Johnson v. American Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 December 1974
• Docket Number: 9041,Nos. 9040,s. 9040
• Parties: Georgia Ann JOHNSON, a minor, by George B. Johnson and Agnes M. Johnson, guardians of the person of the said minor, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant/Appellee. Fred LINGOHR et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant/Appellee. Civ.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 57

225 N.W.2d 57

Georgia Ann JOHNSON, a minor, by George B. Johnson and Agnes

M. Johnson, guardians of the person of the said minor, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant/Appellee.

Fred LINGOHR et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant/Appellee.

Civ. Nos. 9040, 9041.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Dec. 20, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), N.D.R.Civ.P.

2. The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the party opposing the motion will be given all favorable inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

3. Where questions of negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, proximate cause, and the standard of the reasonable man are in issue, even if there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts, if there is any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact, or if the evidence is subject to conflicting interpretations, there is a jury question and summary judgment is improper.

4. Every person is bound without contract to abstain from injuring the person or property of another or infringing upon any of his rights. Section 9--10--01, N.D.C.C.

5. Everyone is responsible not only for the result of his willful acts but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person. The extent of the liability in such cases is defined by Sections 32--03--01 to 32--03--19, inclusive. Section 9--10--06, N.D.C.C.

6. A manufacturer of goods has a duty to use reasonable care in the design of, in the materials used in, in the assembly of, and to inspect the goods to protect those who will use the goods from unreasonable risk of harm while the goods are being used for their intended purpose and while the goods are being used for any purpose which could be reasonably expected.

7. This court hereby adopts the rule of strict liability in tort, as set forth in § 402A, 2 Restatement of Torts 2d: 'Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer--(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.'

McGee, Hankla, Backes & Wheeler, Ltd., Minot, for plaintiffs/appellants George B. Johnson and Agnes M. Johnson.

Tidball, Kemnitz, Axtmann & Lovald, Pierre, S.D., for plaintiffs/appellants Fred Lingohr and Catherine Lingohr.

Pringle & Herigstad, Minot, for defendant/appellee.

KNUDSON, Judge.

This consolidated appeal is from orders of the district court of Ward County entering summary judgments on March 15, 1974, in favor of the defendant, American Motors Corporation (hereinafter AMC), in two cases arising out of an automobile collision on October 2, 1971. The appeals were briefed and argued together and will be resolved together in this opinion.

Peggy Ann Johnson was the operator of a 1960 Rambler station wagon in which Gloria Jean Lingohr was a passenger, when the car was struck from behind by a 1963 Cadillac operated by one Michael Coughlin. Immediately upon impact the Rambler burst into flames and its occupants were incinerated. A passenger in the Cadillac also died as a result of injuries received in the accident.

Georgia Ann Johnson, minor child of Peggy Ann Johnson, commenced a wrongful death action against Michael Coughlin and AMC, the manufacturer of the Rambler, for damages resulting from the wrongful death of her mother. Fred and Catherine Lingohr, the parents of Gloria Jean Lingohr, commenced a separate action against the same defendants for damages sustained by the heirs of Gloria Jean Lingohr's estate through her wrongful death. The civil actions against Michael Coughlin were settled and are not involved in this appeal. The gravamen of plaintiffs' allegations against AMC is that their decedent's deaths, due to incineration caused when the Rambler's gasoline tank ruptured and ignited upon impact, were due to AMC's negligent design of the vehicle.

The trial court granted AMC's motion for summary judgment in each case on grounds of the following conclusions of law:

'I.

'That there is no genuine issue as to any material facts.

'II.

'The question concerning the nature of the duty which an automobile manufacturer owes to users of its product presents an issue of law for the Court to determine.

'III.

'The manufacturer of a motor vehicle is not under a duty to make his automobile accident-proof or fool-proof.

'IV.

'The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may occur.

'V.

'That as a matter of law, the Defendant, American Motors Corporation is entitled to a Summary Judgment for dismissal of the Plaintiff's complaint.'

This appeal requires a determination of whether the cases were properly disposed of by summary judgment.

Rule 56(c), North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that:

'. . . (Summary) Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . .'

'A material fact is one of such a nature as will affect the result or outcome of the case depending upon its resolution.' Rathbun v. W. T. Grant Company, 219 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn.1974).

We have held that to be entitled to entry of summary judgment in his favor the movant must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

'Under N.D.R.Civ.P. Rule 56 the movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the party opposing the motion will be given all favorable inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.' Syllabus 3, Wolff v. Light, 156 N.W.2d 175 (N.D.1968).

See also, Luithle v. Taverna, 214 N.W.2d 117 (N.D.1973).

This is a heavy burden in any case in which negligence is alleged.

Wolff v. Light, Supra, was an action for injuries sustained by plaintiff police officer in attempting to remove a piece of jagged glass from a cafe window broken by the defendant's automobile. This Court (Teigen, C.J., and Strutz, J., dissenting) reversed a summary judgment for the defendant, holding in Syllabus 2 that:

'In cases involving issues of negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk and proximate cause, where the standard of the reasonable man must be applied to conflicting testimony, and even where there is no dispute as to the facts, Where inferences may be reasonably drawn from the evidence that indicate the presence of a genuine issue of fact, summary judgment should not be granted, but these issues should be tried in the usual manner.' (Emphasis added.)

In the instant case, there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts, I.e., that the plaintiffs' decedents were riding in a Rambler automobile manufactured by the defendant; that the automobile was involved in a rear end collision with another automobile; that immediately upon impact the Rambler burst into flames; and that the plaintiffs' decedents died as a result of incineration. This does not, however, negative the existence of an issue of fact. From these evidentiary facts, differing inferences may reasonably be drawn. One inference that could reasonably be drawn is that AMC had so designed and constructed the automobile it manufactured as to subject passengers in it to an unreasonable risk of harm from a foreseeable consequence of putting the automobile to its intended purpose. Another inference that could reasonably be drawn is that the collision was of such force that no steps AMC might have taken in the design and construction of this automobile would have prevented the harm that resulted. Since these differing inferences could reasonably be drawn and the adoption of one or the other would affect the outcome of the case, there is a 'genuine issue as to any material fact' and the cases should have been tried.

'It is only where it is perfectly clear that there are no issues in the case that a summary judgment is proper. Even in cases where the judge is of the opinion that he will have to direct a verdict for one party or the other on the issues that have been raised, he should ordinarily hear the evidence and direct the verdict rather than attempt to try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment, which was never intended to enable parties to evade jury trial or have the judge weigh evidence in advance of its being presented.' Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910, 915 (4th Cir. 1951).

'But there are some instances in which it may appear that even if the facts are as plaintiff asserts them to be, there still can be no recovery and the entry of summary judgment for defendant is proper.

It bears repeating, however, that even when there is no dispute as to the facts, it usually is for the jury to decide whether the conduct in question meets the...