Johnsen v. Collins

• Citation: 875 F. Supp. 1571
• Decision Date: 22 November 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 493-225.
• Parties: Leslie K. JOHNSEN, Plaintiff, v. Marcus E. COLLINS, Sr., Individually and in his capacity as State Revenue Commissioner, and the State of Georgia, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

875 F. Supp. 1571

Leslie K. JOHNSEN, Plaintiff, v. Marcus E. COLLINS, Sr., Individually and in his capacity as State Revenue Commissioner, and the State of Georgia, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 493-225.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division.

November 22, 1994.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Wayne Lee Durden, David Royce Smith, Brannen Searcy & Smith, Robert L. Jenkins, Savannah, GA, for Leslie K. Johnsen.

Michael J. Bowers, Daniel M. Formby, Atlanta, GA, Harold David Melton, State Law Dept., Atlanta, GA, for Marcus E. Collins, Sr., State of Ga.

ORDER

EDENFIELD, District Judge.

Plaintiff brought suit for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, and costs against Defendant Collins and the State of Georgia. Plaintiff argues that the State's automobile title transfer fee provision, O.C.G.A. § 40-3-21.1, institutes an unconstitutional tax on new residents. Although not explicitly stated as such in the complaint, the Court construes this action as one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action that was subsequently converted to a motion for summary judgment by order of this Court on March 7, 1994. Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification and a cross-motion for summary judgment, as well. Because doctrines of sovereign immunity, comity, and federal statutory law prevent the Court from hearing Plaintiff's claims, those claims are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. Background

The facts in this case are undisputed and are essentially as follows:

The State of Georgia began collecting an automobile "title transfer fee" on May 1, 1992, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 40-3-21.1. That statute provides in part:

(a) When a certificate of title is issued for a motor vehicle that, at the time of applying for a certificate of title, is and has been titled in another state or country, a fee shall be levied of a minimum of $40.00 and a maximum of $200.00. The fee shall be based on the value of the vehicle as published in a schedule compiled by the state revenue commissioner; provided, however, that the maximum fee shall apply to all vehicles with a fair market value in excess of $25,000.00. Persons who have paid an equivalent fee on such motor vehicle in the state of origin within 90 days of applying for a new certificate of title in this state shall receive a credit against the fee due under this subsection.

Plaintiff Johnsen moved to Georgia on July 9, 1993, with two automobiles. Upon arrival she applied for certification for one of them and was informed of the transfer fee. She paid it, but later filed suit in state and federal court, alleging various constitutional infirmities with the transfer fee provision.

The parties stipulate that Florida's recently defunct "impact fee" statute, Fla.Stat. § 319.231,¹ was a model for Georgia's transfer fee provision, and that the proceeds of the transfer fee are paid into the general fund of the Georgia State Treasury. See Ga. Rules & Reg. at XXX-XX-XX.04.

The Court is satisfied that the fee is a tax for purposes of constitutional analysis. See generally Gunby v. Yates, 214 Ga. 17, 19, 102 S.E.2d 548 (1958) ("A fee is a charge fixed by law as compensation for a public officer, while a tax is a forced contribution to the public needs of government."); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61, 56 S.Ct. 312, 317, 80 L.Ed. 477 (1936) ("A tax ... as used in the Constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the Government."). Plaintiff notes other provisions of the Georgia Code that already compensated the Motor Vehicle Division for its certification labors before implementation of the transfer fee. See O.C.G.A. § 40-3-38. The fee seems clearly designed to bolster State revenues.

The transfer fee implicates various provisions of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff claims that it hinders interstate trade in violation of the Commerce Clause of Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; restricts interstate travel in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. 4, § 2; deprives new residents of property in violation of the Due Process Clause of Amend. 14, § 1; and discriminates between nonresidents and residents in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of Amend. 14, § 1. Defendants respond that the State and Defendant Collins are immune from suit, prospective relief is barred by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, Plaintiff Johnsen lacks standing, the claims are moot, and the Court should abstain from deciding claims about vital state interests such as those implicated here.

The Court does not reach Plaintiff's constitutional claims, because it finds that the State's sovereign immunity deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over claims for retrospective relief, while comity concerns and federal law deprive it of jurisdiction over claims for prospective relief.

II. The Eleventh Amendment

The procedural and substantive issues in this "test case" have generated an impressive number of motions, briefs and response briefs, but the simple truth is that the State of Georgia has not consented to suit in federal court on this taxation issue.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

Although the express language of the amendment does not bar actions against a State by its own citizens, the United States Supreme Court has held that an unconsenting State is immune from lawsuits brought in federal court by its own citizens, as well. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 507, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). Plaintiff argues that this expansion of the Eleventh Amendment is historically controversial, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 292-93, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2947-48, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Hans), Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258-302, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3156-78, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (presenting a lengthy critique of modern Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence), but it is supported by approximately one hundred years of Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22, 10 S.Ct. 509, 33 L.Ed. 849 (1890); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 19 S.Ct. 269, 43 L.Ed. 535 (1899); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 20 S.Ct. 919, 44 L.Ed. 1140 (1900); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1907); Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32, 39 S.Ct. 16, 63 L.Ed. 108 (1918); Ex Parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 41 S.Ct. 588, 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 54 S.Ct. 18, 78 L.Ed. 145 (1933); Great Northern Life Ins. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 64 S.Ct. 873, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944); Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 72 S.Ct. 321, 96 L.Ed. 335 (1952); Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964); Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985). The Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar precluding all relief for private plaintiffs against unconsenting States at the federal level. See Pennhurst State Schl. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 907-08, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1983) ("This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought."); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91, 102 S.Ct. 2325, 2329, 72 L.Ed.2d 694 (1982) (refusing to construe the Court's decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) as having "limited the strictures of the Eleventh Amendment" to bar only suits seeking money damages); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27, 54 S.Ct. 18, 21, 78 L.Ed. 145 (1933) ("The amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and prosecuted by an individual against the state.").

As with most things legal, there are some exceptions. The State may expressly waive its immunity from suit, Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673, 94 S.Ct. at 1360-61, Congress may abrogate the States' immunity in certain circumstances, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976), and while Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state officers when "the state is the real, substantial party in interest," Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945), those officers can be enjoined from future unconstitutional conduct. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666-67, 94 S.Ct. at 1357-58; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). The instant case requires the Court to consider all three possibilities.

A. Waiver

The last time the Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction over a suit brought by a private citizen against a neighboring State, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793), the resulting "shock of surprise" led to the rapid proposal and adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325, 54 S.Ct. 745, 749, 78 L.Ed. 1282 (1934). That federalist outcry lingers throughout sovereign immunity jurisprudence: In order to waive its immunity from suit, a State's consent must be clearly, unequivocally expressed. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673, 94 S.Ct. at 1360-61. Waivers are narrowly construed and almost never implied. Further, a State's waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of its immunity in federal courts. See, e.g., Florida Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Florida Nursing Home Assoc., 450 U.S. 147, 150, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 1034-35, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981) (per curiam); Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464-65, 65 S.Ct. at 350-51; Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54, 64...