in type to the previous criminal activities occurring on or near the premises so that a reasonable person would take ordinary precautions to protect his tenants against the risk posed by that type of activity.⁷

Even if we were to agree with Johns that the attack in her apartment was foreseeable based on other crimes in the area, that the Housing Authority therefore had a duty to improve security in the complex, and that the Housing Authority...