Johnson's Estate, In re, 55884

• Decision Date: 19 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 55884,55884
• Citation: 213 N.W.2d 536
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE of Dale Eugene JOHNSON, Deceased. Norma JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Beverly Sue JOHNSON, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Dale Eugene Johnson, Deceased, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 536

213 N.W.2d 536

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Dale Eugene JOHNSON, Deceased.

Norma JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Beverly Sue JOHNSON, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Dale Eugene Johnson, Deceased, Appellee.

No. 55884.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 19, 1973.

Charles F. Knudson, of Marcus, for appellant.

Miller, Miller & Miller, Cherokee, for appellee.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and RAWLINGS, LeGRAND, REES and REYNOLDSON, JJ.

REYNOLDSON, Justice.

This appeal requires us to resolve a controversy between Beverly Sue Johnson, a surviving spouse, and Norma Johnson, decedent's mother, over disposition of a settlement in a wrongful death action. The surviving spouse as administrator of the estate filed a petition in the probate proceeding for declaratory judgment, contending the total recovery was exempt property and belonged to her. The trial court so held, and we reverse.

In the proceeding below most of the facts were stipulated. The decedent, age 22, died intestate as a result of a truck accident on June 23, 1971. He left surviving him his spouse, and as sole heir, his mother. The spouse as administrator sued a third-party corporation to recover 'for loss of accumulations to decedent's estate and to recover the value of his services and support as the spouse of Beverly Sue Johnson.' The claim was settled for a net of $35,000.

Decedent, recently discharged from the Marine Corps, had accumulated very little. He earned an average salary as a truck driver, and had inherited an undivided interest in real estate.

It was further stipulated the surviving spouse became entitled to and had received payments under the Iowa Workmen's Compensation Act. Following the death claim settlement the compensation carrier asserted its subrogation rights. She refunded $3072 in payments already received, and future weekly compensation totaling $14,728 was terminated.

Trial court determined the wrongful death recovery was exempt property which passed to the surviving spouse pursuant to § 633.212(2), The Code. Nonetheless, it further determined that even if the recovery was not exempt, a reasonable division of the proceeds would be 80 percent to the surviving spouse for loss of support and 20 percent to the estate as loss of accumulations to decedent's estate.

The mother contends all of the wrongful death recovery must go into the estate by virtue of the plain language of § 633.336, The Code.

'When a wrongful act produces death, damages recovered therefor Shall be disposed of as personal property belonging to the estate of the deceased, but if the deceased leaves a spouse, child, or parent, it shall not be liable for the payment of debts of the estate, except debts and charges of the first, second, third and fifth classes.' (Emphasis supplied.)

As 'personal property belonging to the estate' the recovery, she asserts, is distributable to the surviving spouse and to her under the applicable provisions of § 633.212 and § 633.219, The Code.

The surviving spouse adroitly and forcefully argues a proper construction of several related statutes sustains the district court decision. First, she points out we have interpreted § 611.20, The Code ('All causes of action shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same') as a survival statute permitting the personal representative to sue for wrongful death damages. Because the administrator brings the action under this survival statute, decedent himself must have owned the claim for his wrongful death at the very moment of his demise. Carrying the resurrection hypothesis to its conclusion, the surviving spouse claims the proceeds of the wrongful death recovery thus passed to her as '* * * personal property that, at the time of death, was in the hands of the decedent as the head of a family, exempt from execution.' Section 633.212(2), The Code. It draws its character as a exempt property, she contends, from the second clause in § 633.336, quoted above, 'it shall not be liable for the payment of debts of the estate, except * * *.'

I. A year after the district court decree was entered in this cause, we filed Egan v. Naylor, 208 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1973). While the point at issue was not identical, we necessarily had to construe the same statutory provisions. What we there said, 208 N.W.2d at 918, is dispositive of this case:

'We believe a right of action which survives a decedent is created by § 611.20; the person who may bring it is designated by § 611.22; the measure of recovery as to a spouse and parent is fixed by § 613.15; and the distribution of damages recovered is determined by § 633.336. * * *

'* * * Since wrongful death damages are distributed like personal property in the estate, beneficiaries other than the spouse and children may receive substantial benefit from a recovery where the decedent dies testate. * * * It is anomalous that our statutes confer the right to recover for loss of services and support of a deceased spouse and parent on the decedent's estate rather than on those who incurred the loss. Since the question is legislative we are unable to fashion a judicial remedy.'

Had the Egan decision been available to these litigants and trial court, this appeal might not have surfaced to highlight the inequitable operation of the controlling statutes.

In addition to Egan...