Johnson v. Armfield, 22597.

• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota
• Citation: 672 N.W.2d 478,2003 SD 134
• Docket Number: No. 22597.,22597.
• Parties: Stacia Marie JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ervin Floyd ARMFIELD, Defendant and Appellee.
• Decision Date: 25 November 2003

672 N.W.2d 478
2003 SD 134

Stacia Marie JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Ervin Floyd ARMFIELD, Defendant and Appellee

No. 22597.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs August 25, 2003.

Decided November 25, 2003.

672 N.W.2d 480

Scott A. Abdallah and Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Johnson, Heidepriem, Miner, Marlow & Janklow, L.L.P., Sioux Falls, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellant

Michael L. Luce of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz and Smith, Sioux Falls, Attorney for defendant and appellee.

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] Stacia Marie Johnson (Johnson) brought a claim for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident against Ervin Floyd Armfield (Armfield). Armfield admitted his own negligence but claimed that Johnson's negligence had contributed to the accident. After a three-day trial, a jury denied all of Johnson's personal injury claims, and Johnson now appeals. Because we believe there was insufficient evidence to justify submitting the issue of contributory negligence to the jury, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

[¶ 2.] On the morning of November 16, 1999, Johnson was driving her 1995 Chevrolet Cavalier north along Southeastern Drive in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The weather was clear and there was little traffic. Johnson, a graduate of Augustana College currently working as a dental assistant, had the day off and was returning home from her parents' house. Her route took her past the Avera McKennan Wellness Center, located on the east side of Southeastern Drive.

[¶ 3.] As Johnson passed the Wellness Clinic, a Jeep driven by Armfield, a retired military paratrooper and commercial printer, exited the Wellness Clinic driveway, crossed two lanes of traffic, and struck the passenger side of Johnson's vehicle. Armfield testified that he had checked both left and right before pulling out onto Southeastern Drive. Seeing no oncoming cars, Armfield falsely believed he could safely pull out onto the street. The resulting collision knocked Johnson's vehicle into a ditch on the west side of the street. Johnson's vehicle was totaled and the front end of Armfield's Jeep was crushed. After the accident, Johnson sought medical treatment for several injuries including whiplash and a serious ankle injury.

[¶ 4.] Johnson subsequently brought a claim for personal injuries arising out of the accident. Recognizing that he had a duty to yield to oncoming traffic, Armfield admitted his own negligence. Armfield, however, argued that Johnson had been speeding at the time of the accident and asserted the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. Armfield also contested the extent and nature of the injuries claimed by Johnson.

[¶ 5.] The trial lasted for three days. During the settlement of jury instructions, Johnson argued that the issue of contributory negligence should not go to the jury because no evidence had been offered to suggest she had been speeding at the time of the accident. The trial court overruled this objection and proceeded to submit the contributory negligence instruction to the jury.

[¶ 6.] The jury returned a verdict in favor of Armfield and denied any recovery for Johnson. The trial court also denied Johnson's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and motion for a new trial. Johnson appeals and raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it submitted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury.

672 N.W.2d 481

2. Whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that a violation of the speed limit by Johnson constituted contributory negligence without reference to the element of proximate cause

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 7.] Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in determining how to instruct a jury. State v. Pellegrino, 1998 SD 39, ¶ 9, 577 N.W.2d 590, 594 (citations omitted). Therefore, "[i]f an issue before the court is `supported by competent evidence in the record, the trial court should instruct the jury.'" Artz v. Meyers, 1999 SD 156, ¶ 8, 603 N.W.2d 532, 534 (quoting Kuper v. Lincoln-Union Elec. Co., 1996 SD 145, ¶ 32, 557 N.W.2d 748, 758). A claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish contributory negligence is viewed "in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict." Parker v. Casa Del Rey, 2002 SD 29, ¶ 5, 641 N.W.2d 112, 115 (quoting Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 201, 205 N.W.2d 104, 106 (1973)).

[¶ 8.] As...