Johnson v. Asbury Park Press, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 April 1936
• Citation: 184 A. 518
• Parties: JOHNSON v. ASBURY PARK PRESS, Inc., et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

184 A. 518

JOHNSON

v. ASBURY PARK PRESS, Inc., et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County.

April 27, 1936.

Action at law by Leonard Johnson against Asbury Park Press, Inc., and others. On defendants' motion to strike reply.

Motion granted.

Lester C. Leonard, of Newark, for the motion.

Roger M. Yancey, of Newark, and Robert S. Hartgrove, of Jersey City, opposed.

LAWRENCE, Supreme Court Commissioner.

This is a suit resulting from an alleged libelous publication relating to plaintiff. The article complained of appeared in the issue of the Asbury Park Press of March 7, 1934. The defendant in question moves to strike the reply to its answer on the ground that it is frivolous. The answer, in addition to the defenses, pleads the new statute of limitations (P.L. 1934, p. 287, ch. 98 [N.J.St. Annual 1934, § 119—22b]), in bar. It is as follows:

"An Act limiting the time for the bringing of civil actions for libel or slander.

"Be it Enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

"1. Every civil action for libel or slander shall be commenced and sued within one year next after the publication of the alleged libel or slander, and not thereafter.

"2. This act shall take effect immediately.

"Approved April 30, 1934."

Plaintiff's reply denies the application of this statute, asserting that his cause of action arose prior to its enactment, that it is not retroactive, and since the state of the law, as generally recognized, prior to the approval of the new act, limited suits for libel, as in cases of slander, to two years, the present action was brought within such period and is not consequently controlled by the new act. Counsel for defendant argues that plaintiff had a reasonable time within which to bring his suit, but failed to do so, with the result that the bar of the statute is applicable. He invokes the rule that "statutes of limitation affecting existing rights are not unconstitutional, if a reasonable time is given for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect. * * * The legislature may change [the form of action or mode of remedy] at its discretion, provided adequate means of enforcing the right remain." Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 24 L.Ed. 365. In New Jersey the rule appears to have been applied, with the accent that it is essential that all statutes of limitation which affect existing rights and remedies shall allow a reasonable time after they take effect for the commencement of suits upon such causes of action. Marston v. Seabury, 3 N.J.Law, 435; Smith's Ex'rs v. Tucker, 17 N.J.Law, 82; Vreeland v. Town of Bergen, 34 N.J.Law, 438, at page 441; Warshung v. Hunt, 47 N.J.Law, 256, affirmed 48 N.J.Law, 613, 9 A. 199; and Barnaby v. Bradley & Currier Co., 60 N.J. Law, 158, 37 A. 764.

Ordinarily statutes, unless the contrary intent clearly appears, are not to begiven retrospective operation (Borger v. Board of Free-Holders, 180 A. 495, 13 N.J. Misc. 676, 678), but the rule is not applicable where the right to sue is not affected and only the remedy involving the time within which the action must be brought is the subject of the legislation (Lapsley, Adm'x, v. Public Service Corporation, 75 N.J.Law, 266, 68 A. 1113; Bretthauer, Adm'r, v. Jacobson, 79 N.J.Law, 223 at page 225, 75 A. 560).

It is to be observed that until the new act there was no special legislation limiting the time within which a suit for libel was required to be brought. There was as to words. Rev. 1877, p. 594, as amended, P.L. 1896, p. 119; section 3 of an act for the limitation of actions, 3 Comp.St. 1910, p. 3164, § 3. See, also, section 1, ante, p. 3162, excepting actions for slander from the six-year period. As libel and slander at common law sounded in tort and were in form actions on the case (37 C.J. 16, § 310), it has been generally supposed that the act limiting suits for slander also applies to those for libel, although this is said not to be necessarily so (C.J., supra, § 314). No case was cited on the argument of the present motion, however, in an appellate court here discussing the subject.

It may...